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ABSTRACTS

National Security Advice to U.S. Presidents: Some Lessons from Thirty Years

By I. M. DESTLER

Since 1947 the major formal institution for channeling national security advice to Presidents has been the National Security Council. The Council has operated (1) as a forum where senior officials meet with the President; (2) as a focal point for formal policy planning and decision processes; and (3) as an umbrella for establishment of a Presidential foreign policy staff. The first was the goal of its proponents; the last is what it has most importantly become. But the N.S.C. has reflected the relationships among each administration's top officials more than it has shaped them; hence the need to think of broader advisory "systems" combining the formal and the informal. Among the variables shaping such systems are: a President's particular organizational sense; his attitude toward formality and regularity; whether he has (and wants) strong Cabinet officials; how his key advisers work out their role relationships and jurisdictional boundaries; how widely he casts his net for advce; how broad a range of substantive issue involvement he seeks; how much he seeks operational involvement; and his attitude toward divided counsel and interpersonal conflict.

Prescriptions about foreign policy advisory systems tend to stress the President's role as decision maker; they should focus also on the oft-competing role of effective Presidential leadership in getting policies and decisions executed. The importance of execution argues for giving the Secretary of State primacy over other advisers; the need to protect the President's decision authority argues for a White House assistant independent of the Secretary, though perhaps with reduced rank. Presidents also need better advice on the domestic politics of U.S. foreign policy, and each could profit from a "mid-term system review" after his institutions and advisory relationships have taken shape.

A Zonal Analysis Model for Comparative Politics: A Partial Soviet Application

By J. B. BRUCE and R. W. CLAWSON

Improved analysis of the Soviet and communist political systems requires a greater effort to locate that enterprise in the mainstream of comparative political inquiry. Toward this end the article (1) surveys Soviet and Western political process similarities and differences and identifies consequent conceptual implications; (2) introduces a model for comparative politics built in part from political process similarities evident in both Soviet and Western systems; and (3) reports a case study involving a partial application of the zonal model using Soviet political data. The comparative model integrates micro-, intermediate-, and macro-level zones of analysis as research foci and operational variables for empirical testing and generation of theory. The case study —the politics of Soviet industrial reform, 1962–1965—examines the relationship between two analytic zones, and concludes that changes in both the process and the content of economic interest articulation were strongly associated with prior changes in Soviet policy making.

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Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: The Dynamics of Political Autonomy and Military Intervention

By C. B. JONES

Most Western observers have concluded that in the conflicts between the U.S.S.R. and the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, the Soviets resorted to military intervention only when certain ideological or strategic issues were at stake. This study suggests that in the conflicts between the leaders of the CPSU and the leaders of the Communist Parties of Yugoslavia, Poland, Albania, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia there was only one real issue at stake: control over the local East European party. The adversaries in these struggles have been Muscovite factions dependent on Soviet support and ultimately loyal to Moscow, and domestic factions seeking to base their rule on genuine popular support. What determined whether the Soviets intervened militarily was not the ideological or strategic issue publicly raised by the Soviets, but whether the domestic faction had demonstrated to Moscow the capacity and will to mobilize its country for armed resistance against the Soviets.

Politics in the Post-Military State: Some Reflections on the Pakistani Experience

By G. A. HEEGER

The possibilities of an end to military rule in developing states and of a postmilitary era in these states have only recently started to receive some consideration. In general, movement away from military control of politics is perceived as a matter of choice on the part of military elites and as a question of gradually expanding participation so as not to outstrip the slow accrual of extrabureaucratic power. Pakistan's experiences since 1971 suggest another pattern of transition from military-dominated to civilian-dominated politics. Pakistan has been characterized by suddenly expanded participation and by the new civilian leadership's use of demobilization and patrimonial strategies to curtail this participation. Such strategies, patrimonialism in particular, have "de-developmental" consequences for the political system.

Of Syllabi, Texts, Students, and Scholarship in International Relations: Some Data and Interpretations on the State of a Burgeoning Field

By J. N. ROSENAU, G. GARTIN, E. P. McCLAIN, D. STINZIANO, R. STODDARD, and D. SWANSON

Based on a content analysis of 2,915 paragraphs randomly selected from 26 introductory international relations (IR) textbooks and syllabi for 178 introductory IR courses given in the United States during 1972–1973, the article probes the dimensions of world politics to which undergraduate students are introduced, the analytic skills to which they are exposed, and the incentives with which they are provided for investigating the subject. It was found that no single text dominates the teaching of IR; that the available texts do not differ greatly in their coverage and emphases (though some exceptions were identified along a few dimensions); that they depict IR as state-centered and founded on conflict; and that they are not conspicuous in their effort to equip students with modern analytic skills or to motivate them to view IR as an exciting subject worthy of intense and careful investigation.

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NOTICE TO OUR READERS

Thirtieth Anniversary Issue

October 1978 will mark the 30th anniversary of the initial appearance of WORLD POLITICS. Through the years, the study of international relations and national development has evolved in a series of changing emphases on conceptual approaches, subject matter, and analytical techniques. The editors believe that the 30th anniversary of the journal provides an appropriate opportunity to encourage an evaluation of the themes and methods developed over the past generation, and in particular a discussion of those that seem most promising for the years ahead. They therefore would like to mark this occasion by devoting all or part of an issue to papers concerned with a critique of and the outlook for research trends in international relations and national development.

The editors have chosen to open the proposed anniversary issue to all prospective contributors rather than to commission papers for this purpose. They invite the submission of manuscripts that focus on broad retrospective and prospective views of the study of world politics. Papers received in response to this invitation will be given priority, but must conform to our regular rules and will be handled under normal editorial procedures. Manuscripts submitted for the anniversary issue should be so marked; they should be received before October 1, 1977, and should preferably be no longer than 10,000 words, including footnotes.

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NATIONAL SECURITY ADVICE TO U.S. PRESIDENTS:

Some Lessons from Thirty Years

By I. M. DESTLER*

IN large part, Presidents determine the range and quality of advice that they get. They choose their principal officials. They decide day-by-day, personally or through chosen aides, which of these officials will get into the Oval Office, how often, in what contexts. Their styles and preferences also do much to shape the sorts of advice that will reach them from further down in the government, and from people outside it. Clark Clifford once characterized the executive branch as "like a chameleon," taking its color from "the character and personality of the President";[1] certainly this is true of its senior levels. As Dean Rusk noted, "the real organization of government at higher echelons" is "how confidence flows down from the President."[2]

Yet, notwithstanding their power in shaping it, Presidents are sometimes frustrated by the advice they receive. Kennedy had his Bay of Pigs, of which he noted later—with less than full accuracy—that "the advice of every member of the executive branch brought in to advise was unanimous—and the advice was wrong."[3] Johnson pulled back from the multilateral force, but was moved to denounce his advisers vehemently for the counsel which had nearly won the day.[4] Each President may indeed have determined the advice he got by how he handled the issue and how he handled his advisers, but neither did so with that particular outcome in mind; each was shaken by what his advisory system had wrought. And even when Presidents pronounce themselves satisfied, large numbers of citizens may not be. They may find their President isolated from objective analysis and national sentiment (Cambodia), or caught up in an "inside" set of values and ex-

* An earlier version of this essay was presented at the Princeton University Conference on Presidential Advising, October 31–November 1, 1975. I am grateful to Fred I. Greenstein, Carl Kaysen, Alexander George, and Robert H. Johnson for their helpful critical comments on that draft.

[1] Clifford, "The Presidency As I Have Seen It," in Emmet John Hughes, *The Living Presidency* (New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan 1973), 315.

[2] Quoted in *Life*, January 17, 1969, p. 62B.

[3] Quoted in Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row 1965), 305.

[4] On the MLF decision, see Philip Geyelin, *Lyndon B. Johnson and the World* (New York: Praeger 1966), chap. 7; and John Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974), esp. chap. 9.

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pectations that says more about himself and his advisers than it does about the world they seek to shape (Vietnam escalation as seen through the *Pentagon Papers*; Watergate as seen through the Nixon tapes).

How Presidents get what advice, then, is an important if difficult subject for analysis. It is important in all areas of national policy. It is particularly important in the sphere alternatively labelled "national security" or "foreign" policy. Many Americans rightly reject the standard cold war belief that foreign policy *ought* always to have primacy over domestic. But it continues to receive priority attention from Presidents. There are enduring reasons—the President's particular constitutional authority and responsibility in foreign affairs; the absence of some of the domestic political constraints that affect other spheres; the opportunity to build a statesman's reputation among current voters and future historians alike; the fact that foreign policy remains, in Kennedy's oft-quoted words, the sphere where a mistake "can kill us."[5]

Presidents seek foreign policy advice from many sources. Much of it comes from persons outside of the executive branch—Congressional leaders whose judgment Presidents value or whose support they need; outside experts on specialized subjects; establishment "wise men" like the Senior Informal Advisory Group that urged Lyndon Johnson to change course on Vietnam in March 1968. Formal external advisory bodies also exist on such subjects as intelligence, arms control, and information policy. Presidents get reams of unsolicited advice as well—from policy critics motivated by strong substantive convictions and/or partisan political interest; from foreign leaders; from interest groups with particular economic stakes; from newspaper editorials and columnists.

Without denying the impact of advice from other sources, however, this essay will focus largely on advice provided by officials and institutions within the executive branch. It is such inside advice that any President gets the most of, and that responds most directly to particular problems as he must deal with them. It is, by all evidence, what influences Presidents most, most of the time, when they make particular foreign policy decisions. Too great a dependence upon senior administration insiders can cost a President dearly, particularly if these insiders are insensitive to broader national political currents. Yet, as Joseph Kraft noted ten years ago, the size and complexity of modern government have sharply limited the advisory influence of outsiders compared to the "trained intellectual bureaucrat" who is there, inside the govern-

[5] Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1965), 426.

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ment, to push his objective hour by hour, day by day.[6] In foreign affairs, official secrecy gives further advantages to insiders.

Every postwar President has gotten most of his inside national security advice from the occupants of some or all of a handful of senior line and staff positions: the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Treasury; the Presidential Assistant (entitled *Special* Assistant until 1969) for National Security Affairs; the Chiefs of Staff of the military services (particularly the Chairman of the J.C.S.); and the Director of Central Intelligence. Important policy advice has also flowed from general White House policy aides like Clark Clifford for Truman, Theodore Sorensen for Kennedy, and Bill Moyers for Johnson, and from trusted political advisers like Attorneys General Robert Kennedy in 1961–1963 and John Mitchell during the early Nixon years. Some Presidents have given a regular hearing to sub-Cabinet officials in the State Department; the Under Secretary (now Deputy Secretary) of State has sometimes been one and, less frequently, so have Assistant Secretaries with briefs of particular Presidential interest. The weightiest advisers, however, have usually been holders of senior official foreign policy and national security positions.

The role of these advisers was the target of the central postwar institutional reform in national security policy making, the creation of the National Security Council in 1947.[7] Since then, the formal "White House machinery for the resolution of major foreign affairs issues has remained remarkably stable," as the Murphy Commission report notes.[8] Yet structural continuity has not prevented considerable variation among Presidents and Administrations in how particular issues are typically treated. And how the N.S.C. has evolved over thirty years tells us much about the broader patterns of foreign policy advice to postwar Presidents—what they have desired, what they have received,

[6] Joseph Kraft, *Profiles in Power* (New York: New American Library 1966), 63–68.

[7] Of course, one may argue that the establishment of the Secretary of Defense was of equal if not greater importance. Indeed, in the immediate postwar years the phrase "national security" was considered a near-synonym of "national defense": James Forrestal, as Secretary of the Navy, originally backed the establishment of the N.S.C. as an alternative to defense unification. When both the Council and the Secretary of Defense were established by the National Security Act of 1947, the latter was described in the Act as the President's principal adviser in the field of "national security." In short order, however, the N.S.C. became heavily involved in State Department and foreign policy business, an involvement reflected in Truman's early order that the Secretary of State chair the Council in his absence. "National security policy" then became a near-synonym of foreign policy, or at least of its "security" or "political-military" components. The latter usage is employed in this article.

[8] *Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy* [hereafter referred to as *Murphy Commission Report*] (Washington: G.P.O. June 1975), 4.

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and what choices present themselves for the future. Moreover, the story of the Council offers a sobering object lesson to would-be procedural reformers. Its proponents sought to constrain the President, to bind him more closely to his senior Cabinet advisers. But their creation ended up freeing him and lessening his dependence upon these advisers.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE 1947: THE EVOLUTION OF A REFORM[9]

The Council has affected advice to Presidents in three major ways. It has served as an advisory forum of senior officials reviewing foreign policy issues for the President, usually in his presence. It has provided a focal point for the development of formal policy planning and decision processes. It has provided the umbrella for the emergence of a Presidential foreign policy staff. Its founders mainly conceived it as the first; the last is what it has most importantly become.

The N.S.C. as forum. In form and in public imagery, the National Security Council is the most exalted committee in the Federal Government. Its statutory membership is now limited to four—the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is the senior staff official of the N.S.C.; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and (since 1975) the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency serve as statutory advisers. Unlike many Cabinet-level committees, moreover, the N.S.C. actually does meet—more than 600 times since its inception. Thus, one way

[9] These pages on the N.S.C. draw particularly on the following sources: Stanley L. Falk, "The National Security Council Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 79 (September 1964), 403–34; David K. Hall, "The Custodian-Manager of the Policymaking Process," in Alexander L. George, "Toward a More Soundly Based Foreign Policy: Making Better Use of Information," Appendix D (Volume 2) to the *Murphy Commission Report*, 100–119; Paul Y. Hammond, "The National Security Council: An Interpretation and Appraisal," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 54 (December 1960), reprinted in Alan A. Altshuler, *The Politics of the Federal Bureaucracy* (New York: Dodd, Mead 1968), 140–56; Robert H. Johnson, "The National Security Council: The Relevance of Its Past to Its Future," *Orbis*, XIII (Fall 1969), 709–35; the early Jackson Subcommittee hearings and staff reports (U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, Vols. I–III [Washington 1961]); James S. Lay, Jr. and Robert H. Johnson, "Organizational History of the National Security Council," August 1960; published *ibid.*, Vol. II, 411–68; Richard M. Moose, "The White House National-Security Staffs Since 1947," in Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere, eds., *The President and the Management of National Security* (for the Institute of Defense Analyses, New York: Praeger 1969), 55–98; I. M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1972 and 1974), esp. chap. 5 and Epilogue.

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in which it provides advice to Presidents is through its actual debates and deliberations as a sitting body.

To provide advice to the President through a more orderly, even collegial institution was a major objective of the prime exponent of the N.S.C., James Forrestal. His hopes may have been even greater—that the Council might, in practice, actually make the major U.S. policy decisions. A study which he commissioned in 1945 emphasized that, while the Council "would be formally described as advisory . . . the fact that the President himself heads the Council would for all practical purposes insure that the advice it offered would be accepted."[10] The conscious model was the British War Cabinet; the pattern to avoid was Franklin D. Roosevelt's highly personalized, *ad hoc* decision making during World War II, above and around his principal formal advisers. (The N.S.C. was quickly labelled "Forrestal's revenge.") The President was, to some, a "rogue elephant" who needed fencing in (or perhaps, in Truman's case, a "weak reed" in need of shoring up). Such concerns were widely shared. The report of the Hoover Commission Task Force of January 1949 saw Presidential participation in the conduct of foreign policy as "marked with many pitfalls," and emphasized that "the President should consult his foreign policy advisers in the executive branch before committing the United States to a course of action."[11]

The substantive objective of the N.S.C.—more effective coordination of advice and action in U.S. foreign and military policies—was widely applauded in the forties and has been since. But Forrestal's effort to control Presidential advisory processes, even to collectivize executive decision making, reflected, as Paul Hammond has noted, a "failure to understand the Presidency."[12] It also reflected a failure to understand particular Presidents. Thus, President Truman welcomed the Council as a "badly needed new facility" to bring together "military, diplomatic, and resources problems"[13] but, like all of his successors, firmly established its inability to bind him. One way in which he preserved his autonomy in practice was by attending only 12 of the 57 N.S.C. meetings held prior to the outbreak of war in Korea. Even Eisenhower, who convened the Council approximately as many times as

[10] Study by Myron Gilmore for the *Eberstadt Report*, quoted in Hammond (fn. 9), 141.

[11] Harvey H. Bundy and others, "The Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs," Appendix H to the *Report of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government* (Washington, D.C., February 1949), 51.

[12] Hammond (fn. 9), 141.

[13] Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Doubleday 1956), 59.

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all other postwar Presidents combined, and who almost always attended personally when his health permitted, felt moved to note his puzzlement that certain Congressmen couldn't understand that the N.S.C. itself had no powers but simply gave advice that a President could take or ignore as he pleased.[14]

The Council did nevertheless function as a major Presidential advisory forum through the fifties. Once the Korean War began, it met more frequently, and with Truman in attendance, dealing not only with Korean problems but with the more general U.S. political-military response to what was seen as a worldwide Communist challenge. Under President Eisenhower, the N.S.C. reached its peak as a sitting institution. Meetings had averaged two a month under Truman. During the Eisenhower Administration, the Council met on the average almost once a week, with Secretaries John Foster Dulles (State) and George Humphrey (Treasury) the most weighty voices.[15] When Eisenhower had a heart attack in 1955, and an operation for ileitis in 1956, Council meetings chaired by Vice President Nixon provided for useful continuity in national security policy deliberations, both actual and symbolic. Yet even under Eisenhower, the Council itself did not truly dominate Presidential foreign policy advice. One reason was that its major mandate was to review general and relatively long-range policy; Eisenhower had other institutions and individuals for day-to-day crises and the many *ad hoc* decisions that inevitably arose. A second reason was the strong individual role played by his Secretary of State, and the strong direct relationship to the President which Dulles succeeded in establishing through assiduous efforts.

If the N.S.C. as a sitting, deliberative advisory body was of at least moderate importance to Eisenhower, his successor perceived it largely as an encumbrance. President Kennedy came to office influenced by the Jackson subcommittee's criticisms of Eisenhower's national security procedures as cumbersome and sterile; his personal penchant for informality meshed nicely with such criticism. Thus, he noted as early as 1961: "We have averaged three or four meetings a week with the Secretaries of Defense and State, [Special Assistant for National Security Affairs] McGeorge Bundy, the head of the C.I.A. and the Vice Presi-

[14] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (New York: Doubleday 1965), 246n.

[15] The Secretary of the Treasury has never been a formal member of the N.S.C., but was regularly invited to Council meetings under Eisenhower and most other postwar Presidents. The Murphy Commission proposed that he be added as a statutory member in view of the increased importance of economic relations in foreign policy. Congress passed legislation to this end in December 1975, but President Ford vetoed it, declaring that "adequate arrangements for providing advice to the President on the integration of economic and foreign policy already exist."

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dent. But formal meetings of the Security Council which include a much wider group are not as effective."[16] Formal N.S.C. meetings continued to be held—sixteen during the Administration's first six months, and less frequently thereafter. But they were seldom the place where really serious Presidential advice was solicited or conveyed.

The preference for less formal advisory meetings whose format and attendance were more susceptible to Presidential control continued under President Johnson. Bill Moyers noted that L.B.J. found the Council to be "not a live institution, not suited to precise debate for the sake of decision."[17] The Council did experience a modest re-emphasis under Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Walt Rostow, who replaced Bundy in early 1966; meetings were held, in Rostow's words, "primarily for generating and exposing a series of major problems on which decisions would be required of the President, not at the moment but in some foreseeable time period."[18] But the heart of Johnson's foreign policy advisory system was the Vietnam-dominated "Tuesday lunch," where he met informally with a small group of his top aides, including the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Special Assistant.

Nixon came to office in 1969 pledged to "restore the National Security Council to its pre-eminent role in national security planning"; he even made this the theme of a late-October campaign speech.[19] "Catch-as-catch-can talkfests" were to be supplanted by actual use of the Council as the "principal forum for the consideration of policy issues" requiring Presidential decision.[20] For a while in 1969, and more sporadically in 1970, Nixon did so employ it. But like other aspects of Nixon's proclaimed "open Presidency," it had by 1973 lapsed into unprecedented disuse, with advice to the President formulated and conveyed primarily by and through National Security Assistant Henry Kissinger, working with his staff and with interagency N.S.C. subgroups that he dominated.[21] Up to President Nixon's trip to China in

[16] Quoted in Sorensen (fn. 3), 284.

[17] "Bill Moyers Talks about LBJ, Poverty, War and the Young," *Atlantic*, Vol. 222 (July 1968), 35.

[18] W. W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power* (New York: Macmillan 1972), 361.

[19] Report in the *New York Times*, October 25, 1968.

[20] *Ibid.*, and White House Statement of February 7, 1969.

[21] On the operations of the Nixon-Kissinger system generally, see esp. Chester Crocker, "The Nixon-Kissinger National Security Council System, 1969–1972: A Study in Foreign Policy Management," in National Academy of Public Administration, "Making Organizational Change Effective: Case Studies of Attempted Reforms in Foreign Affairs," Appendix O (Vol. 6) to the *Murphy Commission Report* (fn. 8), 79–99; and Destler, (fn. 9), chap. 5 and Epilogue. For an insider's account of how the system was established, see Morton H. Halperin, "The 1969 NSC System," unpub. paper prepared for the Murphy Commission.

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February 1972, his Council had had 73 meetings—half of them in his first year. This twice-a-month average was nearly double that of the Johnson Administration. But when Kissinger stated that the controversial October 1973 military alert during the Yom Kippur War had been decided upon only after "a special meeting of the National Security Council," N.S.C. records did not support him. In fact, they showed only two meetings during the first ten months of 1973.[22]

Under President Ford, use of the N.S.C. as a convening forum has been revived somewhat (as of April 1976, the Council had met 31 times during his Presidency)[23] to a frequency slightly above that of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations. But overall postwar experience provides ample reason to conclude that Presidential use of the National Security Council as a regularized, major advisory forum is the exception rather than the rule. A major reason is that the Council's main virtues to its proponents—formality and regularity of membership and meetings; pre-established, well-disseminated agendas—prove to be drawbacks in practice. N.S.C. meetings tend to attract too many people for serious advice to be conveyed—senior advisers and Presidents are constrained to speak "for the record" notwithstanding the formal secrecy of the proceedings, since their remarks are likely to be passed on by word of mouth to a much wider audience inside the Government. Cabinet members consider themselves judged on how effectively they push their departmental briefs; Presidents must take care lest their tentative suggestions close off discussion or be disseminated after the meetings as clear Presidential preferences. These drawbacks can be reduced by limiting attendance, and all Administrations that took the Council at all seriously have made some efforts in that direction. The Nixon regime was particularly stringent in this regard. But security and frankness can be achieved even more effectively through informal meetings or "one-on-one" sessions, and it is these on which Presidents ultimately tend to rely for serious advice.

The Council as committee can nonetheless serve certain Presidential purposes. By calling them together collegially, a President can impress on officials that they share responsibilities for national security and foreign policy advice which stretch beyond their specific job descriptions. Thus the Council tends to meet most often early in an Administration, when the roles of senior advisors are still fluid and susceptible to being defined. But Presidents can build a sense of a collegial advisory

[22] *Washington Post*, November 9, 1973.

[23] Information provided by the N.S.C. staff, covering the period through April 28, 1976.

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team in other ways. In fact, well-conducted informal sessions may be more effective in this regard, since they can encourage the "real" debate that the Council itself inhibits. Indeed, the most widely praised example of collegial advisory practice was the informal group of his most important advisers that President Kennedy established to explore options during the Cuban missile crisis.

One way in which the Council has proved useful to all Presidents has been in public relations. Convening the Council in a time of crisis is thought to convey the impression of the most somber and careful high-level deliberation. Such meetings can protect the President from charges that he acts arbitrarily and raise the image of his Administration. Thus, Kissinger's insistence that the military alert of October 1973 had the "unanimous" support of the N.S.C. was aimed at combatting the widespread suspicion that Nixon was trying to divert attention from the domestic crisis brought on by his firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. Eleven years earlier, Kennedy had dubbed his chosen advisory group during the Cuban missile crisis the "Executive Committee of the National Security Council." And in May 1975, Press Secretary Ronald Nessen had a similar goal when he declared, "The President has met with the National Security Council," in the second sentence of his briefing revealing the seizure of the *Mayaguez*. Indeed, the Council did meet five times during that week.[24]

The N.S.C. as formal process. Most of those who have favored a major role for the National Security Council have sought to establish regular means for bringing important policy issues before it, supported by thorough staff work. Fundamental to the early activities of the Council, therefore, were procedures for interdepartmental reviews and policy papers aimed at putting particular issues into focus, and giving the Council documents on which to act. Under President Truman, a considerable number of policy papers were developed for N.S.C. consideration, dealing mostly with individual countries or regions. One of the most famous of all Council papers, NSC–68, was completed during this time; its call for much-increased defense spending was implemented once the Korean War made this possible domestically. NSC–68, however, was not so much instigated by Truman's N.S.C. system as by Paul Nitze and other State Department officials, who felt that the American military response to the Soviet challenge was seriously inadequate. The N.S.C. framework, however, was useful to these

[24] *New York Times*, May 13, 1975; *The New Republic*, June 7, 1975, p. 8; and information provided by N.S.C. staff.

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officials in gaining interdepartmental cooperation at a time when the Secretaries of State and Defense were not on speaking terms.[25]

The Korean War infused the policy studies process of the Truman Council with a greater sense of urgency. And the N.S.C.'s role was formally strengthened in July 1950 by a Presidential directive emphasizing that all major national security policies should be recommended to the President through the Council. Truman had stated this earlier, but his personal participation in Council sessions now gave it new significance. However, after a year of intensive activity, the Truman process, in one participant's words, "gradually drifted into the doldrums along with the rest of the government,"[26] as a lame-duck Administration struggled with a war it could not end.

President Eisenhower built upon procedures already established in the Truman Administration, but made them more structured, formal, and comprehensive. He and his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Robert Cutler, believed deeply in orderly deliberations based upon thorough staff work. Under them, the Council "Planning Board" (a committee of departmental assistant secretaries) presided over the development of papers that analyzed virtually every significant U.S. foreign policy problem and proposed, on each, a general "policy" for Council review and Presidential approval. The most comprehensive of these was the annual overview document entitled "Basic National Security Policy."

In the development of its structure and the scope of its ambition, Eisenhower's N.S.C. process was therefore unmatched. The aim was not just to get top officials to consider every issue of consequence; it was to have a set of written general policies approved by the President which would serve as guidance for the overall government. But the process proved to have three very serious limitations.

One of these limitations is endemic to all efforts aimed at statements of general policy: they frequently do not and can not provide clear cues for responses to particular events unknown and unanticipated when the documents were written. The tendency of officials is therefore to deal with such events on their own terms without too much reference to policy statements framed earlier. A second limitation arose from its comprehensiveness: such a large number of papers was being drafted and cleared that the whole operation became, to many participants,

[25] The standard account of this episode is Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament," in Warner Schilling and others, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press 1962).

[26] Johnson (fn. 9), 714.

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a cumbersome, slow-moving "papermill." The third, perhaps most frequently expressed criticism was that, because the process pressed the different agencies to reach agreement on a paper prior to its submission to the Council, key policy issues and choices were suppressed rather than highlighted. Dean Acheson suggested that the way the system handled disagreements was to "increase the vagueness and generality" of the policies adopted.[27]

Defenders of the Eisenhower system argued that major issues were in fact frequently brought up for Council debate during the process; they pointed to the existence of "splits," or disagreements between agencies reflected by alternative language in the papers the N.S.C. reviewed. Eisenhower's Special Assistants for National Security Affairs seem to have been sensitive to this problem, and labored hard to be sure that fundamental issues were not buried in verbiage meaning different things to different people. Nevertheless, since Eisenhower's concept of interagency staff work was that it should, if possible, produce an agreed recommendation, such efforts seem to have had limited effect.

Finally, the Eisenhower process was limited by the evolution of the President's broader advisory system, above all the foreign policy predominance established by the Secretary of State. John Foster Dulles and his subordinates participated actively in the system, but he valued his own flexibility highly in particular negotiations and decisions, and worked very hard to keep it. He preferred to resolve tough choices by dealing privately with the President or, when necessary, in negotiations with other strong officials like Treasury Secretary George Humphrey. Such procedures limited the ability of the managers of Eisenhower's N.S.C. process to ensure that it was the place where the basic policy questions were really addressed.

President Kennedy's attitude toward this process was even more negative than his attitude toward Council meetings. He dismantled it completely, abolishing both the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board whose role was to oversee implementation of policies developed through the N.S.C. framework. In National Security Assistant McGeorge Bundy's words, the new administration "deliberately rubbed out the distinction between planning and operation which governed the administrative structure of the NSC staff in the last administration."[28] Believing that "policy" was shaped primarily through day-to-day decisions and actions, Kennedy put nothing in the place

[27] Acheson, "Thoughts on Thought in High Places," reprinted in Jackson Subcommittee (fn. 9), II, 292.

[28] Bundy's letter to Senator Henry Jackson, in Jackson Subcommittee (fn. 9), I, 1338.

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of the Eisenhower process; nor generally did his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson. There were some efforts at developing broad policy guidelines outside the N.S.C. framework, such as the "National Policy Papers" pushed by Rostow while he was State Department Policy Planning Chairman; some efforts were conducted under the auspices of interdepartmental committees (chaired by State Department officials) established by Johnson in March 1966. Also, a general counter-insurgency policy had been adopted in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco. But these were exceptions to the informal, operations-oriented style that prevailed.

As already noted, Presidential candidate Nixon sharply criticized this Kennedy-Johnson informality. He was also, however, critical of the Eisenhower process as fostering illusory "concurrences" that limited active assertion of the President's power to choose. Therefore, the formal process for providing policy advice which he established—the so-called N.S.S.M. (National Security Study Memorandum) system—reflected his desire that policy papers drafted by interagency committees offer not agreed recommendations but real "options" from which the President might select. The focus shifted from establishing broad policy to providing an analytic basis for specific decisions. There was also an effort to avoid duplicating the encyclopedism of the Eisenhower period by being selective in the studies ordered. However, since many issues were in need of review, and since the memoranda were a major vehicle for the Kissinger staff in seizing the initiative, 69 studies were ordered in the system's first six months of operation. That volume was enough to convince some departmental officials (mistakenly, it appears) that the purpose of the system was simply to inundate the bureaucracy with paperwork so that Nixon and Kissinger could do their real business without too much molestation. And the number of completed studies soon did become far greater than the capacity of the Nixon Administration to review them and act seriously on them, especially considering the extreme centralization of power under the President and his White House National Security Assistant.

Ironically, the *de facto* Nixon-Kissinger "system" soon evolved into practically the opposite of the one advocated in 1968 and designed in 1969: the two chief officials tended to disregard or discount much of the advice they received from the broader Government. They not only made their own decisions based on their own analyses (or their own private sifting of other analyses), but often kept the bureaucracy in the dark concerning these decisions. And the Nixon Administration's N.S.C. "system" also demonstrated, rather quickly, another limitation

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of structuring procedures too much around broad policy studies aimed at a limited number of major decisions. Responses to various crises and to ongoing situations which the United States is seeking to influence require day-to-day operational choices by the President and lesser officials which are not easily managed through formal "options" studies that take weeks to prepare. Thus the most active institution in the Nixon system was frequently the Kissinger-dominated "Washington Special Actions Group," which was not even a part of the original system, but was created in the aftermath of the downing of a U.S. intelligence airplane by North Korea. The Group was designed to coordinate advice and operations on similar fast-moving situations.

Nevertheless, N.S.S.M.'s have continued to be employed; 35 new studies were initiated in Ford's first 21 months. And, notwithstanding how the real Nixon-Kissinger "system" evolved, their N.S.S.M. procedure seems a clear improvement over its predecessors in both its selectivity and its focus on Presidential choice. Its formal goal—that agencies reach agreement on a list of options through objective analysis uncolored by agency interest—is probably unrealistic, and may also be undesirable; Alexander George, for example, has argued that Presidents should nourish rather than suppress "multiple advocacy" founded upon the divergent perspectives and interests of different agencies.[29] But in practice, such advocacy is not eliminated, for agencies have frequently used the system to try to ensure that their own preferred options are presented in reasonably attractive form, so that their chiefs can argue for them effectively at high-level meetings. And as George and others have recognized, multiple advocacy works best when senior officials are acting not as narrow pleaders for their departmental briefs, but as senior governmental officials bound by obligations to their President and their colleagues to explore all possible choices in the most objective and thoroughgoing manner. The N.S.S.M. process is designed to push officialdom in that direction.

The N.S.C. as Presidential staff. The third, and surely most important way in which the creation of the National Security Council has shaped foreign policy advice to Presidents is that it has served as the institutional base for the establishment of a strong Presidential foreign policy staff. Unlike the generally declining use of the Council as a sitting committee and the intermittent use of it as a focal point for formal policy-making procedures, the use of the N.S.C. as staff has grown steadily.

[29] George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66 (September 1972), esp. 753–56.

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All postwar Presidents from Truman to Nixon contributed to this development. Truman established the precedent of treating the Council as his body to be housed in his Executive Office, and adopted its staff as a useful addition to Presidential resources. He considered it, however, a career staff like that of the Bureau of the Budget, which would serve from administration to administration, providing continuity. His two N.S.C. Executive Secretaries, Sidney Souers and James Lay, were appointed with this criterion of "neutral competence" in mind.[30]

Support staffing was strengthened in the N.S.C. reorganization that followed the outbreak of war in Korea. It was both strengthened and enlarged in 1953, when President Eisenhower created the new position of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.[31] This official was to serve as the President's personal staff aide in charge of managing the N.S.C. process, with the Executive Secretary's role now that of head of the career staff. The Council staff was also enlarged and strengthened in other ways, including an enhanced capability for independent analysis and review of agency positions. It remained, however, predominantly a career staff operating under the expectation that most of its members would (or at least could) stay on from administration to administration. The new Special Assistant, though a stronger, higher-ranking official than Truman's Executive Secretaries, was limited in his leverage over the senior national security officials and agencies by, among other things, his separation from the day-to-day processes of national security operations. In fact, Eisenhower had *two* staff aides with national security responsibilities. The Special Assistant was one; the other was his Staff Secretary, General Andrew Goodpaster, whose duties included providing daily intelligence briefings to the President, coordinating the flow of daily national security business, and acting as liaison in arranging for meetings and the communication of decisions on operational issues.

When President Kennedy assumed office, he preserved the position of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, but abolished most of the formal policy planning system on which the position's previous occupants had lavished their attention. McGeorge Bundy inherited, however, most of the national security tasks of General Goodpaster, particularly the management of day-to-day Presidential foreign policy business. This gave him a new and very important source of leverage,

[30] On the issue of neutral competence in U.S. public administration, see Herbert Kaufman, "Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration," in Altshuler (fn. 9), 75–77; and Hugh Heclo, "OMB and the Presidency—the Problem of 'Neutral Competence,'" *The Public Interest*, No. 38 (Winter 1975), 80–98.

[31] For a careful, illuminating account of the development of this role, and of conflicts among the Special Assistant's *roles*, see Hall (fn. 9).

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particularly since he—unlike Goodpaster—was working for a President who was inclined to make a large number of specific decisions himself rather than delegate them to others. Moreover, Bundy's own instinct for power no doubt contributed to his ability to carve a major advisory and coordinating role for himself out of his position at the center of White House national security action processes. Moreover, the Bay of Pigs fiasco of April 1961 strengthened Kennedy's determination to exert control, with Bundy his principal vehicle.

Bundy recruited a small, aggressive, independent staff of intellectual operators who identified particularly with the current administration. They were inclined to seek out issues, to challenge departmental opinions, to press for surfacing of buried policy choices and for implementation of what they saw as Presidential desires. The staff was strengthened because Bundy was an apt delegator of authority, allowing staff members to operate rather freely as his agents. Another major innovation was direct access to information. The White House Situation Room was established, and equipment was installed enabling the White House to receive departmental cables to and from the State and Defense Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency; previously, Presidents and their White House aides had depended on the agencies to forward such communications.

Working for a President who tended to resist any firm sense of organizational structure and divison of labor, Bundy and his staff met the need for an informal yet wide-ranging effort at central coordination. In so doing, they began increasingly to play one of the roles originally envisaged for the Council—developing and pressing a broad, government-wide "Presidential" view encompassing diplomatic, military, and frequently economic elements in foreign policy.

One indication that this staff reform was filling a real need was that it lasted, in modified form, under a very different type of President. Lyndon Johnson did not duplicate his predecessor's wide-ranging involvement in foreign policy, preferring to limit himself to a few issues (though he dominated these), and to lean predominantly on his chief line officers, the Secretaries of State and Defense. Over time, this reduced the power of the Special Assistant and his staff, as did the fact that Bundy's style did not mesh with Johnson's nearly as well as it had with Kennedy's. Nevertheless, Bundy's successor, Walt Rostow—though he was originally given a reduced mandate—ended up performing essentially the same formal functions: coordinating the flow of information and intelligence to the President; managing the flow of decision papers to the President; monitoring governmental operations

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to promote coordination and responsiveness to Presidential interests; communicating Presidential decisions and instructions to departments and agencies; acting as liaison with Cabinet officers and other high foreign policy officials; and serving as personal adviser and source of staff analysis for the President.[32]

But it was under Henry Kissinger, of course, that the N.S.C. and its staff became synonyms. And as the President's foreign policy adviser, now renamed *Assistant* for National Security Affairs, Kissinger achieved unparalleled personal dominance. If Kennedy's active involvement and preference for an open decision-making style created a need for coordination which a Bundy could fill, Nixon's combination of a desire to dominate foreign policy personally, and a preference for dealing with and through a very small number of people, gave Kissinger an even greater opportunity. Moreover, Kissinger—unlike Bundy—was to become identified as the architect (and actual builder) of a particular set of policies. Under him, the strength of other senior N.S.C. staff members proved less than it had been under Bundy. His own closed style disinclined him to delegate, and this, plus the President's closed style, limited the direct access of Kissinger's subordinates to the Oval Office. The staff grew to unprecedented size, however—over fifty professionals—giving Kissinger considerable issue coverage and analytic and operational resources when he chose to employ them. Kissinger's strength was further enhanced, during the early months, by his role as director of the policy studies program already described. He thus combined the role of Eisenhower's Special Assistants—directing a structured planning process—with that of Bundy and Rostow—managing the day-to-day Presidential process. Before his first year was out, he was to add a further role which became prominent in 1971 and 1972—that of the President's personal, secret envoy handling those negotiations about which Nixon cared the most.

In September 1973, however, Kissinger became Secretary of State. And although he retained his N.S.C. position until November 1975, he gave priority to the Secretaryship almost immediately in order to play a stronger role of public leadership and to gain a measure of separation from the Watergate-enveloped White House. The Council's staff remained in existence, with its day-to-day operations under Kissinger's N.S.C. deputy, Brent Scowcroft. But, with most of Kissinger's chief aides now in State Department positions, it went into relative eclipse. Its formal neutrality vis-à-vis the departments was re-established in November 1975, when President Ford replaced Kissinger with Scowcroft

[32] On Rostow's functions, see Moose (fn. 9), 85–86.

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as National Security Assistant. However, the staff did not return to its former power. The major reason, apparently, was that Ford was not playing the kind of assertive, initiating foreign policy role that most of his predecessors had played. Another important reason was the strong role that Kissinger had established and was loath to relinquish as long as he stayed in office. This waning of the N.S.C. staff has precedents in other election years—1952 and 1968 come to mind. In both cases, it rose to new importance after the Presidential inauguration the following January.

Lessons of the N.S.C. experience. What can be learned from this decidedly mixed experience—the fluctuation and evolution of the N.S.C. as Council, as process, and as staff?

The first lesson is that the N.S.C. has taken a course very different from that envisaged by its original proponents. They sought coordination of policy advice and execution, and the development of a transdepartmental view of national security problems, and these the N.S.C. has, to varying degrees, provided. But James Forrestal would roll over several times in his grave were he to learn that Richard Nixon had been able to use the N.S.C. to shield himself from his advisers, as the institutional base for a Presidency of unexampled isolation and considerable flexibility in decision and action.

Nixon was able to do this, of course, because of what the Council did become. Hence, the second clear lesson: the Council's most consistent value to Presidents has been to provide them with a senior official and staff to coordinate their personal foreign policy business, and serve as a broader coordinator of decision and action processes. The Council itself has increasingly been treated as a bore, if not an encumbrance. Formal planning processes have risen and fallen with particular Presidents—or, as in the case of the N.S.S.M.'s—declined within the tenure of a particular President. But three consecutive, very different Presidents found the National Security Assistant and his staff to be of considerable personal value. A fourth, Gerald Ford, emulated them formally by re-establishing the separation of the positions of Secretary and Assistant, though he did not accompany this action with a systematic effort to use the Assistant to reduce his dependence on his chief Cabinet advisers.

Even the rise of the National Security Assistant has been the result of special circumstances, including the disinclination or inability of two Secretaries of State—Dean Rusk and William Rogers—to exert leadership and achieve predominance as Acheson and Dulles did before them and Kissinger after. The third broad conclusion therefore is that the

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N.S.C. in all its manifestations has reflected more than it has shaped the foreign policy making of particular administrations. Not only is the N.S.C. at the mercy of particular Presidents, to be used, reshaped, or ignored as they prefer. The impact of particular processes and the emergence of particular roles depends also on the broader pattern of relationships among top Presidential advisers. Eisenhower's planning process was limited by a Dulles determined to be Secretary of State in the maximum sense and a President quite willing to allow it. Both Bundy and Kissinger built the role of National Security Assistant into something much larger than envisaged because they met Presidential needs no one else was meeting. And when Bundy stayed on to serve a second President, his role came to shrink when Rusk increasingly met *Johnson's* criteria of performance for a Secretary of State.

BROADER PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY SYSTEMS

The foregoing underscores the need to think in terms of broader systems that shape national security advice to Presidents, systems that include the N.S.C. but many other things besides. The need becomes particularly dramatic in the case of a Nixon and a Kissinger: the "closed" system for foreign policy making and execution which they had developed by 1971 and 1972 was so completely at variance with the structured system built around the Council as forum, relatively open to inputs from other officials, which they had proclaimed with much fanfare in January and February of 1969. Other Presidential "systems" for decision and action on foreign policy may defy such brief characterization. But all administrations do develop recurrent patterns of how issues reach the President, with what range of analysis and advice, whose advice is most valued on which subjects, and what roles senior officials play vis-à-vis the President and one another. When a particular issue arises, the manner of handling it will be shaped, to a considerable degree, by the "system" already in place. This is particularly true of crises perceived as requiring a quick response.

What are some of the variations in broad Presidential policy-making systems that have appeared in the postwar period? What substantive, stylistic, or organizational preferences on the part of Presidents and other senior officials have helped to determine them? At least eight related variables among Presidents and their advisory teams seem important in shaping their broader foreign policy-making systems. No attempt is made here to rank them in importance, or to delineate all of the many relationships among them.

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One basic variable is *whether a President has a particularly clear organizational sense*, especially a conception of the appropriate roles for occupants of particular positions, and how much he is prepared to insist on its implementation. Eisenhower had such a sense to an unusual degree—he clearly distinguished between staff and line functions, between planning and operations, and he expected his subordinates to keep to their proper roles. Indeed, he himself deferred frequently to others' roles rather than insisting on command over them, a habit that lent support to the view that he became his system's prisoner. At the other extreme was Kennedy, who seems—perhaps by design—to have differentiated very little among individuals' roles. He dealt with those whom he found congenial and useful, handing them such assignments as he felt they could perform—much in the way some Senators handle their staffs. When a McNamara insisted on control of top Defense Department appointments and of his Department more generally, Kennedy could live with it and even came to welcome it. But such organizational order was not something he would have imposed himself, as evidenced by his choice of at least three other state appointees before he decided on Secretary Rusk. And his disorder had costs also, including confusion about who was responsible for what, about what "the policy" was, and who reflected the President's wishes.

A second, related variable is *how much particular Presidents have favored formality and regularity in the flow of analysis and advice to them*. Here Eisenhower similarly ranks as the most in favor of formal procedures, and Kennedy as the least. Truman inclines to the Eisenhower side, Johnson toward the Kennedy side. Nixon is an odd case. He certainly conceived of himself as preferring orderly procedures, but what he seems to have meant by this in practice was having an orderly, controlled personal environment. He ended up being served by highly informal procedures, though these were combined with very limited and controlled channels of access to his person.

A third important variable is *how much particular Presidents have had—and have wanted—strong leaders in the major line positions*, the Secretary of State above all, but also the Secretary of Defense. That is related, of course, to one of the most-discussed issues of foreign policy organization—whether a system of coordination and central management should be State Department-centered or White House-centered. It is related also to whether a President wishes to make a large number of decisions himself or to preside over a process in which decisions are largely made by others. All of this having been said, one is struck by

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the fact that most postwar Presidents have not perceived their Cabinet members as "natural enemies."[33] Truman and Eisenhower wanted and supported strong Secretaries of State and deferred to them. Johnson likewise deferred to Rusk. Even Kennedy, who was ambivalent on this point, was enthusiastic about Robert McNamara, the archetypal strong Cabinet member, and frustrated with Rusk. Richard Neustadt noted in 1963 that Kennedy "appears far less inclined than FDR to keep his senior ministers at arms length. . . . On the contrary, with those of his department heads whose work is most bound up with his from day to day—State, Defense, Justice, above all—he has sought a relationship as close and confidential and collegial as with his staff, and he has delegated tasks to them and their associates as though they all were members of his staff."[34] Gerald Ford seems particularly to have welcomed strong voices in his Cabinet—he retained some and appointed more. Only Nixon seems consistently to have preferred weakness in Cabinet positions, though he professed the contrary. His appointment of Kissinger as Secretary of State in 1973 seems attributable not to his stated desire "to get the work out in the departments where it belongs,"[35] but to his need to demonstrate renewed Administration vitality and distract attention from his personal plight in the first year of Watergate.

A fourth important variable, partly subject to a President's control but partly beyond it, is *how his principal advisers work out their own particular roles, jurisdictional boundaries, and relationships with one another*. Bundy, as National Security Assistant, deferred to Cabinet members much more than Kissinger did; Rusk accepted McNamara's primacy on military-strategic questions in a way Kissinger, as Secretary, would never have considered accepting Schlesinger's. Another dimension of the relationships among senior Presidential advisers is how much they are collegial and mutually supportive, and how much they are antagonistic.[36] There are always elements of both competition and

[33] The quote is from the first federal Budget Director, General Charles G. Dawes, who used to brief his successors about the job and end with the following: "Young man, if you retain nothing else that I have told you, remember this: Cabinet members are Vice Presidents in charge of spending, and as such they are the natural enemies of the President. Good day." Quoted by Kermit Gordon, "The Budget Director," in Thomas E. Cronin and Sanford D. Greenberg, eds., *The Presidential Advisory System* (New York: Harper and Row 1969), 61. It should perhaps be noted that Dawes was probably referring mainly to Cabinet members in charge of *domestic* Departments, with strong program interests and supporting constituencies.

[34] Neustadt, "Approaches to Staffing the Presidency: Notes on FDR and JFK" in Altshuler (fn. 9), 119.

[35] Quoted in the *New York Times*, August 23, 1973.

[36] On "competitive," "collegial," and "formalistic" management patterns in general

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cooperation, but the mix differs—as do the effects on foreign policy. On balance, considerable collegiality seems desirable, but it can cause officials to avoid the hard questions and the rigorous and perhaps wounding debate necessary to subject difficult policy choices to hard scrutiny. This proved to be a serious flaw in policy making toward the end of the Truman Administration, and also, recurrently, in the Kennedy and Johnson regimes. The generally antagonistic relations among senior advisers during the Nixon Administration were also quite damaging, however, reinforcing the lack of interpersonal trust emanating from the President personally, and reinforcing the closed, two-man character of that system.

A fifth important variable is *how widely Presidents have wished to cast their nets for advice*. By this measure, Nixon stood clearly at one extreme and Kennedy at the other, and their unusually "closed" and "open" systems reflected these conflicting tendencies. Ranking the other three Presidents is harder. Johnson seemed to be seeking a range of advice, but frequently came down hard on proponents of views he wished not to face. Truman was content to receive the bulk of his advice through line channels once he found congenial Secretaries of State; Clark Clifford's main impact seems to have been prior to the Marshall-Acheson regime. Eisenhower welcomed and sometimes sought advice from outside line channels, but would defer in action to his Secretary of State. (This and some of the earlier variables help to determine how many senior officials will have a strong personal relationship with the President, and will be able to act, in Washington and vis-à-vis foreign governments, with the weight that such relationships allow.)

A sixth variable is *how broad a substantive involvement a President seeks personally*. Inevitably, he will deal formally with a very wide range of matters, but over what range does he seek to make a strong personal mark? Here Kennedy with his global interests ranks at the broad end. Johnson, in contrast, took on only a few issues that were not forced upon him. Gerald Ford likewise seems to have dealt chiefly with issues brought before him by ongoing world events and by his Secretary of State.

A seventh important variable relates to the type of advice a President wants: *what is his attitude toward divided counsel and toward interpersonal disputes among his principal advisers?* Does he typically seek alternative views as a means of enhancing his choice and leverage, or

Presidential decision making, see Richard T. Johnson, "Presidential Style," in Aaron Wildavsky, ed., *Perspectives on the Presidency* (Boston: Little, Brown 1975), 262–300.

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does he want "agreed recommendations" from his advisers? Of the postwar Presidents, Eisenhower and Johnson explicitly pressed for concurrences—Eisenhower through his formal system, Johnson less formally. Kennedy and Nixon more frequently wanted the differences brought to them for decision, and Nixon was perhaps more willing than any of his postwar predecessors to *act* with divided counsel, though he shielded himself from personal exposure to advisory give-and-take. No President since F.D.R. seems to have welcomed personal rivalries among his chief aides.

An eighth variable is *how much a President seeks operational involvement—pre- and post-decision—as opposed to preferring his impact to come at a regular decision point.* How much is he a persistent intruder in the process, as opposed to a magistrate, seeing his role as deciding issues brought to him and having his wishes executed without further extensive personal effort? By this criterion, Kennedy and Johnson were "intruders," whereas Eisenhower and Nixon were "magistrates." Truman and Ford come closer to the latter role than to the former.

In addition to these variations, there is a whole range of personal Presidential characteristics that affect their systems. Do they prefer advice and information orally or in writing? If the former, do they prefer "one-on-one" or group sessions? How do they react to being confronted, personally, with a challenge to their policies? Can they "turn off" an adviser supporting a course they reject without discouraging him from such advocacy on other issues in the future? Nixon offers an unusual case here: a President almost incapable of delivering a strong no or rebuff to an aide, who—partly for that reason—dealt increasingly through staff aides who could.

PRESCRIPTION—PROBLEMS AND CHOICES

In view of the extensive postwar experience analyzed here, how ought Presidents to organize their advice-getting in the future? What can outside observers recommend to them? Given that the systems that evolve are so heavily dependent upon the personalities of Presidents and their chief aides, can general prescriptions be offered that are not tailored to fit a particular chief executive? The remainder of this article is a discussion of some such prescriptions.[37]

A BASIC DILEMMA: CHOICE VERSUS PERSISTENCE

Most thinking and writing about foreign policy advice to Presidents focuses on ensuring the wisest, most fully informed Presidential *choices*,

[37] The discussion will avoid duplication of the more comprehensive organizational proposals on foreign affairs presented in Destler (fn. 9), chap. 9.

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from among the widest range of reasonable policy alternatives. That was the purpose of the most sophisticated formal inside effort to date—Nixon's N.S.S.M. system. It is the purpose also of most of the best academic work, notably that of Alexander George and his colleagues. The model (usually explicit) is the chief executive as magistrate, *the President deciding*.[38]

Yet Presidents need advice and support not just in deciding what they want, but in making their choices effective. They need help in implementation. Since it takes considerable time and effort for most policies to be put across, Presidents need both the fact and the appearance of steadfastness of purpose, of knowing and communicating what they are after, and of being skillful in getting it. Neustadt quoted Truman to the effect that what the powers of the Presidency amounted to was the chance to persuade others to do what they ought to do anyway. The word "ought" implies that the President already knew—as when he mobilized his limited power resources in 1947–1948 to win Congressional support of the Marshall Plan. The model here is a different one —*the President leading*.[39]

Obviously, Presidential advisers and advisory institutions need to support the President in both of these tasks: careful deliberation prior to decision; effective pursuit of the goal chosen in a decision when its attainment depends on more than Presidential action alone. Fortunately, all Presidents do get support toward both of these goals. Unfortunately, the goals are frequently in conflict. For Robert McNamara in 1967, continued escalation in Vietnam was futile and foreclosed other possibilities. What was needed was to reevaluate the situation and consider other, more limited options. His President, however, believed—or dearly wished to believe—that what was needed above all was perseverance to prevail over adversaries at home and abroad. And when McNamara surfaced some of his arguments before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Johnson "drew the analogy of a man trying to sell his house, while one of the sons of the family went to the prospective buyer to point out that there were leaks in the basement."[40]

To use Vietnam as an example today hardly presents the best argument for perseverance. But Richard Nixon behaved similarly in a much more successful case—that of China policy. Once he had set his course, he gave the utmost priority to careful implementation—maintaining

[38] See, for example, George (fns. 29 and 9); Hall (fn. 9); and Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1972).

[39] See above all Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: Wiley & Sons 1960 and 1964).

[40] Quoted in Townsend Hoopes, *The Limits of Intervention* (New York: David McKay 1969), 90.

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secrecy until the Kissinger visit (even though this foreclosed any very broad canvassing of alternative approaches), and placing very severe restrictions on intragovernmental consideration of China policy between his surprise announcement of July 15, 1971, and his visit the following February.[41] In both cases, consistency of purpose and execution were given priority; serious policy review was discouraged or prevented. And in both, the conflict between the two goals was real. The need for sending a consistent set of signals to Hanoi or China may have been exaggerated by Johnson or Nixon, but it was a real need and it stood to be threatened by any appearance of reconsideration or irresolution. The tension had other roots as well. Johnson needed unity among his advisers to sell a controversial policy at home; Nixon needed some degree of secrecy in approaching Peking.

The fact that there is a conflict between full consideration of all options (irresolution?) and perseverance in a policy course (tunnel vision?) suggests that Presidential advice must balance and trade off the two; unfortunately, it is hard to develop objective criteria that determine how the trade-off should be made. In practice, people tend to choose one value or the other, according to whether they like the current policy; it is a "conflict between coherence and change."[42] Another way the trade-off has been made in more than one Administration is by emphasizing choice early in the term, and execution thereafter. As Robert H. Johnson has written, "at the beginning of any administration" leaders tend to believe "that existing policy is defective" and that "the international environment is relatively malleable."[43] They are in search of alternatives, of ways to make an impact. Later on, they have a reduced sense of the possible and are hooked to their own choices. This helps explain the evolution of the Nixon-Kissinger system from an open process, oriented toward widening Presidential options, to a very closed implementation system, with the President's Assistant becoming predominantly a "line" officer engaged in making and carrying out decisions on policy execution.

Another basis for making the trade-off is one this author has suggested elsewhere[44]—one's conception of how U.S. foreign policy is made. If one

[41] For one contemporary report, see Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Foggy Bottom Faces a Trauma," *Los Angeles Times*, August 30, 1971, cited in John S. Esterline and Robert Black, *Inside Foreign Policy* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Mayfield Publishing Company 1975), 231. It refers to an instruction by Secretary Rogers warning against "written memoranda raising questions about such dramatic policies as Mr. Nixon's approach to mainland China."

[42] Destler (fn. 9), 292.

[43] Johnson (fn. 9), 716.

[44] Destler, "Comment: Multiple Advocacy: Some Limits and Costs," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66 (September 1972), esp. pp. 787–89.

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sees it as shaped predominantly by a manageable number of Presidential decisions, one advocates a system that spurs the broadest range of pre-decision analysis and advocacy. If one believes that the truly consequential Presidential decisions are exceptional, and that most policy evolves from day-to-day actions at several governmental levels, one emphasizes the advice and support Presidents need in pursuing effective policies over time, as well as the need for the government to act with coherence to achieve consistent impact. One would not favor this degree of emphasis on execution, however, if one felt—either because of a negative view of the Presidency or a skepticism about the prospects of strong policy initiatives in an uncertain world—that strong Presidential leadership were likely to bring more harm than good. In such a case, one might well emphasize care in choice and regularity in reconsideration of choices previously taken, with damage limitation as the goal. This face of the dilemma was highlighted by what Acheson told Neustadt after Johnson torpedoed the multilateral force: "I know your theory. You think Presidents should be warned. You're wrong. Presidents should be given confidence."[45]

Finally, some have argued that it is typically a President's subordinates who favor strong action, while the President's interests are usually served by a deferral of choice—"keeping options open." As Graham Allison has put it: "In policy making then, the issue looking *down* is options: how to preserve my leeway until time clarifies uncertainties . . . the issue looking *upwards* is confidence: how to give the boss confidence in doing what needs to be done."[46] The Neustadt "theory" denounced by Acheson is generally consistent with Allison's proposition—though not with Neustadt's celebration elsewhere of Truman's (and Acheson's) Marshall Plan leadership. In this view, Presidents not only want to have a range of options available, but want to retain them—to avoid choosing as long as possible. By contrast, foreign policy making systems built around options usually assume that a President's interest is often in making a choice; that includes not just the 1969 Nixon system, but George's multiple-advocacy proposal.

But to carry a system of "open options" to its logical conclusion is to forego effectiveness of execution almost entirely. Thomas L. Hughes wrote ten years ago that any prolonged "attempt to keep all options open prevents the persistent pursuit of any one of them. . . . A foreign policy whose chief characteristic is a plethora of unclosed options is

[45] Acheson quoted in Steinbruner (fn. 4), 332.

[46] Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63 (September 1969), 711.

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not much of a foreign policy at all."[47] Ultimately, a President's influence is not shaped by the choices he defers, though it may be protected by them. It comes from the choices he makes and perseveres in. Admittedly, Presidents do not wish to have subordinates force their hand on decisions. But some, like Truman and Nixon, have placed very positive value on being—to appropriate a phrase recently applied to a Japanese Prime Minister—"men of decision and action." Their historical reputations, for better or worse, will rest on the courses they persisted in following. To quote Dean Acheson again, "Flexibility in maneuver may be highly desirable in certain circumstances, but when it leaves one's own and friendly forces and commanders uncertain of the nature and purpose of the operations or of who has responsibility for what, it can be a handicap. Machiavelli was writing for weak princes."[48]

If one accepts the need to emphasize effectiveness of execution as well as care in decision in foreign policy making systems, and if one accepts further the elusiveness of general rules to establish which value should receive priority when, prescription must fall back upon a need to institutionalize both. This offers a marginally new way of looking at an old question of foreign policy making—whether the President's prime adviser should be the Secretary of State or the National Security Assistant, and what sort of balance should exist between the Secretary and the White House staff.

A STATE- OR WHITE HOUSE-CENTERED SYSTEM: THE NEED TO CHOOSE ONE AND BALANCE IT WITH THE OTHER

Typically, those who stress policy review and choice focus on staff functions and officials; those who emphasize execution stress line officers. Thus, Alexander George and David Hall concentrate on the actual and potential role of the National Security Assistant, while Dean Acheson's views were clear enough on the other side, notwithstanding his partial eleventh-hour recantation.[49] For the Assistant's chief roles are, or ought to be, "staff functions."[50] And while the Secretary of State also performs, and should perform, important staff duties for the President, his direct "line" responsibilities—representation, negotiation, direction of a major department, advocating policy before the public and the Congress—are very great.

This observer's (relative) emphasis on execution, on the difficulty of

[47] Hughes, "Relativity in Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XLV (July 1967), 676.
[48] Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton 1969), 734.
[49] Acheson, "The Eclipse of the State Department," *Foreign Affairs*, XLIX (July 1971), esp. pp. 603–06.
[50] *Murphy Commission Report* (fn. 8), 4.

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actually pursuing coherent, purposive foreign policies, has led him to advocate a system built around a team of "Presidential" officials combining line and staff roles, headed by the Secretary of State and including other senior State Department officials. Such a team seems more likely to be able to combine responsiveness to the President with leadership of the broader government in translating Presidential policy into day-to-day bureaucratic action. But a simple "line solution" of the sort apparently favored by Acheson (and adopted, to some degree, by Truman) does not seem desirable. Such a solution would meet the needs of subordinates at the expense of superiors, who would become overdependent upon them for information and advice as well as action. There is a need for each executive to have a staff strong enough to act as a check and a prod to the executives at the level below, to review policies, and to look for alternatives.

In two respects, the argument for prime reliance on the Secretary of State seems stronger today than when it was advanced in 1971 and 1972.[51] For one thing, the *possibility* has been demonstrated anew—there has been a strong Secretary for the past three years. Second, the strong current immediate impact of domestic politics on foreign policy—the subject of the next section of this essay—increases the importance of having the President's chief foreign policy adviser in an office where he must deal regularly, seriously, and often openly with Congress, press, and public.

This does not, however, mean that the Secretary of State should have the lead on all issues in which some foreign policy interest is involved. This article has concentrated on national security advice, but international economic problems also play a major role in American foreign policy. On these it should not be assumed that foreign policy concerns will or should prevail over domestic ones. When a question on grain sales to Russia, for example, comes to the President for decision, he cannot normally expect from the Secretary of State a balanced weighing of international considerations against the domestic gains or losses in terms of farm income, consumer food prices, and so forth. The impact of even a strong Secretary of State will and should diminish as foreign policy issues overlap with domestic; he will play less the role of leader responsible for balancing *all* Presidential concerns, and more the role of spokesman for just *some* of these concerns.

Even on issues within the sphere of national security, it is not desirable for the Secretary of State to be the National Security Assistant as well.

[51] Destler, "The Nixon NSC: Can One Man Do?" *Foreign Policy*, No. 5 (Winter 1971–72), 28–40; and Destler (fn. 9), chap. 9.

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The danger of too much predominance by one adviser is that execution will gain too much priority over policy analysis and review—that this adviser, overly staked to his own actions and enterprises, will be reluctant to consider and bring up options that threaten these actions and enterprises. Ironically, it seems to matter little in this respect whether the official exercising such predominance is National Security Assistant or Secretary of State. The Nixon system of 1971, bent on opening relations with China its own way, could not have been less suitably structured for fully evaluating the damage its particular approach was likely to do to relations with Japan. So, while a predominant Secretary needs to be checked by a White House foreign policy staff outside of his control, a predominant Assistant needs to be limited also. One way that seems desirable is to keep the Assistant out of direct policy implementation and negotiation (though he can and should continue to monitor such activities by others and transmit relevant Presidential orders to them). Such a limitation requires, of course, that the Secretary of State and other key "line" officials be strong enough, with good and visible Presidential relationships, to carry out these functions themselves. In addition, the Assistant should not play the role of public spokesman and defender of policy (and should be cautious and selective in his private advocacy) in order not to limit his capacity for evenhandedness and openness to policy changes. If the way to check a strong Secretary is through alternative staff resources, the way to check a strong Assistant is through limiting his line functions. In both cases, if it is desirable to have one primary adviser for the sake of effective execution, his power should be limited to promote breadth of choice, to encourage fuller presentation of options to the President than extreme power concentration in one subordinate allows. None of this can be done completely or precisely—the roles of high officials tend to overflow particular functional categories. But norms can and do develop about the roles appropriate to particular high positions, and limits of this sort could—if widely supported—influence various Presidential systems.

In a system centered around the Secretary of State, there remain serious questions about how exactly the White House should be staffed. Is a custodial function of the sort that George envisages possible? It seems unlikely that a "Special Assistant" to the President can be effective in the role of managing the process of Presidential choice—of insuring the broadest canvassing of possibilities and the most fruitful analysis and debate of these possibilities—if that is the only role that he has. He needs other staff roles in which he serves the President and can establish his value to the President; he must also have other roles in order to give him

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a sufficient feel for where the chief executive's mind is on foreign policy, something that is essential to managing an advocacy process before the President. Such roles should be chosen with an eye to reinforcing his Presidential relationship while limiting the danger properly emphasized by George and Hall—that of distorting the "custodian's" role by compromising his objectivity. The most appropriate ones would seem to be those of managing the President's daily foreign policy business and overseeing policy implementation, especially on issues of particular Presidential concern.

The problem then arises as to whether such roles would not, together with day-to-day proximity to the President, give the Assistant too much weight, conflicting with the exercise of a custodial function and leading inevitably to an influence that precludes the pre-eminence of a Secretary of State. Kissinger seems to have accepted a new National Security Assistant with reluctance, notwithstanding Scowcroft's prior service as his subordinate. As Graham Allison has put it in his recent study for the Murphy Commission: won't the "holder of the ring" typically decide to "play the game himself," as did "Bundy on Vietnam" and "Kissinger on everything"?[52]

The major way to resolve this dilemma, if there is a resolution, must be care in choosing the person to fill the position, combined with Presidential attentiveness to the dangers, and determination to avoid them. One possibility, however, might be to reduce, at least marginally, the title and the status of the National Security Assistant so that he would not pose as great a "threat" to Cabinet officials. This might be done as part of a broader reorganization and merger of White House staffs serving the President on major policy issues.[53]

[52] Allison, "Overview of Findings and Recommendations From Defense and Arms Control Cases," Appendix K (Volume 4) to the *Murphy Commission Report* (fn. 8), 38. The language quoted is in reference to a White House staffing proposal put forward by Francis Bator.

[53] Robert H. Johnson, for example, has suggested eliminating the N.S.C. and other parallel bodies, replacing them with less formal Cabinet-level councils appropriate to particular problems under consideration, and supporting them all with a unified "Cabinet staff." One of "perhaps four deputies" would handle "foreign security" issues, another would concentrate on "international interdependence" issues; the other two would cover domestic matters. (See, for example, his "Managing Interdependence: Restructuring the U.S. Government," in John Sewell, ed., *The U.S. and World Development: Agenda for Action 1977* [Overseas Development Council, forthcoming].) Graham T. Allison and Peter L. Szanton have urged that "an executive committee of the Cabinet become the chief forum for high-level review and decision of all major issues combining 'foreign,' 'domestic,' and 'economic' implications." See *Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection* (New York: Basic Books 1976), chap. 4. This "ExCab" would be supported by a staff incorporating those of the N.S.C., the Domestic Council, and the Economic Policy Board.

Although the implications of such proposals require analysis beyond the scope of this

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FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE MOST SERIOUS GAP IN PRESIDENTIAL ADVICE

The influence of domestic politics in shaping and constraining American foreign policy hardly needs elaboration today. Yet it has long been considered improper, somehow, to take this fully into account. As Morton Halperin puts it, "There is a strong and widely held view in the United States that it is immoral to let domestic political considerations influence decisions which may affect war and peace. . . . This belief is so strongly held that senior officials frequently deny in public, and even apparently to themselves, that they take domestic politics into account."[54] In the late forties, of course, high U.S. officials were very sensitive to the need to sell particular policies to the Congress and to compromise on details if necessary to do so. They remembered Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations very well. But as the years passed and (except on foreign aid) Congress acceded to the activist foreign policies of successive administrations, the notion of domestic politics being out of place here joined with *de facto* executive primacy to nourish the conviction that foreign policy was overridingly, by right, the affair of the executive branch. One product of these related tendencies has been that Presidents do not normally have at their disposal analyses explicitly relating foreign policy choices to domestic political realities. To relate them *ad hoc* is to some degree the responsibility of all politically appointed leaders. But foreign policy officials seem to perform this task incompletely, reluctantly, and with a sense that such "low politics" ought not to sully the pursuit of high diplomacy.

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article, they should certainly not be dismissed as lightly as the *Murphy Commission Report* (fn. 8), 36, rejects a similar proposal. Employing the Cabinet in this way would not necessarily prove "cumbersome and inefficient" because the Cabinet would seldom need to meet as a whole—the real business would be done by ExCab, the Staff, or the particular Cabinet subgroups.

A key issue here is whether current governmental organization gives undue prominence to national security concerns and excessive influence to national security institutions. Graham Allison so argues in his Murphy Commission studies. And though the "militarization of American foreign policy" in the fifties and sixties seems to have had causes mainly outside the structure of Presidential advisory institutions, the continuing institutional emphasis on national security policy as a relatively separate and superior sphere is certainly open to question today. Broadening the N.S.C. and staff to encompass general Presidential policy would remedy these limitations. If such reform were to name the highest aide working full time on national security a *Deputy* Assistant to the President, it would certainly make him less likely to eclipse Cabinet members. The question then arises, of course, whether he would have enough leverage at that level to play the staff role strongly and effectively. Certainly he and the other major deputies would need to deal directly with the President.

[54] Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 1974), 63–64.

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Many questions can be raised about this attitude. Why should sensitivity to domestic politics elsewhere—a must for effective diplomacy—be legitimate while response to home politics is considered illegitimate? What *should* be the source of American foreign policy priorities if not the domestic political process? The point to be made here is more limited. Misreading of domestic politics—or failure to take it *very* seriously—can be disastrously counterproductive in terms of the goals of foreign policy leaders themselves. There are numerous recent examples, such as the fiasco over arms to Turkey, and the long wrangle over relating most-favored-nation treatment to Soviet policy on Jewish emigration. One will be singled out here: President Ford's request for a $522 million supplemental appropriation for military aid to Vietnam and Cambodia in January 1975. (This request was made before any of the devastating military setbacks that brought a Communist victory by May; the universal prognosis was that a major challenge was at least a year away.) The 93rd Congress had cut the money requested for Vietnam from the Administration's request, and now the much more militant, more anti-Vietnam, more Democratic 94th Congress was being pressed to restore the cut. One might have expected that a foreign policy leadership still bleeding over Turkey and Soviet trade would not go around looking for another rebuff, another issue where its inability to "deliver" the Congress would be dramatized. Yet, Ford and Kissinger plunged ahead and strongly urged the new Congress to reverse the old. As was easily predictable,[55] the request never had a chance, and this Congressional inaction (and the more general criticism of Vietnam military aid which the request was bound to trigger) may have helped to bring President Nguyen Van Thieu to make the disastrous strategic decisions that led to the North Vietnamese victory. It is important to emphasize that this particular request, unlike the emergency request later that spring, was not forced by crisis; rather, it may have helped to precipitate one.

Certainly, in the years to come, American foreign policy is either going to involve creative, constructive Presidential cooperation with a yet-to-emerge Congressional leadership, or a trimming of American sails to the prevailing, rather negative winds. In either case, the effective integration of domestic political advice and foreign policy advice becomes a matter of some urgency. Foreign policy leaders must face, explicitly and systematically, the constraints, interests, and values that have weight in the U.S. domestic process and build their policies upon these interests and values. Alternatively, they must form strong alliances

[55] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* of February 15, 1975, for example, indicated that the request had "little support."

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with leading political figures to overcome some of the constraints, as Truman did with Senator Arthur Vandenberg.

One useful prescription, implemented (though not for this reason) by President Nixon in 1973, is to make the primary foreign policy adviser the Secretary of State, since this position makes him deal directly and continuously with Congress and the broader public political arena, and since he will suffer badly—as Henry Kissinger sometimes has—from his mistakes in that arena. And domestic political sensitivity should be a major qualification when future Presidents recruit for the secretaryship and other senior foreign policy positions. But such officials' orientation toward foreign relations will necessarily limit such sensitivity, so attention must be given to White House-level staffs and processes as well. Obviously, "inside" advisory reform cannot resolve any President's domestic political problems. Paul Hammond noted sixteen years ago that what may be the National Security Council's policy or the President's policy cannot become *U.S.* policy until "the give and take of the NSC chamber" is "repeated for the interested public in the Congressional-executive dialogue and the other forums of our public life."[56] Still, internal reform can help. One possibility is to assign to a portion of the N.S.C. staff or to the broader White House staff the explicit responsibility of analyzing public and Congressional sentiment and how it affects foreign policy choices.[57] Robert Johnson has recommended a second, more *ad hoc* measure: to provide a combined foreign policy/domestic political staff to whatever official a President chooses to employ as a domestic/political watchdog for his foreign policy.[58]

TOWARD A MID-TERM "SYSTEM REVIEW"?

Finally, one lesson provided by all of the postwar advisory experience is that Presidential systems evolve; the advisory system that a President finds two or three years into his term is not precisely what he or anyone else intended. Perhaps because of our emphasis on the formal, we tend to think of policy-making systems as being set into place at the beginning of a President's tenure, and fully operative thereafter. Public attention, journalistic and academic, focuses on policy-making systems mainly at the beginning of Presidential terms, and when a new President is entering office. And after a system has evolved, there is a

[56] Hammond (fn. 9), 154.

[57] This might prove easier if one of the Cabinet staff proposals noted in footnote 53 was adopted.

[58] Johnson (fn. 53), chap. 5.

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tendency to believe that what exists is what the President has wanted all along.

Particular attention to the Presidential advisory system is appropriate at the beginning of a President's tenure, since that is the time when he has the greatest ability to influence it. He is filling all the major positions at once, and the government is waiting to learn what new procedures he will propose or impose. Unfortunately, it is also the time when Presidents know the least about what they are doing—about what being President means in day-to-day practice, and about the individuals and types of individuals they will need in high policy roles. President-elect Kennedy told John Kenneth Galbraith in December 1960: "I must make the appointments now; a year hence I will know who I really want to appoint."[59] Moreover, Presidents come to office with predilections and preferences in style that frequently are internally inconsistent, and even more frequently don't suit their job or their priorities as they come to define them. They make some appointments that mesh with these preferences and predilections, and some that don't. Yet they are unlikely to take a serious, overall second look: they are busy, and they don't want to admit failure in their original efforts.

This suggests the need for a broad mid-term review, conducted for the President, which analyzes how his system is actually working. How well is it providing the President with timely choices, the full range of choices? How well is it facilitating consistent and fruitful action along the general policy lines he prefers? How well is it dealing with and responding to the larger national political community, particularly the Congress? Exactly who would best conduct such a review will vary with the circumstances. Preferably it should be someone responsive directly to Presidential interests and concerns, knowledgeable about high foreign policy making, but not holding a major appointment in the current system. If the system possessed an actor approaching the model of George's "custodian," that official could and should play a role in adapting the system to make it perform more effectively. But, precisely because he would be a central actor of the system to be evaluated, the custodian should probably not conduct the review himself.

No such review could remain above the struggles for power and position which are a part of every administration. The recommendation of the advisory group Ford convened after taking office—that he appoint a National Security Assistant other than Henry Kissinger—was inevitably interpreted as an effort to "get Henry." But a discreetly con-

[59] Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1969), 7.

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ducted review that is persuasive in its findings should help convince the President to assume the costs in personal feelings of making immediate personnel changes, in order to gain the greater benefits of improvement in the quality of the advice he gets, and in the advisers and institutions that provide it.

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A ZONAL ANALYSIS MODEL FOR COMPARATIVE POLITICS:
A Partial Soviet Application

By JAMES B. BRUCE and ROBERT W. CLAWSON*

THE purpose of this study is to propose a zonal analysis model for comparative politics. The model is designed to locate the study of Soviet and other communist systems in the mainstream of comparative political inquiry, and is illustrated by a case study of Soviet economic reforms between 1962 and 1965.

CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES

Numerous critics have pointed to the conceptual inadequacy of existing studies of Soviet and communist politics.[1] At a minimum, the absence of any approach with widespread acceptability in the field is taken as a given. At present, two basic schools of conceptual activity in Soviet studies can be identified. Their compatibility with the aims of systematic comparative inquiry differs markedly.

One school, closely tied to the tradition of area studies, focuses on the *sui generis* character of communist political systems, and stresses in particular magnified social control, political repression, and ideological

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[1] In particular, Paul Shoup has stressed the underdevelopment of empirical inquiry, and noted the importance of model building in the comparative enterprise: "Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empirical Approach," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (March 1968), 185–204, esp. 189ff. The appraisals of other critics have also centered on conceptual difficulties. See, for instance, Daniel Bell, "Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior in the Social Sciences," *World Politics*, x (April 1958), 327–65; Alex Inkeles, "Models and Issues in the Analysis of Soviet Society," *Survey*, No. 60 (July 1966), 3–17; William A. Welsh, "The Usefulness of Social Stratification, Input-Output, and Issue Processing Models in the Study of Communist Systems in Eastern Europe," paper delivered at the 66th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, September 1970; Frederic J. Fleron Jr., ed., *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1969), esp. Fleron's introductory essay and the symposium in chap. 9. Recent articles in *Studies in Comparative Communism* have explored conceptual and theoretical themes, including contributions by general comparativists; see esp. the symposium in IV (April 1971), and Joseph LaPalombara, "Monoliths or Plural Systems: Through Conceptual Lenses Darkly," VIII (Autumn 1975), 305–32.

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politics. Examples include both totalitarian and Kremlinological analytical frameworks and conceptual foci of lesser scope, highlighting such communist features as purges, terror, and struggles for succession.[2] As *analytical frameworks*, the conceptualizations in this school remain essentially ideographic, thus obscuring needed systematic cross-cultural comparisons. Since, typically, they are lacking in conceptual rigor and requisite attention to operationalization and hypothesis testing, they also remain theoretically undeveloped. In a word, because these concepts were fashioned for the most part with the Soviet system in mind, their limited comparative potential is recognized at the outset.

The second school, more heavily influenced by contemporary political science, is notable for its tendency to nudge Soviet political studies closer to the comparative milieu by arguing, in effect, that political processes and institutions of the type found in Western polities are not wholly absent from the Soviet system. Principal efforts here include work on interest groups, participation, and voting behavior;[3] studies applying such theoretical constructs as structural-functionalism or cybernetics;[4]

[2] Works identified with the totalitarian approach include Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled* (rev. ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1963); Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1956); Bertram D. Wolfe, *Communist Totalitarianism* (Boston: Beacon Press 1962); and Adam Ulam, *The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1963). Representative of the Kremlinological approach are Sidney I. Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1965); Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: 1957–64* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1966); Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR* (New York: Macmillan 1960); and Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin* (New York: Viking Press 1970). Varying conceptual and methodological critiques of these approaches are found in the sources cited in fn. 1. Key analytical concepts related to the above approaches include terror, purges, succession struggles, and ideology. See, for example, Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, *Political Terror in Communist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1970); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1956); Myron Rush, *Political Succession in the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press 1965); and Gerhart Niemeyer and John S. Reshetar, *An Inquiry into Soviet Mentality* (New York: Praeger 1956).

[3] H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 435–51; H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970); Joel Schwartz and William R. Keech, "Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (September 1968), 840–51; Milton Lodge, *Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill 1969); Robert S. Sharlet, "Concept Formation in Political Science and Communist Studies: Conceptualizing Political Participation," in Fleron (fn. 1), 244–53; D. Richard Little, "Mass Political Participation in the US and the USSR: A Conceptual Analysis," *Comparative Political Studies*, VIII (January 1976), 437–60; Jerome M. Gilison, "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (September 1968), 814–26.

[4] Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Politics in the USSR* (2d ed.; Boston: Little, Brown 1972); Michael P. Gehlen, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Functional Analysis*

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investigations that demonstrate the analytic utility of leadership and elite studies;[5] and models of organizational behavior.[6] Finally, a number of concepts and models have been proposed for application, but remain essentially untried.[7] Conceptual frameworks in this second school, not being premised on Soviet uniqueness, constitute a marked improvement over those of the first school in their potential for cross-polity empirical theory. Still empirically undeveloped, these conceptual frameworks in both Soviet and Western applications have been attended by uneven efforts at specification of concepts and identity of observable indicators. With the exception of structural-functionalism,[8] all are relatively narrow-gauge and therefore limited in their potential explanatory scope; they neither intend nor offer the promise of undertaking more than "partial" theoretical questions. An additional problem, as yet largely unexplored, is that of conceptual stretching: in the transfer of concepts from application in Western polities to Soviet-type systems there is a risk of loss of intended conceptual specificity.[9]

(Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1969). Marginally influenced by structural-functionalism is Richard C. Gripp, *Patterns of Soviet Politics* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press 1967). The "cybernetic sociocultural system model" (CSSM), is developed by Richard D. Dixon, Peter Feuerle, and Ram Singh, in "Models for the Comparative Analysis of Social Systems with Applications to Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union," presented at the Faculty Institute arranged by the Regional Council for International Education, Punderson Manor, Ohio, March 1973.

[5] R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Chicago: Aldine 1970); Carl Beck and others, *Comparative Communist Political Leadership* (New York: David McKay 1973); articles by Fleron and Kelly, Fleron, Lodge, and Gehlen and McBride, in Roger Kanet, ed., *The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies* (New York: Free Press 1971); Yaroslav Bilinski, *Changes in the Central Committee: Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1961–66* (Denver: University of Denver Monograph Series in World Affairs, 1967); T. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R.: 1917–1967* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1968); Robert H. Donaldson, "The 1971 Soviet Central Committee: An Assessment of the New Elite," *World Politics*, XXIV (April 1972), 382–409.

[6] Alfred G. Meyer, *The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation* (New York: Random House 1965); Jerry Hough, *The Soviet Prefects* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1969).

[7] Robert C. Tucker, "Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement Regimes," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 55 (June 1961), 281–90; Welsh (fn. 1), judges the Spiro issue-processing model as superior to systems and social stratification models for application to communist studies; Allen Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism without Terror," Fleron (fn. 1), 153–69; Eric P. Hoffman, "Communications Theory and the Study of Soviet Politics," *ibid.*, 379–96; Bohdan Harasymiw, "Application of the Concept of Pluralism to the Soviet Political System," *Newsletter on Comparative Studies of Communism*, V (November 1971), 40–54; Alex Simirenko, "Models of Communist Societies; Towards a Therapogenic Model," *ibid.*, 25–39.

[8] See Robert Holt and John Richardson, "Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics," in Holt and John E. Turner, eds., *The Methodology of Comparative Research* (New York: Free Press 1970), 21–71.

[9] See Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64 (December 1970), 1033–53. The problem of con-

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The zonal model discussed below is a product of this second school; it is constructed with empirical application in mind, and in scope approximates that of broad-gauge theory. We begin with a preliminary identification of some analytical problems endemic to studying the Soviet system, and conceptual implications that follow therefrom.

PROCESSES AND CONCEPTS

The matter of resolving once and for all the question of the extent to which the Soviet system is different from or similar to its Western counterparts remains a task for systematic investigation. Still, it is useful to entertain this question, if only in a tentative way. The purpose of Table 1 is to enumerate some of the more apparent features of contemporary Soviet political life which demonstrate similarities with Western systems. In Table 2, apparent differences are noted.[10] The profiles of similarities and differences are accompanied by an adjacent listing of implications for conceptualization.

In light of the similarities and differences between Soviet and Western political processes, several general considerations emerge. First, the *similarities* highlight significant analytical gaps. When so viewed, it is clear that the conceptual frameworks grouped in the first school fall short of telling the whole story. A more adequate explanation requires refinement in conceptualization. At the same time, the *differences* serve to remind us of the basic character of Soviet politics: though not purely "directed" in the totalitarian sense, it is still a relatively controlled society. Nevertheless, we conclude that these differences, however normatively interpreted, do not constitute an adequate basis for continuing to treat the Soviet political system as an entity apart. The task of bringing Soviet studies into the mainstream of comparative inquiry, as Jerry Hough has argued, requires less certainty in our judgments and more openness in our approach. The problem, in fact, is largely conceptual: "What is needed is a willingness—indeed a determination—to subject our assumptions to searching examination and to separate our distaste for the Soviet system from our descriptive analysis of it. Nothing will

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ceptual stretching in applying the group concept to Soviet politics is explored in Robert W. Clawson, "The Politics of Industrial Reform in the Soviet Union: 1957–65," Ph.D. diss. (University of California, Los Angeles 1969), chap. 8.

[10] Most of the differences presented in Table 2 have been gleaned from Welsh (fn. 1); Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Internal Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet System," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press 1966), 283–87; Alfred G. Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," in Fleron (fn. 1), 188–98; and Kassof (fn. 7). See also Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press 1964).

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TABLE 1

APPARENT SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SOVIET AND WESTERN POLITIES

Cross-national (General) Similarities	*Implications for Conceptualization*
1. Major policy decision making is a collective political process; no single person can be said to be in undisputed authority; political conflict occurs.	Requires framework which illuminates decision making and allows for conflict. Totalitarianism hence precluded.
2. Decision making entails the allocation of scarce resources; choices among a limited number of alternatives must be made.	Invites consideration of a framework for public policy analysis and rational synoptic decision models.
3. Identifiable institutions comprise the basic arenas of top-level political interaction.	Emphasis on processes cannot come at the expense of attention to institutions.
4. Political interaction occurs between policy makers and special interest groups; i.e., policy is arrived at with recourse to data and advice from essentially "nonpolitical" elites.	Channels for interest articulation exist. Moreover, policy decisions are not unaffected by articulations. Parochial or institutional loyalties impinge on policy choice. Bureaucratic politics framework here shows great but untapped potential.
5. Once arrived at, all policy requires mechanisms for its implementation if it is to be carried out.	Policy-implementing structures are not without discretion in implementation. Conceptualization must allow for this.
6. The population at large has wants and demands (e.g., a consumer ethic, travel, improved housing, etc.). Some outputs are directly related to such popular orientations.	Mass demand inputs are not completely latent; channels do exist for the expression of these demands; they cannot be studied unless they are acknowledged and conceptualized.
7. The political orientations of the population constitute an item of relative concern to the political leadership.	Political socialization is both a policy output and a variable of immense significance for present and future political behavior.
8. The political system is at once dynamic (capable of evincing much change), and stable (capable of utilizing effective mechanisms of crisis management).	Systems analysis addresses questions of dynamism and stability. Analytic potential here is yet untapped, as is the relationship between system stability and political recruitment.

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TABLE 2

APPARENT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOVIET AND WESTERN POLITIES

Differences—U.S.S.R.	*Implications for Conceptualization*
1. The pre-eminent extensive and intensive role of the Communist Party (CPSU) obscures virtually all subsystem boundaries; it results in a very high degree of party membership and activities among political elites.	Complicates the task of separating the political system from other types of social systems, and tends to hide the roles of special interest groups and other articulators within the elites in the policy process. Greater emphasis must be placed on development of precise conceptual referents.
2. Top political elites seek to insure a degree of insecurity for special interest groups as a measure of preventing the consolidation of vested interests whose legitimacy and entrenchment could serve to restrict the party's pre-eminent role in the policy process.	Must not exaggerate group impact; be alert to less visible processes of group articulation and self-protection.
3. Top Soviet officials have virtually no competing or conflicting responsibilities with or in the private (nonpublic) domain. They also have virtually no private base to return to if politically deposed.	Political recruitment occurs with longevity in mind; hence recruitment criteria are of immense importance for analysis. Role conflict, however, can and does occur (e.g., party-bureaucracy). Maximizes conformist political behavior and institutional conservatism, and therefore increases personal risks inherent in the advocacy of innovative policy. Suggests need for exploration of the bureaucratic politics model.
4. The leadership places substantial controls on political liberties and channels for overt expression of anti-regime viewpoints.	Elite-nonelite relationships must be studied for stability and normative implications.
5. The leadership devotes extraordinary resources to conduct intensive and extensive programs to educate citizens in the virtues of regime-functional political attitudes and activities.	The study of political socialization must be viewed as essential to understanding Soviet political processes.
6. The Soviet Union is essentially a closed society with all major decisions arrived at in secret at the top of the political hierarchy, inviting minimal participation from concerned elites and relatively controlled public discussion at lower levels of society.	Though secrecy in policy making is often a characteristic in Western systems, the Soviet system presents special problems of degree. Bureaucratic politics model appears to be an appropriate starting point.

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TABLE 2 (continued)

7. Ideological justifications accompany all policy decisions.	Specific origins and nature of processes for political and social change are obscured thereby. Tendency analysis suggested.
8. The military and industrial elites are integrated into the system's political and administrative structures, allowing for an extraordinary degree of influence.	Need to be alert to military concerns as input to policy process. Group theory or tendency analysis suggested.
9. Soviet internal politics is closely intertwined with the domestic and foreign situations of other communist (mainly East European) states.	The international communist system provides inputs into Soviet decision making, demonstrating a "linkage" relationship between domestic and foreign policy.

serve these purposes better than a rigorous comparative approach in the choice of standards that we apply, and strict comparability in the definitions of the concepts we employ."[11]

It is these aims to which we address ourselves in the following section. Specifically, we seek a framework that demonstrates cross-cultural applicability, that accounts for the principal features of political life, that stimulates a variety of propositions amenable to empirical testing, and, finally, that contains sufficient elements to yield empirical theory.

A Proposed Model for the Comparative Study of Politics

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND EXISTING APPROACHES

Our chief theoretical assumption is derived from the list of cross-national *similarities* presented above. *All* polities—popularity, ideology, and national character notwithstanding—evince certain behavioral regularities, patterns, and processes which are important and essential to the business of governing. These characteristics include the processes of political decision making and those that manage competing interests and implement public policy. All polities, moreover, have selection procedures for staffing leadership positions, as well as a concern for and some ability to shape political attitudes, values, and beliefs.[12] Within

[11] Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?" *Problems of Communism* (March–April 1972), 45. In an illuminating essay, Sharlet notes that "a massive job of reconceptualization stands before us if we hope systematically to study communist political systems, individually or comparatively." "Systematic Political Science and Communist Systems," in Fleron (fn. 1), 211.

[12] Since these similarities are derived from comparisons of Soviet and "developed" Western systems, without attention to nonindustrialized countries, we might restrict their intended universality to industrialized systems. Even so, the list of countries included (depending on criteria employed) is sizable; upon systematic investigation, the

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certain limits, however, political systems can develop characteristically unique *forms* that such processes take. Finally, of course, political systems differ in relative measures of democracy, stability, governmental authority, and so on. Our aim is to develop an analytic scheme that is cognizant of such similarities and that accounts for differences as well. Given this array of concerns, we have found it useful to adopt a posture of balanced appreciation for earlier conceptual work in developing a comparative and empirically framed conceptual apparatus. Our efforts here are essentially eclectic and drawn from those studies that have shown the greatest theoretical promise in terms of nomothetic orientation, sensitivity to environmental relationships, greater attention to process than to structure, and affordability of comparative statements. At the most macro level, Easton's systems analysis[13] and Almond's structural-functionalism[14] are potentially the most theoretically lucrative in the discipline. At a more micro level, recent attention to public policy analysis by the Mitchells[15] and Allison's bureaucratic politics framework[16] also demonstrate theoretical potential, and afford conceptual foci currently unattainable in more macro formulations. We note, however, that these frameworks, particularly those of Easton and Almond, have invited substantial critique.[17] Our "balanced appreciation," therefore, at-

less developed countries may eventually be shown to demonstrate such systemic similarities. Cf. Alfred Diamant, "Is There a Non-Western Political Process? Comments on Lucian W. Pye's 'The Non-Western Political Process,'" *Journal of Politics*, IX (February 1959), 123–27.

[13] The best summaries of Easton's work on systems analysis are David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, IX (April 1957), 383–400, and "Categories for the Systems Analysis of Politics," in Easton, ed., *Varieties of Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1966), 143–54.

Here and in subsequent sections, our use of the terms "micro" and "macro" as adjectives referring to analytic levels, not units, departs slightly from the more common usage in the literature. The relativist notion of these terms is noted by Heinz Eulau who employs them both ways: see *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics* (New York: Random House 1963), 123ff.

[14] Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown 1966). The "approach" of this work, as subtitled, is principally developmental; however, it also combines significant elements of the systems approach and structural-functionalism. It is the latter emphasis that supplies the chief concepts of interest to us.

[15] Joyce M. Mitchell and William C. Mitchell, *Political Analysis and Public Policy: An Introduction to Political Science* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1969).

[16] Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63 (September 1969), 708–11; Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971), chap. 5, esp. 162–81. Significantly, Thomas W. Wolfe has advocated the application of this model to the study of Soviet politics. See his "Policy-Making in the Soviet Union: A Statement with Supplementary Comments," P-4131 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 1969), 1–9.

[17] The major vulnerabilities of the systems and functional approaches, summarized in Table 3, are discussed in the following: James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, *Com-*

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tempts to account for some of the more compelling criticism these frameworks have generated. Since construction of the zonal model draws heavily from these works, it is useful to consider the critical appraisals of their respective merits and defects, as summarized in Table 3.

As noted in Table 3, the several approaches differ in terms of scope (providing their chief appeals), and in terms of assumptions and empirical operational potential (illustrating their conceptual weaknesses). The macro-level formulations of Easton and Almond pose more general questions than those of the Mitchells and Allison, the latter operative at a more micro level. The entire range of questions is of manifest interest to the discipline. The zonal model has as its chief purpose the integration of both these perspectives, which are not intrinsically incompatible but, given appropriate conceptual adjustment, are entirely complementary. The task entails combining the strongest points of each and correcting for their major weaknesses, as seen most clearly in the assumptions they incorporate and the operational problems they raise. Before we turn our attention to integrating the strengths of the approaches considered, we shall briefly discuss two sets of problems: assumptions and operational obstacles.

It is significant that the fundamental weaknesses of the above approaches need not accompany the integration of their strengths. With respect to the first problem set, the zonal model makes no assumptions about teleological or self-regulating properties of political systems; it neither assumes nor posits any "requisite functions," nor does it argue for the analysis of political "structures" in terms of their contributions to political "functions." It assumes no system functions whatsoever, nor is it an "ideal type." The second problem set, that of empirically operationalizing the concepts of the approaches considered, is fundamentally linked to these assumptions. As these are avoided in the construction of the zonal model, an important first step is taken toward operational potential. The next step hinges on the conceptual components of the model itself and is discussed briefly below. Like all models, however,

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parative Politics: The Quest for Theory (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill 1973), chap. 7; Robert T. Golembiewski, William A. Welsh, and William J. Crotty, *A Methodological Primer for Political Scientists* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1969), chap. 8; Lawrence C. Mayer, *Comparative Political Inquiry: A Methodological Survey* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press 1972), 142–36, and chap. 8. See also Sartori's critique of structural-functionalism (fn. 9), 1046–49. Welsh (fn. 1) examines the conceptual problems of systems analysis as they relate to inquiry on communist systems; Howard A. Scarrow explores the difficulties of combining systems analysis with structural-functionalism in *Comparative Political Analysis: An Introduction* (New York: Harper and Row 1969), 62–63.

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TABLE 3

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF SEVERAL THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Approach	*Strengths*	*Weaknesses*
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS (Easton)	Suggestive macro view of interactive relationship between political systems and their social environments. Conceptualizes real-world polities as "systems" and prompts logically related propositional set. A coherent model of objects and relationships abstracting from reality a theoretically plausible data-classificatory schema. Eminently cross-cultural.	Overly macro and abstract: political interaction is black-boxed; withinputs elusive. System boundaries obscured. Degree of abstraction from real world yields crucial concepts lacking empirical referents; thus propositions generated are untestable. Disproportionate stress on system stability, persistence, legitimacy, and support. Insensitive to normative aspects of value distribution: who gets what, when, and how. Questionable teleological assumptions empirically undemonstrable.
STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONALISM (Almond)	Embellishes systemic input-output view. Stresses political culture; points to socialization, conversion, and capability as important system attributes. Develops hypothesis of self-regulation. Breaks away from study of simple structures in favor of search for cross-culturally valid theoretical relationships.	Conceptually fuzzy; functions and structures somewhat tautological. Functional requisites and boundaries imprecise and empirically questionable. Absence of referents, plus enormous operational problems, render important propositions untestable. Functions operationally undefined. Same teleological problems as systems analysis. Explanatory and predictive capabilities weak.
PUBLIC POLICY (Mitchell and Mitchell) AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS (Allison)	Greater specification of conversion process: highlights give and take of politics. Points to needed policy focus and corresponding distributive aspects. Alert to normative considerations. Allows for study of people as political actors, linking individuals to political roles.	Excessively micro focus lacks explanatory capability of whole political systems. Understanding of policy process entails loss of comprehensiveness afforded in more macro-level formulations.

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the zonal construct also makes assumptions. Two of them seem basic: (1) universal similarity of processes noted above (though allowing for differences in forms), and (2) conceptualization of political life in a systemic way. Both assumptions are heuristic premises—the first of social scientific inquiry and prerequisite to general theory,[18] the second of comparative political analysis. Both are today widely shared, if not assimilated, by the political science community, especially among comparativists.[19] Unlike the frameworks of the first conceptual school noted above (Soviet politics as *sui generis*), the model incorporates no assumptions peculiar to the Soviet system, or, in fact, peculiar to any political system. Finally, the designation of "zonal *model*" simply reflects a preference over alternative labels for pre-operational conceptual constructs, chiefly on grounds of formalization.[20]

A ZONAL ANALYSIS MODEL FOR COMPARATIVE POLITICS

At first glance, our conceptual efforts are principally integrative. In arguing the complementarity of the several approaches noted above, we start by positing a three-level model as depicted in Figure 1. Basically, this begins with Easton's notion of inputs and outputs. The fundamental relationship illustrated by this highly abstract model is that of interaction between the political system and the subsuming social system, in the form of inputs and outputs. The processing of inputs from the various levels (1), (2), and (3) through the system results in a related set of political activities which produce outputs or outcomes that circulate through the various levels. The assumption at this point is that these abstract concepts have empirical referents. Easton's "axioms" concerning system stress cannot at this level be assumed, and his propositions generated at approximately this level are rightly criticized for

[18] Science, understood as "a search for hidden likenesses," is nomothetic. Frohock notes that, since science "is concerned with establishing causal relations and general laws," the social scientist pays a price: "the sacrifice of the distinctiveness of social events." Fred M. Frohock, *The Nature of Political Inquiry* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press 1967), 141. The search for universal concepts, i.e., those "which have similar (if not identical) empirical referents in all political systems," is a methodological commitment of comparative model builders and is clearly a prerequisite of general theory. Golembiewski and others (fn. 17), 242.

[19] As James Klonoski has stated of Easton's systems analysis, "the simple fact of the matter is that this outlook has become a part of modern political science." Quoted from a review cited in Bill and Hardgrave (fn. 17), 227. Systemically conceptualizing political activity is one of the substantive characteristics of the enterprise of comparative model building. Golembiewski and others (fn. 17), 242.

[20] Our use of the term "model" follows George J. Graham, *Methodological Foundations for Political Analysis* (Waltham, Mass.: Xerox College Publishing Co., 1971), 112–25. See also Gregor's discussion of "candidate preliminary schema" in A. James Gregor, *An Introduction to Metapolitics* (New York: Free Press 1971), 32-33.

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

FIGURE 1. THE SOCIAL-POLITICAL SYSTEM

being so abstract as to be untestable. This first, preliminary model merely illustrates that it is the principal business of the political system to process demands and supports from the social environment, the political system, and from within the allocator itself. This processing results (in a so far undefined manner) in some mix of policy outcomes.

This model corresponds in general outline to the input-output content of Almond's functionalism. However, Almond's stress on the notion of "requisite functions" is neither testable nor of central importance to the merits of the scheme. The importance of Almond's work lies in his development of several concepts crucial to understanding political life, which are valuable for their descriptive content and explanatory potential *independent* of functionalism as a logic of inquiry. Whatever the defects of a functionalist's logic,[21] these concepts are employed here as elements and activities that obtain in and affect the performance of political systems. Specifically, they include the following: political culture, system maintenance and adaptation, political socialization, recruitment, and interest articulation and aggregation. We do not contend that such items are "functional," or that acceptance of functionalism is prerequisite to their utility. We simply argue that these concepts can tell us more about political systems than can be ascertained without them, and that they are more informative theoretically when removed from functionalist theory and treated systemically.

Finally, the model draws attention to an explicit policy focus: the

[21] See Carl G. Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in G. Gross, ed., *Symposium in Sociological Theory* (New York: Harper and Row 1969); and Robert E. Dowse, "A Functionalist's Logic," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966), 607–22.

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politics of policy making—its origins, nature, and consequences. Effectively overlooked in the macro-level formulations of systems and functional analysis, a policy focus derives its importance from reasons beyond its intrinsic interest; in many ways, it defines the relationship between the political and subsuming social system. Our aim is to incorporate this focus theoretically into a more comprehensive framework.

The integration of these analytic modes—a systems approach to political life, the key concepts of Almond's work, and a policy focus—is central to the model. We aim to maximize the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of these frameworks. We are explicitly seeking a conceptual framework that is sufficiently comprehensive to incorporate the chief concerns of political analysis, but will permit attention to relationships at different levels of analysis. In short, what we are arguing for is a framework allowing consideration of both macro- and micro-levels, and one that allows for the shifting of levels of analysis without risking a disproportionate loss in conceptual specificity.

By incorporating the complementary aspects of the theoretical approaches, the model illustrates the most important analytical levels in political inquiry corresponding to the three systemic levels noted above: social system, political system, and authoritative allocator. Furthermore, the model illustrates within and across these levels several distinctive analytical foci that conceptualize observable variation within and among political systems. These foci constitute the analytic *zones* discussed below. The object of conceptualizing in this manner is to obtain a composite view of political systems and the chief constituent variables that yield differing system behaviors.

At the highest level of abstraction, the model should provide a comprehensive view of what these several levels of analysis can tell us about the way political systems operate in their environments. Contained within this aggregate perspective are several zones of analysis. The term *zone of analysis* indicates an analytic concept, not a concrete one; it has no counterpart in the real world. The term "zone," used in reference to the model, refers to the analytic perspective of the investigator; used in reference to operational research (discussed below), the term designates key variables for analysis. The zonal model presents a composite picture of the political system; the several zones of analysis afford different analytic perspectives of that picture. More specifically, the zones constitute a heuristic device to carve out important and analytically distinct segments of political systems. The fundamental premise of the zonal model is that an understanding of the basic behavioral relationships within these zones and between them will yield a more com-

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prehensive understanding of the political system and how it performs in its social environment.

What follows is a descriptive overview of the five zones of analysis that we consider theoretically important to systematic analysis of any and all polities. The intended levels of analysis are: Zones III and IV, micro; Zones I and II, intermediary; and Zone V, macro. A more detailed presentation appears in Table 4 below.[22]

Zone I: Political Culture. In the most general sense, political culture refers to modal patterns of orientations toward specific political objects and activities. This zone derives its importance from the fact that attitudes, values, and beliefs about political objects exert demonstrable influence on the various parts of political systems, and in turn are influenced by them. The nature of this interaction is better understood when viewed in relation to the other zones. Depending on the political system being investigated, it may be useful to isolate elite and nonelite political cultures in terms of cognitive orientations (knowledge and information) and affective orientations (feelings of attachment or rejection).

Zone II: System Maintenance and Adaptation. Our basic concern, in this zone, is with the chief processes endemic to a political system's capabilities to adapt itself to change and maintain itself over time. It is not necessary to assume that systems "live," or that they seek to preserve themselves. System persistence and disintegration are facts of political life and demonstrate observable indicators. An explanation of system maintenance and adaptation is provided by analytic attention to the two most important processes that constitute the *subzones* of Zone II: (A) political socialization, and (B) political recruitment. As in the case of political culture, there are certain interactive traits with the other

[22] Our discussion of these zones draws heavily from the efforts of earlier investigators, but principally those of Almond and Powell (fn. 14), and Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown 1965). We wish to make this acknowledgment, but also note that our treatment of these concepts quite often departs from Almond's; his emphasis is on political development, ours is not. Our discussion of political culture draws from Mayer (fn. 17), chap. 9, and Walter A. Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (New York: Praeger 1975), chaps. 1 and 2. Note should be taken that our intentions here, and in Table 4, are designedly suggestive, especially in the matter of enumerating suitable empirical referents for the model's key variables, and in the empirical-normative distinction. Our empirical emphases are chiefly those of system efficiency, while our normative interests are those which seek to provide a basis for value judgments on the *homo mensura* principle and on the assumption that reasoned choices require empirical bases. See Eugene J. Meehan, *The Foundations of Political Analysis: Empirical and Normative* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press 1971), esp. Part II.

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zones, and these interrelationships suggest the consideration of a number of system-level variables relating to stability, change, and other features.

Zone III: Political Input Action. The focus of this zone is on the input side of political systems. It directs attention to the two major processes of political input participation: the subzones (A), interest articulation—the formulation and presentation of particular (demand or support) inputs, and (B), interest aggregation—the combining and packaging of alternative courses of policy action, which are political activities that occur prior to a government's (authoritative allocator) selection of policy; the latter is the concern of Zone IV.

Zone IV: Policy Action. Our aim, in this zone, is to penetrate the "black box" of conversion by focusing on the policy process (not "rule making"), as well as on the system's output side. The three subzones here are (A) policy making, (B) policy implementation, and (C) policy adjudication. The chief concerns here are the hows, whys, and consequences of policy activity, viewed as internal to Zone IV, and in relationship to the other four zones.

Zone V: Total System. In this macro-level zone, we deal principally with the operative relationship between the political system and its larger social environment. Empirically, we are concerned with system performance in terms of such dependent variables as stability, capability, responsiveness, and resilience; normatively, we ask about the "good life." The independent variables are of two principal types: those dealing with whatever findings are generalized from investigations of Zones I to IV, and social and economic indicators selected for analysis, such as education, urbanization, and industrialization.

We treat the various zones and subzones as variables at two basic levels. First, any zone may be viewed separately, as a distinct analytic entity, and exclusive of the other zones. When attention is thus focused, the concern is *intra*zonal. By this we mean that when any single zone, or its attendant concepts and subzones, is treated as a *dependent* variable, and when the *independent* variables are taken from the same zone in question, then intrazonal research is under way. Research at this level aims to account for the activities and phenomena *within* a particular zone. Second, when the analytic concern shifts to relationships *between* and among zones, the concern is *inter*zonal. In this case, while any particular zone may be treated as *dependent*, the *independent* variables

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TABLE 4

DESCRIPTION OF ZONES

ZONES OF ANALYSIS	CENTRAL ORIENTING CONCEPTS	CHIEF UNITS/LEVELS OF ANALYSIS	ZONE AS VARIABLE: RANGE OF VARIATION		THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS		ESTIMATED SOVIET DATA AVAILABILITY
			AS PROCESS	AS CONTENT	EMPIRICAL	NORMATIVE	
I POLITICAL CULTURE	Modal patterns of orientations toward political objects	Attitudes, values, beliefs of individuals	Continuity and heritage of dominant and subcultural profiles. Orientations as catalyst or deterrent to political action	Orientations toward political institutions and processes, self, and others as political actors: trust, legitimacy, efficacy, competence, and satisfaction	Congruence of orientation patterns between populace and political elites, and formal governmental processes	Social-political tolerance, pluralism; popular participation; ethnocentrism; xenophobia; individualist-collectivist values	Selectively: Soviet attitude survey data increasingly available and applicable, including emigrant surveys
II SYSTEM MAINTENANCE AND ADAPTATION	A. Political Socialization B. Political Recruitment	A. Socialization processes B. Induction and staffing procedures	A and B: Process dominance/autonomy; central/local	A. Inhibit/facilitate ability to critically appraise system performance and structure B. Ability and competence of political leaders	A. Supportive/destructive of system maintenance and change B. Recruitment criteria: controlled/pluralistic, innovative/conservative	A. Foster tolerant, pluralist, participatory political culture. B. Recruitment legitimacy: popular, technocratic, patronage: degree of popular choice	A and B: Some formal Soviet data availability, supplemented by increased capability for field observation. Growing elite data archives in West
III POLITICAL INPUT ACTION	A. Interest Articulation B. Interest Aggregation	A and B: Demand and support input participation of individuals and groups; relevant institutions in input processes	Degree of autonomy Input targeting: specific/diffuse. Activity: promotional/self-pleading. Style: pragmatic/absolute	Demand content: specific/diffuse; manifest/latent; particularistic/universalistic; secular/ideological; demand/support	A and B: Expand or delimit input scope, and range of policy options	A and B: Availability of opportunities for political expression, and potential influence in policy initiation	A. Rapidly expanding Western case study data, not matched by Soviet data or field research capability B. Soviet data sparse. Western elite studies helpful
IV POLICY ACTION	A. Policy Making B. Policy Implementation C. Policy Adjudication	A. Policy processes and decisions B. Bureaucratic patterns C. Judicial processes and decisions	A. Accessibility and participatory scope and impact B. Range of implementary discretion C. Autonomy from A and B	A. Design of policy intent relative to issue needs B. Congruence with policy intent C. Degree of issue resolution	A, B, C: Efficacy and consequences of policy activity	A, B, C: Degree of accountability, openness, responsiveness, arbitrariness, justice, social consequences, and adherence to rule of law	A,B,C: Relatively broad coverage chiefly of Kremlinological variety; varies with policy considered
V TOTAL SYSTEM	Relationship between political system and social system environment	System performance: How stable, capable, responsive, resilient	Depending on social political relationship examined, common variables amenable to relative and/or typological measures: e.g., high-medium-low		Evaluation: system performance in relationship with social system	Attainment of good life: harmony of human community; dignity of man, individual and collective	Socioeconomic data increasing; political data generated from other zones

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are composed of any of the *other* zones, their attendant concepts and subzones, as well as whatever other social and economic (or other "non-political") data are deemed useful to the investigation. One way to express such hypothesized interzonal linkages is illustrated by the matrix in Table 5. It is at this level—the interzonal level—that the interactional dynamics and theoretical potential of the model are most evident.

When we say that any zone can be treated as a variable, we refer to the idea that any zone can be described in terms of relative qualitative types or quantitative magnitudes. Specifically, zones may vary in at least two principal ways: in terms of content, and in terms of process. For example, if we are interested in Subzone III:A (interest articulation), we note that the *process* of articulation may vary in relative measures of autonomy, latency, specificity, and visibility. This kind of variation is referred to as process. At the same time, we note that the *content* of articulation may vary along several change-seeking or status quo-maintaining dimensions. For instance, the actual content of a particular articulation (e.g., demand for more and better consumer goods) might result from—or in—variation in this or other zones. In other words, changes in the variation of the articulation subzone, when treated as a dependent variable, may result from changes either internal to Zone III (intrazonal), or external to it (interzonal). Likewise, when treated as an independent variable, such changes in articulation may be examined as causally prior to other intra- and interzonal changes. (See Table 4.)

A fully operationalized model would consist of a coherent set of logically related and empirically tested propositions. Built inductively, such propositions first would be generalizations at the subzonal level. For example, in the case of Zone III, our interest lies in generating and testing propositions in each subzone. Specifically, tested propositions grouped in Subzone III:A (interest articulation), and III:B (interest aggregation), are further refined, then linked. The outcome sought from linking these two subsets is a more generalized group of statements about Zone III, political input action. The same empirical, inductive process applies to the other zones. Ultimately, we would aim for a further generalized set of tested propositions that link the several zones. Empirically built and logically linked, the resultant cross-culturally tested propositional set should approximate system-level political theory.[23]

There are typological implications as well. Use of the zonal model directs attention to comparative aspects of political systems in theoreti-

[23] Reference to "theory" here follows Mayer: "a system of logically related, empirically testable, lawlike propositions" (fn. 17), 48.

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TABLE 5
ZONAL MATRIX

$y = f(x)$		Zone I: Political Culture	Zone II: System Maintenance and Adaptation		Zone III: Political Input Action		Zone IV: Policy Action			Zone V: Total System
			A *Political Socialization*	B *Political Recruitment*	A *Interest Articulation*	B *Interest Aggregation*	A *Policy Making*	B *Policy Implementation*	C *Policy Adjudication*	
Zone I	Political Culture									
Zone II: System Maintenance and Adaptation	A *Political Socialization*									
	B *Political Recruitment*									
Zone III: Political Input Action	A *Interest Articulation*									
	B *Interest Aggregation*									
Zone IV: Policy Action	A *Policy Making*									
	B *Policy Implementation*									
	C *Policy Adjudication*									
Zone V:	Total System									

NOTE: The elements of the matrix are the zones and subzones. Arranged conventionally, the dependent variables are listed vertically in the left column, the independent variables are named horizontally across the top. As a guide to research, the matrix is suggestive. For example, designating any zone or subzone as dependent, the investigator can work *laterally* across the matrix generating hypotheses about observed changes in the named *y* as a function of the effects of observed variation in salient independent variables (*x*'s)—i.e., those listed across the top. Similarly, the investigator, working the matrix *vertically*, can treat any zone or subzone as independent, thus hypothesizing the effects of observed changes there as causally prior to any observed variation he wishes to explain in the zones or subzones examined as dependent. (The case study that follows examines the relationships noted in the cross-hatched cells.)

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cal ways not afforded by existing democratic-developmental-totalitarian typologies. This feature of the model is as yet unexplored and will depend on the kinds of intra- and interzonal generalizations yielded by subsequent analyses. However, since the model stresses zonal relationships, we anticipate that different system types will illustrate differing zonal configurations described in terms of interdependencies. For example, our Soviet case study below shows a very strong relationship between the scope of activity in Subzones III:A (articulation) and IV:A (policy making), a kind we would not expect to find in Western democracies. Clearly, further work on a zonal system typology awaits future comparative research.

Before moving on to our illustration, we should indicate several methodological appeals of conceptualizing in this way. First, the model is theoretically parsimonious: it restricts attention to a few, though important, variables[24]—the several zones and subzones. Second, as mentioned above, the model permits shifting from micro to macro levels while inviting minimal conceptual distortion, since the theoretical connectedness of the several zones is constantly present. Third, the model invites consideration of questions of interest to both empirical and normative theorists. On the empirical level, the model's preponderant focus is on questions raised by systems analysts concerning performance, stability, responsiveness, and so on, as well as on the mix of political activities and elements that influence these and other dimensions of system performance. If the concerns of the empiricist are often how *well* a system performs, those of the normativist may be how *wisely* it performs. Neither of these theoretical perspectives is intrinsically denied in the model presented here. In this sense, we argue for a more unified political science; notwithstanding methodological antagonisms, normative and empirical researchers have much to offer one another. The approach discussed here can help to bridge these concerns. Finally, the model facilitates dynamic analysis since it is highly sensitive not only to changes in the various segments of political systems, but in their interrelationships as well. This feature is thematic in the case study that follows.

It is neither possible nor even perhaps advisable to undertake here an

[24] See Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65 (September 1971), 690. Lijphart states: "Comparative analysis must avoid the danger of being overwhelmed by large numbers of variables and, as a result, losing the possibility of discovering controlled relationships, and it must therefore judiciously restrict itself to the really key variables, omitting those of only marginal importance."

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extensive discussion of either the proposition-generating potential of the entire model or specific operational directives for concept measurement. In the space remaining we provide a partial illustration of several inter- and intrazonal relationships evident in the politics of Soviet industrial reform, 1962–1965. For a dependent variable we have arbitrarily selected Subzone III:A (interest articulation). We wish to explore the association between changes in the economic interest articulation process during this period and changes in the Soviet policy process; thus, Subzone IV:A (policy making) constitutes the source of the independent variables.

In the following illustration, our work is fashioned toward exploring the model's conceptual applicability to the Soviet political system. Hence it is, in Lijphart's taxonomy, chiefly a hypothesis-generating case study.[25] Although the data gathered are non-numerical and thus no statistical tests of association are attempted, we are satisfied that the qualitative method employed is suitable for the purposes of the case study.[26] The task of converting our verbal statements to more precise mathematical formulations is one that must await further research. Given the paucity of quantifiable political data (all too well known to students of the Soviet policy process), we restrict ourselves in the present investigation to accessible qualitative observations and concentrate, following Wolfe, on developing an adequate conceptual device to handle them.[27]

The Zonal Model: A Partial Application to Soviet Politics

Changes in the attitudes of Soviet policy makers toward interest articulation began to occur in the mid-1950's, coinciding with Khrushchev's ascendancy. Nikita Khrushchev, and eventually to some extent his

[25] *Ibid.*, 692: "Hypothesis-generating case studies start out with a more or less vague notion of possible hypotheses, and attempt to formulate definite hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a larger number of cases. Their objective is to develop theoretical generalizations in areas where no theory exists yet."

[26] Sociologists Barney G. Glazer and Anselm L. Strauss have persuasively argued that "qualitative research—quite apart from its usefulness as a prelude to quantitative research—should be scrutinized for its usefulness in the discovery of substantive theory. By the discovery of substantive theory we mean the formulation of concepts and their interrelation into a set of hypotheses for a given substantive area. . . ." "Discovery of Substantive Theory: A Basic Strategy Underlying Qualitative Research," *The American Behavioral Scientist*, VIII (February 1965), 5.

[27] The problem is less one of the "fog of secrecy" and data generation than one of concept formation. In fact, there is, as Wolfe argues, "a great variety of direct and indirect information available on the activities of the Party and state bureaucracies, and upon the issues with which the Soviet leadership must deal. The problem perhaps is more often one of interpretation and analysis of this information, of finding an adequate conceptual model to explain how the system operates. . . ." Wolfe (fn. 16), 1.

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lieutenants, reversed their earlier professed Stalinist attitudes toward the relevance of diverse articulation inputs in the Soviet political process. Various nonleadership elements of the population began making demand inputs to Soviet policy-making structures. This alteration of the general Stalinist monolithic prescription never resulted in a formal policy change toward the ability or legitimacy of diverse interests to organize. However, within specialist populations, fleeting and informal "schools" and alliances did appear, most prominently relating to reforms in Soviet law, education, economic administration, military policy, and police powers.[28]

These phenomena have essentially been based on very loose, nonassociational, shared attitudes held by individuals manifesting relatively low degrees of face-to-face interaction. They have mainly been specialists who, primarily through the publication of critical literature, have claimed advisory roles in the formation of policy within their areas of academic or practical specialization.

Such activities appear to have developed slowly, due to the basic characteristics of the Soviet system; the flow of communications continued to be systematically restricted, and it was the common assumption of those concerned that expansion of articulation was frought with personal risk. Although Khrushchev demonstrated to numerous categories of specialists that he valued their inputs (witness the calling of these "outside" experts to testify before the Central Committee),[29] only few indications of that attitude appeared in the public media. Khrushchev and his successors remained reluctant to designate in any concrete way

[28] See H. Gordon Skilling, "The Party, Opposition, and Interest Groups: Fifty Years of Continuity and Change," *International Journal*, XXII (Autumn 1967), 618–31; Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics" (fn. 3); and the studies in Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 3). For other important works combining case studies and theoretical analysis, see Schwartz and Keech (fn. 3); Donald Barry, "The Specialist in Soviet Policy Making: The Adoption of a Law," *Soviet Studies*, XVI (October 1964), 152–65; and Philip D. Stewart, "Soviet Interest Groups and the Political Process: The Repeal of Production Education," *World Politics*, XXII (October 1969), 29–50. See also Lodge (fn. 3). Other contributions to the group literature include John Berman, "The Struggle of the Soviet Jurists Against a Return to Stalinist Terror," *Slavic Review*, XXII (June 1963), 314–20; John Hazard, "Has the Soviet State a New Function?" *Political Quarterly*, XXXIV (Autumn 1963), 391–98; Louis Andolino and Lawrence Baas, "The Soviet Jurists as an Interest Group: An Analysis of Their Role in the Formulation of the 1958 Criminal Code," unpub. (Kent State University 1970); D. Richard Little, "The Policy Making Process in the Soviet Educational System," Ph.D. diss. (University of California, Los Angeles 1965); Clawson (fn. 9); Alfred Monks, "Evolution of Soviet Military Thinking," *Military Review*, Vol. 51 (March 1971), 78–93; and Peter Juviler, "The Soviet Campaign for Law and Order," paper presented at the Midwest Slavic Conference, Lincoln, Neb., April 1969.

[29] Howard R. Swearer, "The Dynamics of Administrative Reform in the Soviet Union," unpub. (University of California, Los Angeles 1963). See also Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, *The Communist Party Apparatus* (Chicago: Henry Regnery 1966), 196.

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the limits of acceptable behavior, thus maximizing insecurity among the specialists and ensuring a highly cautious and conservative public approach to organizing. However, it is clear that the restrictions placed upon journal and newspaper editorial boards were dramatically reduced.[30]

THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL REFORM, 1957–1965: BACKGROUND DESCRIPTION

In 1957 the Soviet system of industrial administration was decentralized. Moscow-based industrial ministries—each controlling a major segment of production—yielded control to local comprehensive territorial units. Basically, this step was taken to provide partial solutions for two sets of problems. First, the maturing Soviet economic system was stagnating under the inflexible rules of a command economy. As a remedy, most Soviet observers advised decentralization to about fifty locally controlled economic districts.[31] Second, Khrushchev's political problems were becoming critical in early 1957. He needed allies in his struggle to achieve a stable hold on the entire top leadership, and apparently sought to recruit them by making the local *oblast* party secretaries more powerful. The result was the sacrifice of economic administrative effectiveness for short-term political survival. Khrushchev created over one hundred *oblast*-size economic districts. To administer virtually all industrial production in each district, he created councils (*sovnarkhozy*). In these, the role of the local *oblast* secretary would predominate. By 1962, economic chaos had resulted from the drastic decentralization, and Soviet growth rates had reached new lows. Khrushchev again decided that the system should be modified. The result was a patchwork of intermediate "coordinating" agencies and a reduction in the number of economic administrative districts—principally a strong trend toward recentralization. Between 1957 and 1962, economists articulating inputs

[30] Clawson (fn. 9), 105–6, and 245–61. That restrictions in relation to economic discussions were sharply reduced is also borne out in Richard Judy, "The Economists," in Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 3), 209–51.

[31] I. Kugukalo, "Ekonomicheskie rayony Ukrainskoy SSR" [The Economic Regions of the Ukrainian SSR] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (April 1957), 44–54; A. Koroyed and I. Kugukalo, *Pravda*, April 4, 1957; N. Organov, "K voprosu ob ekonomicheskom rayonirovanii Sibirii" [A Contribution to the Problem of Dividing Siberia into Economic Regions] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (April 1957), 36–43; A. Omarovskiy, "O nekotorykh voprosakh organizatsii upravleniya i planirovaniya v promyshlennosti SSSR" [On Several Problems Related to the Organization of Administration and Planning in the Industry of the USSR] *ibid.*, 64–74; V. Vasyutin, "O kompleksnom razvitii ekonomicheskikh rayonov" [On the All-Around Development of Economic Regions] *ibid.*, 55–63; and A. Osorgin, "Utochnit granitsy ekonomicheskikh administrativnykh rayonov" [Making the Borders of the Economic Administrative Regions More Accurate] *ibid.*, 148–49.

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had primarily urged that industrial administrative reforms be guided by economic factors rather (they implied) than political expediency; these modifications represented a kind of limited victory for that viewpoint.

Following the changes of 1962, several schools of academic economic-administrative thought emerged. One of them published articles advocating increased managerial autonomy. A second advocated a highly sophisticated cybernetic system of central planning and control. A third school attempted, in effect, to link the two. All were unified on one point, however: a massive reform of the chaotic Khrushchevian system had to occur.

In 1965, following Khrushchev's forced resignation, industrial administration was returned to the basic, centrally controlled system of branch industrial ministries, with some significant variations on the Stalinist model. Portions of the suggestions of all three schools were included in the 1965 recentralization. The producing enterprise was given some increased powers which substantially reflected the arguments of the Liberman and Nemchinov schools; at the same time, major data link-up experiments that were related to more effective economic planning incorporated the cybernetic point of view.

In short, the various schools of economists were able to engage in interest articulation: they presented a very broad range of opinions to the leadership for consideration, and had an impact on portions of policy. The range of solutions advocated had been remarkably expanded in the period considered, and the process by which they were articulated had been significantly modified over time.[32]

IDENTIFICATION OF VARIABLES

Because our analytic focus is on the interest articulation subzone of the matrix as the dependent variable, we are at once led away from examining the total multiple phenomena of the reforms, and are directed to look at a particular set of articulations *in relation* to those reforms. Our focus is further narrowed by the case study selected and described above, involving several schools of academic economists.

The principal events we seek to explain are the articulations of economists' demand inputs in Soviet industrial administration between 1962 and 1965, the period of highest relevant articulation. From the model and the data provided in the description, we are instructed to ask the questions that appear to be most important in relation to the data. What

[32] This summary draws primarily from Clawson (fn. 9), and Judy (fn. 30).

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articulation inputs did these economists make? What was the intended policy content of these articulations? How was their content shaped? How was it possible for these particular specialists to engage in articulations relating to the reforms? Does such articulation activity constitute a departure from the range and scope of existing activity?

The course of answering such questions is made analytically more rigorous by a further imperative of the matrix portion of the model. Directing our attention to interest articulation (Subzone III:A) as the dependent variable, we can work our way horizontally through all the zones from political culture to total system, asking and hypothesizing how independent variables in each zone affect the economists' articulations. For the purposes of this illustration, it is sufficient to concentrate on one subzone as a source of independent variables to determine the relationships between them and the economists' inputs. We are directed by the summary and our general knowledge of the Soviet system to regard policy making (Subzone IV:A) as the most salient and productive subzone in this case.

Focusing on the cell in which interest articulation is a dependent variable and policy making an independent variable (shaded, see Table 5), propositions of content and process may be generated to explain articulation in terms of the portions affected by policy making. As indicated above, a complete picture of all the variables acting on the economists' activities cannot be obtained without an analysis of all the zones and their independent variables. Such a vast undertaking is beyond the scope of this illustration. The limits of our inquiry are set by the following question: In the case of the economic policy discussions of 1962–1965, in what ways does the articulation activity of the academic economists—in terms of its content and process—appear to be affected by the policy-making activity of the Soviet leadership?

PROPOSITIONS: INTEREST ARTICULATION AS A FUNCTION OF POLICY MAKING

Following the 1962 reforms, an unprecedented increase in the range of economic discussion flourished in both the mass and the specialized press. There were two major schools of economists still pressing for structural reform of the system. The first consisted of those who favored Evsei Liberman's theory of the industrial firm as the basic organizing principle of the economy.[33] The other major school, consisting of the

[33] The most important proponents of the Liberman proposals after November 1962 were published in the prominent national press organs. See V. A. Trapeznikov, *Pravda*, August 17, 1964, and E. G. Liberman, *Pravda*, September 20, 1964. There was an extended discussion of the Trapeznikov article, and a number of letters from economists such as B. Smakhov, backing the proposals with a few reservations, in *Pravda*, Febru-

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mathematical economists or cyberneticists (e.g., Kantorovich, Novozhilov, Lifshits, Lure), believed that vast computer networks and elaborate production and distribution formulas were solutions to economic organization.[34] As practical answers, these two positions are quite divergent. One would place authority for making decisions concerning industrial policy squarely with the enterprise or firm. The other would advocate that policy decisions be made at a considerable distance from the nagging and often petty importunities of the individual industrial enterprise. Between these two extremes, but allied with one or the other at various points, were other economists who gave their voices to the clamor raised for further and more effective reforms after what they considered the half-hearted changes of 1962. Men like L. A. Vaag and S. Zakharov and V. Nemchinov cannot be definitely placed in either group, but their ideas were widely publicized; they contributed to the tenor of critical dissent and diversity of input that prevailed in the community of professional economists.[35]

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ary 17, 1965. Also advocating additional enterprise autonomy was an article by N. Fedorenko, *Pravda*, January 17, 1965, and an editorial in *Economicheskaya gazeta*, February 24, 1965. Also see A. M. Birman and V. D. Belkin, *Pravda*, October 14, 1964, and S. Iliyshin and A. Rutenburg, "Za bolee effektivnye formy khozyaystvovaniya" [For a More Effective Form of Management] *Planovoe khozyaystvo* (January 1965), 51–59.

[34] This group's views of mathematical economics after 1962 were partially represented by the following: A. I. Lifshits, *Primenenie matematiki i elektronnykh vychislitelnykh mashin v ekonomike* [The Application of Mathematics and Electronic Computers in Economics] (Novosibirsk: Ekonizdat SO AN-SSSR 1963); A. L. Lure, *O matematicheskikh metodakh resheniya zadach po optimum pri planirovanii sotsialisticheskogo khozyaystva* [On Mathematical Methods for Making Optimal Decisions in Planning a Socialist Economy] (Moscow: "Nauka" 1964); and A. I. Berg and Yu. I. Chernyak, *Informatsia i upravlenie* [Information and Administration] (Moscow: "Ekonomika" 1966). There were many articles in which the basic request for the introduction of these techniques was repeated. Among the best-known are: V. M. Glushkov, A. A. Dorodnitsyn, and N. Fedorenko, *Izvestia*, September 6, 1964; S. Lifshits, "Primenenie matematiki i eletronnoy vychislitelnoy tekhniki v ekonomike" [The Application of Mathematics and Electronic Computing Techniques in Economics.] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (May 1964), 157–58; V. M. Glushkov and N. Fedorenko, "Problemy shirokogo vnedreniya vychislitelnoy tekhniki v narodnoe khozyaystvo" [Problems Related to the Widespread Adoption of Computing Techniques in the National Economy] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (July 1964), 87–92. There was an extensive debate in *Literaturnaya gazeta* between May and August 1964, in which the basic requests were again repeated. And most of the participants in this group gave presentations at a Conference on the Application of Mathematics to Economics sponsored by the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and published under the main title of "Ekonomisti i matematiki za 'Kruglym stolom'" [Economists and Mathematicians at the 'Round Table'] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (September 1964), 63–110.

[35] See L. A. Vaag and S. Zakharov, "Platnost proizvodstvennikh fondov i pribyl predpriyatiya" [Production Fund Charges and Enterprise Profit] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (April 1963), 88–100, and Vaag's pamphlets, *Sovershenstvovat ekonomicheskie metody upravleniya khozyaystva* [Toward Improvement of the Economical Method of Administration of the Economy] (Moscow: Ekonomika 1965), and *Plata za proizvodst-*

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The common themes intrinsic to the writings of all of these schools involved, first, a recognition of the basic defects of the existing organization of the Soviet industrial economy; second, an implied assertion of the right to advise on matters related to their academic expertise; and third, the fashioning of specific solutions to these problems. The articulated solutions constituted nothing less than full-scale policy recommendations for major economic reform—a culmination of the steadily growing interplay between economic specialists and the political leadership.

Content. We can formulate a number of propositions about the unprecedented range of diversity in the content of the economic solutions articulated as related to the political situation obtaining in the policy-making subzone.

H_1: The range of solutions articulated is negatively associated with imposed restrictions on economic discussions, and positively associated with specific encouragement from the political leadership.

In examining this relationship, it is important to recognize the basic nature of Soviet policy making in that period. Of central importance is the fact that specialists, who may have perceived the pressing need for economic reform, still lacked the wherewithal to articulate their concerns effectively to those who made the policy decisions. Notwithstanding the confusion and flux of de-Stalinization and Khrushchev's erratic style, important policy discussions and inputs from outside the normal party policy-making hierarchy were generally still initiated and controlled by the top leadership.[36] Public discussion was effectively

vennye fondy i effectivnost ikh ispolzovaniya [The Charge to the Production Fund and the Effectiveness of Its Employment] (Moscow: Ekonomika 1966). This group included several prominent economists working permanently with state line operations. Also see V. Nemchinov, *Primenenie matematiki v ekonomicheskikh issledovaniyakh* [The Application of Mathematics in Economic Research] (Moscow: Sotsikgiz 1959); *Obshchie voprosy razvitiya proizvoditelnykh sil* [General Questions on the Growth of Productive Forces] (Moscow: Izdatelstvo akademii nauk SSSR 1960); *Ekonomiko-Matematicheskie metody i modeli* [Econo-Mathematical Methods and Models] (Moscow: Sotsikgin 1962); and *O dalneyshem sovershenstvo-planirovaniya i upravleniya narodnym khozyaystvom* [Toward the Long-Term Perfection of Planning and Administration of the Economy] (Moscow: Ekonizdat 1963). Also see numerous articles by the aging Nemchinov during 1964 in such varied organs as *Kommunist, Voprosy ekonomiki*, and *Literaturnaya gazeta.*

[36] Henry W. Morton, "The Structure of Decision-Making in the USSR: A Comparative Introduction," in Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton, eds., *Soviet Policy Making: Studies of Communism in Transition* (New York: Praeger 1967), 12.

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controlled in those years by guidelines issued by the party hierarchy through *Agitprop* to the editorial boards of publications. The leadership informed outsiders of any desire for content diversity in public discussion by means of a statement—sometimes public—directly to those concerned.[37] Although many of the specialized public discussions of those years may not have been officially inspired, the subjects that were open to popular debate were limited by the party leadership. There were areas, such as policy on tort liability, which were discussed essentially without restrictions and without specific encouragement by the leadership, because the post-Stalinist leaders apparently did not consider them to be crucial or sensitive. There were other areas on which the leadership substantially restricted discussion and did not encourage content diversity at all, e.g., the formulation of foreign policy.[38]

Evidently, the academic and research economists, functioning outside the normal policy-development channels of the party hierarchy, fell into a category partway between the two. The party leadership, for reasons explored below, decided to reduce the restrictions on discussion and to encourage a limited diversity in economic debate. The result at first was a cautious—because the limits were not spelled out—expansion of the range of criticism. Then, when restrictions were further reduced and the leadership increased its explicit encouragement, a broad range of articulated economic solutions began to appear in print.[39]

The two independent variables in the above proposition may be further explained by attention to the dynamic elements underlying their occurrence. The first independent variable in H_1—reduced restrictions on economic discussions—can be accounted for by perceptions and activities within the top party leadership:

H_2: Reduction in the restrictions on public discussions by economic specialists is positively associated with leadership recognition of the scope and complexity of the problem, and with controversy within the top leadership.

[37] R. W. Campbell, "Marx, Kantorovich, and Novozhilov," *Slavic Review*, xx (October 1961), 402–18; M. Dobb, "The Revival of Theoretical Discussion Among Soviet Economists," *Science and Society*, xxiv (Summer 1960), 274–92; Myron Rush, *The Rise of Khrushchev* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press 1958), 88–94; and Gayle Durham Hollander, *Soviet Political Indoctrination* (New York: Praeger 1972), 47–51, 86–87.

[38] Andolino and Baas (fn. 28); Aspaturian (fn. 10). Varying sensitivities of the leadership to different policy sectors very likely have implications for the degree of specialists' influence as well; i.e., influence is inversely related to policy sensitivity. Donald R. Kelly's study supports this hypothesis, utilizing data from the 1958 educational reforms and the economic reforms of the preceding year. See "Interest Groups in the USSR: The Impact of Political Sensitivity on Group Influence," *Journal of Politics*, xxxiv (August 1972), 860–88.

[39] See in particular the works cited in fns. 33, 34, and 35.

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These two major changes—the leadership's recognition of the problem, and controversy within the leadership—lie at the root of the decreased restrictions on public discussion. As the administrative mechanisms created by the reforms of 1957 were becoming increasingly inoperable (circa 1962), the leadership began to voice what in effect was a very cautious public recognition of the basic problems existing in the Soviet economy. For the first time since Stalin's consolidation of power, the Soviet leadership was admitting publicly that the Soviet economy faced major difficulties. Subsequently, an increasingly broad spectrum of economic opinion was published and discussed in the press.[40]

The existence of widening controversy within the top leadership is illustrated by Kosygin's involvement with the debate over enterprise autonomy. Khrushchev, Kozlov, Suslov, and perhaps Kirilenko—all members of the Politburo (then Presidium)—appear to have stood against any basic reform of the economy. Following Khrushchev's forced resignation, what eventually came to be called the "Kosygin

[40] It is evident from statements by the leadership (referred to by Judy), that they recognized the industrial administrative problems of the Soviet economy as "economic" problems, but not entirely. Khrushchev in particular was prone to consider administrative problem solving as essentially getting the "right man in the right place." With his replacement by two more conservative administrators, efficiency by shake-up tended to lose some of its attraction, and more purely economic solutions were at least formally more popular than under Khrushchev. See Kosygin, *Pravda*, September 28, 1965. This could easily be overstressed, however. See Judy (fn. 30), 218–32.

For an idea of the extremely broad range of input, see the classics: L. V. Kantorovich, *Ekonomicheskii raschyot nailuchshego ispolzovaniya resursov* [Economical Calculation of the Best Utilization of Resources] (Moscow: Izdatelstvo AN-SSSR 1959); the conference reported under the title of "Matematicheskie metody v ekonomiki" [Mathematical Methods in Economics] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (August 1960), 100; A. Berg, *Pravda*, October 24, 1962; L. M. Gatovskiy, "Sotsialisticheskiy printsip materialnoy zainteresovannosti i ispolzovanie tovarnodenezhnykh otnosheniy" [Socialist Principles of Material Interest and the Employment of Commodity-Money Relations] *Kommunist*, xxxv (January 1959), 69–78; E. G. Liberman, "Ob ekonomicheskikh ruchagakh vypolneniy plana promyshlennostyu" [Concerning Economic Levers of Industrial Plan Fulfillment] *ibid.*, 88–97; V. Nemchinov, "Stoimost i tsena pri sotsializme" [Cost and Price under Socialism] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (December 1960), 85–103; E. G. Liberman, "Planirovanie proizvodstva i normativy dlitelnogo deystviya" [The Planning of Production and Standards of Long-Term Operations] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (August 1962), 104–12; and the most famous Liberman piece in *Pravda*, September 9, 1962. Other participants include M. Fedorovich (anti-Liberman); V. Nemchinov (cautiously skeptical of Liberman *and* the mathematicians); numerous letters to the editors from technicians and practitioners, and a series of essays critical of things in general but not picking up Liberman or any other particular strain. Through November 1962 the battle moved back and forth: V. Chernyavsky (pro-Liberman), and K. Plotnikov and A. Zverov (against): a debate in the *Dolovoi Klub* ringing in all sides and published in *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*. In late November, Birman and Belkin attempted to wed the Liberman proposals to Berg's revival of Kantorovich's ideas of price and value. Following a symposium in *Voprosy ekonomiki* in December 1962, the first round ended. There was also an extremely broad range of commentary on organizational themes in the early 1960's. See Clawson (fn. 9), 257–61.

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reforms" were adopted as basic Soviet policy. Among other things, they bore a strong resemblance to much of what had been advocated by both the managerial autonomy school and the cyberneticists. The leadership publicly, if dimly, recognized the problem's economic dimension; lacking consensus on feasible solutions, it signaled decreased restrictions on public discussions of economics.[41]

The second independent variable of H_1 identifies the leadership's encouragement of content diversity and is further described as follows:

H_3: The leadership's encouragement of diversity of economic content is positively associated with its perceptions of faulty policy formulated without the advice of specialists, and with the leadership's perceptions of the accuracy of earlier economic articulations.

These two major changes—the leadership's recognition of mistakes in policy due to lack of participation by experts, and their acknowledgment of the accuracy of previous outside advice—are basic to the increase in the leadership's encouragement of content diversity. Specifically, the recognition that faulty policy had been made in the absence of any real outside expert advice gradually emerged after Stalin's death. Stalin had allowed a mere handful of economists to voice opinions. These men advocated only what they thought Stalin wanted to hear. That was, in fact, not outside specialist advice but sycophancy. During the late Khrushchev period, there was a public recognition of the resulting disastrous economic decisions that were having their full impact only after Stalin's death.[42] The realization that expert outside opinion had some relevance for Soviet economic policy may well have resulted in the leadership's desiring nothing more than detailed advice. In fact, the outside experts generated wide-ranging solutions premised on total reform. Most of them were apparently encouraged by the leadership's hope that from these diverse articulations would emerge appropriate solutions.

Criticism by "outside" economists had by 1962 not only gained the ear of the leadership, but was also perceived to an increasing degree as

[41] Tatu (fn. 2), 283–88; Harry Schwartz, *The Soviet Economy Since Stalin* (Philadelphia: Lippincott 1965), 121–88; Jeremy A. Azrael, "The Legislative Process in the USSR," in Elke Frank, ed., *Lawmakers in a Changing World* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1966); and Michel Tatu, "Soviet Reforms: The Debate Goes On," in D. Richard Little, ed., *Liberalization in the USSR: Facade or Reality?* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath 1968), 53–61.

[42] See Judy (fn. 30), 218–23. Criticism of sycophancy in the "economists" favored by Stalin was a particularly common theme during the Khrushchev years.

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accurate. Between 1957 and 1962, the economists, whose inputs had on the whole not been incorporated into policy, were at least able to show that their pessimism about the 1957 reforms had been generally justified. Khrushchev himself credited the scholars with having originally suggested some of the changes he instituted in 1962; he noted in his address to the Central Committee meeting of November 1962 that many of the proposed reforms had been advocated by certain academic specialists as early as the spring of 1957.[43] The eclectic Kosygin reforms announced in 1965 illustrated that virtually the entire spectrum of economists' articulations was now perceived by the leadership as completely correct —even to the point of simultaneously adopting mutually contradictory policies.[44]

In sum, the unprecedented increase in the diversity of articulated content occurred as a result of a decrease in the existing restrictions on discussion and an increase in the leadership's encouragement of a wide range of expert solutions—changes that were prompted by the developments detailed in propositions H_2 and H_3. The leadership's decisions to decrease content restrictions and encourage content diversity had a positive impact on the range of solutions articulated. But what process was it that made the economists take advantage of these content opportunities? What accounts for their more active political role? In the Soviet system real political activism, in marked contrast to that found in any Western pluralistic system, is a form of participation reserved for a select few, usually within the leadership of the Communist Party and government. Involvement of outsiders in a process of effective articulation hinges on decisions by Soviet policy makers. We are thus again compelled to look to the policy-making subzone. Here we shift our focus from content to process.

Process. While a content proposition is related to *what* is presented and produced (specific communications, legal documents, speeches, articles), a process proposition centers on *how* the operation is performed—i.e., the usage of political styles, methods, channels, and authority patterns.

Specifically, the nature of Soviet authority patterns during the period under consideration may be described as hierarchical and compartmentalized. The effect on policy of any articulated solutions was primarily at the discretion of forces located in the policy arena; the degree

[43] Khrushchev, *Pravda*, November 20, 1962.

[44] The initial, and abbreviated, version of these changes is found in Alexei Kosygin, *Pravda*, September 28, 1965.

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of participation by outside experts was officially the prerogative of the leadership. Further, the party continued to prevent any outside group from organizing, electing independent leadership, or appealing to the public at large for support. However, the Soviet policy-making process was increasingly accessible to participation by outsiders in the formation and implementation of policy.[45]

Accordingly, we can generate some propositions about the process of political activism of the academic economists as it relates to the political situation obtaining in the policy-making subzone. The first proposition is a general one:

H_4: Political activism by economic specialists is positively associated with accessibility to the policy process, and with leadership legitimation of their policy-advising role.

Under the Stalinist authority pattern, societal efficiency was sacrificed to political control. Following the post-Stalin struggle for succession, a tendency emerged toward bargaining (versus hierarchy), autonomy (versus compartmentalization) and a limited tolerance of expert input; policy was thus based partially on societal efficiency.[46] The important decisions, however, were still initiated at the top by the party leadership. The leadership's confidence in its ability to solve complex social problems, such as those presented by the stagnating economy, should not be overstressed, however. In fact, the leaders found themselves performing in ways that increased the desire for expert input to the policy-making process. In particular, they became increasingly convinced that modern Soviet economic problems were too complex for them to handle with only the "inside" resources available to them.[47] More and more, they

[45] Morton (fn. 36), 6–12.

[46] Morton, drawing on Dahl and Lindblom, describes *hierarchical* as a situation where "leaders substantially decide when, in what conditions, and with whom, consultation takes place." Drawing from Rose, he describes a *bargaining* system as one where "the cooperation of several groups, each with different sources of strength and differing needs, [is] required for the attainment of an object of government policy." A condition where "no group—outside of the Party—has the right to organize, to elect independent leadership, to communicate freely with its followers, or to appeal, if necessary, to the public at large for support" is *compartmentalized*. The term *autonomous* refers to a condition where "subsystems function with little direct governmental control." *Ibid.*, 9–10.

[47] Albert Parry, *The New Class Divided* (New York: Macmillan 1966); Herbert S. Levine, "Economics," in George Fischer, ed., *Science and Ideology in Soviet Society* (New York: Atherton Press 1967), 107–38. For the pre-1962 period, see Khrushchev, *Pravda*, February 15, 1956, and other Twentieth Party Congress documents, *Pravda*, February 15–28, 1956. Also see Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economy* (New York: Praeger 1961), 68. For the later period, see Clawson (fn. 9), 216, 303–07; such prereform documents as the Central Committee *postanovlenie* of July 17, 1960, in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* of that date; and Schwartz and Keech (fn. 3).

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were allowing portions of outside advice to enter the policy arena for consideration and processing, and to emerge as policy on economic matters, thus increasing accessibility to policy making.[48] In short, the leadership's need for policy-oriented expertise had inevitable ramifications for the growing political roles of the academic economists.

These specialists began to publish more widely, thus substantially increasing the dissemination of their reformist ideas both among themselves and for the political leadership. Their activities were anything but apolitical. Not merely were more solutions being advocated, but considerably more economists were voicing them: the specialists were participating in much greater numbers. In addition, leading spokesmen of the various schools of thought took their arguments well beyond the printed page. They attended conferences at which these proposals were discussed; many traveled widely to promote their viewpoints beyond Moscow and the central party apparatus located there, and several appeared at Central Committee meetings for the sole purpose of addressing the party leadership on the causes of and remedies for the economic stagnation.[49] In brief, the party leadership allowed the process to become more accessible to economic specialist influence, thus conferring steadily increasing political legitimacy on the process of economic interest articulation.

The two independent variables in H_4 may be accounted for by further attention to the decisional perspective of the policy makers. The first points to leadership dynamics that had the effect of increasing the specialists' accessibility to the policy process:

[48] Khrushchev, *Pravda*, November 20, 1960. Also see Jerome Gilison, *British and Soviet Politics* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press 1972), 165–72; Joseph R. Strayer, "Problems of Dictatorship: The Russian Experience," *Foreign Affairs*, XLIV (January 1966), 264–74; and Clawson (fn. 9), 373–92.

[49] Conferences and symposia on the question of how best to reform the Soviet economy were organized and sponsored by local, regional, and national clubs, institutes, and state administrative agencies. These were regularly reported, often verbatim, in the pages of *Voprosy ekonomiki, Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, and even the general national press, under the same headings and in the same formats used to chronicle the hundreds of relatively meaningless "conferences" which had gone before. But the conventional style did not conceal the fact that what was being discussed had new substance. See examples listed in fns. 34 and 40.

With reference to specialists appearing before the Central Committee, see fn. 29, and Richard Lowenthal, "The Revolution Withers Away," *Problems of Communism*, XIV (January–February 1965), 10–22. Khrushchev's habit of "embarrassing" the Central Committee by inviting economists and other outside experts to explain policy alternatives to the members may have been one of the accusations presented in Suslov's indictment of Khrushchev in October of 1964. See Karl W. Ryavec, "Khrushchev," in Edward Feit and others, *Government by Men: Personality and Politics in Comparative Perspective* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, forthcoming).

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H_5: Accessibility of the economic specialists to the policy process is positively associated with the leadership's perceived need for a broader base of economic expertise, and with the leadership's differentiated search for supportive arguments on behalf of competing political initiatives within the Politburo.

The leadership's increased desire for a broad base of expertise and the interest of the various factions in generating supportive arguments lay at the base of the expansion in accessibility to policy making. Specifically, the desire for a broader base of economic expertise reflects another dimension of the elements identified in proposition H_1. While the increased range of solutions (described as *content* above) may be viewed as an intensive development based on the leadership's desire to get a wider spectrum of input from the economists, the motivation to broaden the number of economists actually participating in the debates (*process*) appears to represent a "natural" Soviet inclination toward participation on a larger scale. If a dozen economists could produce an interesting spectrum of significant but still socialist solutions, ten dozen should do even better.[50]

The competing leadership group's apparent search for supportive argumentation is essentially a companion element of process to the content variable identified in H_2 as "controversy within the top leadership." While the expanded scope of debate meant that segments of the leadership would be permitting various relaxations in content guidelines in order to gather the most convincingly stated arguments, the present process variable represents the desire of leadership factions to appear to have a maximum force of rational experts supporting them. As portions of the leadership began to identify with different main currents of reform, they probably also sought additional assistance by encouraging increasing numbers of economists to support their positions.[51]

The second independent variable in H_4, leadership legitimation of

[50] The earlier publicity surrounding the publication of "millions" of letters to the editor during the debate over the 1957 decentralization scheme displays this mentality in its classical form (fn. 9), 105–08. That the "mass" participation of economists in 1957 got mixed up with Khrushchev's encouraging the articulation of authentic policy alternatives may simply have been coincidence. That the subsequent involvement of the experts was *not* accompanied by the participation of "millions" is open to various interpretations. Suffice it to say that Khrushchev's statements during the early 1960's, exhorting economists to participate in increased articulation, seem to have been asking them to do so *en masse*; it appears to have been typical of Khrushchev's style. See Khrushchev (fn. 43).

[51] Skilling discusses the general phenomenon of client-patron relations in the Soviet context: "Interest Groups and Communist Politics: An Introduction" in Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 3), 41–42.

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the policy-advising role of the economic specialists, can also be further accounted for:

H_6: Increased legitimation of the economic specialists' policy-advising role is positively associated with the leadership's perceived need that policy appear to be based on rational economic criteria, and with the leadership's apparent willingness to appraise the utility of an expanded policy-formation process.

Here it appears that the Soviet leaders were literally experimenting with a limited variation of Soviet "mass participation" in major policy decisions. Unlike the mass public discussions that accompanied the Stalin constitution of 1936, the economic decentralization reforms of 1957, and other examples of formula "democratic" participation, the economists' inputs that began in 1962 and followed through to 1965 constituted a very real involvement of many specialists. The Soviet leadership appeared to be stressing that this involvement was a prime example of their continued effort to instill the policy-making process with "rationality." The most highly qualified opinions available were now informing policy. The result was expected to be not only a more effective economic system, but also the increased legitimacy of economic policies, thus awarding additional credence to the party leadership. At the same time, if the reforms went wrong, obvious scapegoats would be close at hand.[52]

It is important to note that the leadership was in a limited way responding to the pressure of the specialists themselves. The latter were asking for an advisory role in deciding those policy issues on which they claimed proprietary expertise. The leadership evidently was willing to consider and appraise the virtues and drawbacks of a politically more

[52] To argue that Khrushchev was "image-conscious" on key policy questions defies adequate documentation, yet inferentially it is not without support. In fact, the relative openness of Khrushchev's style (including in particular his sensitivity to important specialist constituencies), especially when contrasted with that of his successor, remains one of the distinctive features of the Khrushchev years. Sidney Ploss notes, "Khrushchev tried to create a real public opinion, slightly lifting the cloak of secrecy around Politburo operations of the past and present. Both practitioners and theorists openly urged solutions to national dilemmas, going all the way to the Liberman proposals for steeply upgrading the role of profits in Soviet industry." "New Politics in Russia?" *Survey*, XIX (Autumn 1973), 28. Also see Barghoorn (fn. 4), 219–29; Skilling, "Group Conflict in Soviet Politics: Some Conclusions," in Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 3), 403.

In the first years following Khrushchev's departure from power, it became common for Soviet policy to be announced in a manner that implicitly compared Khrushchev's adventurism unfavorably with the "business-like" and "rational" leadership provided by Kosygin. See Wolfgang Leonhard, "Politics and Ideology in the Post-Khrushchev Era," in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson, eds., *Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1968), 54–55. Leonhard cites *Pravda*, October 17, 1964 and November 1, 1964, as well as *Partiinaya zhizn*, Nos. 20 and 21 (1964), and *Kommunist*, No. 15 (1964).

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active role for the experts. During this period, the utility of policy participation by specialists would be measured against the utility of the traditional, closed decision-making practice at the top of the party-government oligarchy. There was a distinctly experimental quality attached to the policy makers' variety of orientations toward the economists.[53] That was not only an admission of the complexity of the substantive economic issues, but also of the increasing complexity of the policy process itself. In other words, access to more information and advice was only half the package; how to convert this conglomeration of diverse and often conflicting recommendations into sensible economic reform was the other half. Greater political involvement of the specialists —without, of course, actually abdicating final political authority—represented an opportunity for the leadership to consider not merely the substantive issues at hand, but also the larger question of the process itself.[54]

Synthesis. Having isolated the important changes in articulation activity in specific inputs (content), and the style, dynamics, and participatory scope of the expression (process), we must now synthesize these two related phenomena into a more generalized statement on articulation activity of the academic economists studied herein.

First, setting our focus at the interzonal level—i.e., the relationship between interest articulation and policy making—a strong association seems evident. The increase in both the range of solutions advocated (H_1) and the activity of the economists (H_4) appears directly attributable to changes in the policy arena. Although we cannot conclusively demonstrate that such an increase in economic articulation in 1962–1965 *could* have resulted independently, regardless of the aims of the leadership, it seems quite clear from the evidence that it did not. Moreover, while we

[53] See Lodge (fn. 3), 11–30.

[54] This hypothesis certainly invites contrasts between the policy-making styles of Khrushchev and Brezhnev: if indeed the leadership was experimenting with the *process* of greater specialist involvement—and the events described do suggest this—what, then, were the political results? The question is not answerable without further systematic study, but preliminary attention to the major economic debates of the 1970's (e.g., SOFE, the role of the production associations, and the perennial issue of consumer goods) suggests that the leadership now is relatively less impressed with the utility of vigorous specialist involvement of the 1962–1965 type; economists no longer seem to enjoy the same policy participation as they did during the reforms under discussion here. See Ploss (fn. 52); John Dornberg, *Brezhnev: The Masks of Power* (New York: Basic Books 1974) 191–95 and 202–04; Barghoorn (fn. 4), 226–27; and Darrell P. Hammer, *USSR: The Politics of Oligarchy* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press 1974), 319–20. A theoretical discussion of the relationship between economic specialists and political elites is provided in Jeremy R. Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1966), chap. 7.

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cannot pinpoint a precise *decision* taken deliberately by the party leadership to sanction this scope of economic articulation, the *net effect* of the perceptions and activities of the policy makers was to do just that. Thus, a more generalized perspective on the case studied here points to the following synthetic hypothesis:

H_7: Economic interest articulation is positively associated with leadership-sanctioned modifications in the policy process which legitimate and encourage its expression.

First, in matters of national economics, the Soviet process of interest articulation appears *non-autonomous*: when policy needs dictate, it will occur; otherwise, it very likely will not—at least not in the scope and diversity identified above. In sum: lacking visible change in restrictions on publishable discussion, specific encouragement from a divided party leadership, and expressed concern for greater input on specific issues—a rather clear leadership legitimation—specialist articulation is likely to remain latent or weak.

Second, in restricting our focus to the intrazonal level, we obtain a better picture as to *why* the leadership policy changes, resulting as they did in significantly expanded specialist input, occurred in the first place. A review of the independent variables identified in the intrazonal propositions (H_2, H_3, H_5, and H_6) indicates not merely political divisions within the leadership, but also a growing appreciation for the expertise only the professional economists could bring to bear on the enormously complex problems of economic reform. In short, there was more than a mere glimmer of rationality in the process. Thus we hypothesize:

H_8: The Soviet leadership's decision to expand economic articulation activity is associated not only with political divisions among the top policy makers, but also with a corresponding appreciation for the utility of specialist input, and a rational comprehension of the complexity and magnitude of the problem.

In a word, although the decisional process was not completely open, and its participants were not dispassionate and united, neither was it totally arbitrary or devoid of a variety of well-argued positions with ample supporting data. Thus, our findings lend support to what Triska and Finley have identified as a "synoptically rational decision process."[55]

[55] Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan 1968), 69–74. See also Donald R. Kelly's discussion of "rationalization of decision-making" in "Toward a Model of Soviet Decision Making: A Research Note," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68 (June 1974), 701; and Brzezinski and Huntington (fn. 10), 202 ff.

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Figure 2 is a simplified flow chart of the causal linkages hypothesized above.



FIGURE 2. FLOW CHART OF HYPOTHESIZED LINKAGES FOR SOVIET INDUSTRIAL REFORMS DISCUSSED IN 1962–1965

CONCLUSIONS

In summarizing our illustration of the zonal model, we wish briefly to highlight several related substantive and methodological concerns.

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Substantively, we have shown that the remarkably wide diversity of the content of the economic inputs—ranging from Liberman to Kantorovich, with much inbetween—and the increased political activism of the numerous economists was associated with changes in the policy-making zone. This does not mean that other independent variables from this or other zones did not have an impact. Indeed, there is no doubt that they did. In arguing that expanded economic articulation followed crucial changes in the Soviet leadership's growing comprehension of economic and political complexities, we do not maintain that the latter is totally explanatory, or that our evidence is so conclusive as to preclude alternative interpretations. But, based on our findings in the above case study, we suggest that significant changes in the present Soviet political system, especially those related to politically sensitive policy inputs, are unlikely to occur *autonomously*. Rather their origins result from, and their pace is regulated by, activities in the Soviet leadership system. It also appears, however, that in such a situation inputs may not be entirely controlled or controllable. In other words, this investigation has shown that in the Soviet system, and very likely in other communist systems as well, the interdependence between the zones of interest articulation and policy making is characteristically very strong: the likelihood of significant change in the former is highly dependent on change in the latter.

Although the technical specialists do not appear to be enjoying the same role as policy advisers under Brezhnev as they did under Khrushchev, the *relationships* posited here seem to demonstrate continuity. The preservation, if not the reinforcement, of the essentially authoritarian character of the Soviet political system, and therefore the maintenance of restrictions on policy discussions and the renewal of conservative ideological orthodoxy, seems to be a major commitment of the Brezhnev system.[56] In brief, the articulation process appears no more autonomous today than in the period of the case we examined; Brezhnev's style of leadership seems to insure this.

Methodologically, our partial use of the zonal model in the case study illustrates several conceptual considerations we believe important in the analysis of Soviet politics. First, by focusing on the process of interest articulation rather than on interest *groups*, the study is not encumbered with the conceptual problems normally attending a group-based

[56] Sidney Ploss (fn. 52), dates Brezhnev's more rigid style from April 1968, when the Party Central Committee met to "ratify the lessons" of the Dubcek experiment in Czechoslovakia.

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analysis.[57] Second, unlike virtually all of the case studies of Soviet articulation to date, in which policy is treated as the dependent and interest articulation as the independent variable, the compelling logic of the model directed us to do just the reverse: study the impact of policy making on interest articulation. The demonstration of this heuristic capacity suggests that one of the most valuable characteristics of the model is its potential for facilitating the discovery and clarification of the broadest range of multivariate relationships. Third, the model has provided a broader conceptual framework in which the findings of particular case studies can be theoretically integrated. Further studies of the relationships within and between those examined above and other zones of analysis may suggest the possibility, not only of more theoretically complete explanations of single political systems, but of macro-level comparative theory as well.

We are fully aware that the concepts of greatest interest to political scientists—especially to those studying data-poor systems—remain the least amenable to quantitative measurement no matter what theoretical framework they occur in; this model, like all models, does not pretend to be a panacea for the discipline's conceptual ills. Yet as a framework for inquiry it has been a major aid in our own investigation, and it provides a wide variety of theoretically important and related questions for further research.

Much work remains. In this sense our study is both partial and illustrative. The model's applicability, however, is intended for comparative analysis involving all political systems. Our interest is in making further zonal comparisons involving a wide variety of polities, and in developing a systems typology based on such comparative findings. These tasks, of course, go far beyond our intentions here.

[57] In particular, a tendency to view Soviet politics as formalistic and static, to exaggerate group cohesion and impact, and to restrict attention unduly to occupational groupings. See Jan F. Triska's review of Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 3), "A New Approach to Soviet Politics," *Problems of Communism*, XX (July-August 1971), 77–80, and the chapter by Griffiths in the volume reviewed. Also see David E. Langsam and David W. Paul, "Soviet Politics and the Group Approach: A Conceptual Note," *Slavic Review*, XXXI (March 1972) 136–41.

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SOVIET HEGEMONY IN EASTERN EUROPE: The Dynamics of Political Autonomy and Military Intervention

By CHRISTOPHER D. JONES*

THE Soviets have dealt in different ways with the East European Communist regimes that have come into conflict with the Soviet Union. Moscow carried out full-scale military interventions against Hungary in 1956 and against Czechoslovakia in 1968. In Yugoslavia, Tito faced both verbal assaults and overt threats of military intervention between 1948 and 1953, as did Gomulka in Poland in October 1956. Khrushchev mounted a ferocious polemical attack on the leaders of the Albanian party in 1961, but did not threaten to use military force. When the Rumanians broke out of the Soviet orbit in the early 1960's, the Soviets refrained from taking even verbal reprisals.

Most Western observers have concluded that, in these conflicts with East European Communist regimes, the Soviets resorted to military intervention only when certain ideological or strategic issues were at stake. In their view, East European Communists who avoided challenging the Soviets in these particular areas were able to break free of Soviet control and were subjected only to a greater or lesser degree of verbal abuse.[1]

In this study, I will present a different view—that in the conflicts between the Soviet leaders and the leaders of the Communist parties of Yugoslavia, Poland, Albania, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia there was only one real issue at stake: control over the local Communist party. The adversaries in these struggles have been Muscovite factions dependent on Soviet support, and domestic factions seeking to base their rule on genuine popular support. In the struggles between the Muscovite and domestic factions of the Communist parties of Yugoslavia, Poland, Albania, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia, it was not the ideological or strategic issue publicly raised by Moscow that determined whether the Soviets intervened militarily. What really determined

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[1] Zbiginiew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1974), passim; Robin A. Remington, *The Warsaw Pact* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press 1971), 165–74; Philip Windsor, *Czechoslovakia 1968* (New York: Columbia University Press 1969), 62–94; Jacques Levesque, "Modèles de conflit entre l'URSS et les autres états socialistes," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, VII (March 1974).

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whether the Soviets would resort to military intervention against a domestic faction was whether that domestic faction demonstrated to Moscow the capacity and will to mobilize its country for armed resistance. In Hungary, Khrushchev's intervention was not aimed at a domestic faction of the Hungarian party that was trying to take over from the Muscovites. He sent his troops to put down a popular anti-Communist uprising directed against all elements of the Hungarian party committed to preserving a one-party dictatorship.

Policy and Personnel in the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe

After the Bolshevik revolution, Communist parties were formed in every country of Eastern Europe. Each of these parties accepted Lenin's 21 conditions for membership in the Comintern. These conditions called for strict subordination of party members to the party's leadership. During the 1920's, the East European parties accepted an additional condition for membership in the Comintern: their first duty was the defense of the U.S.S.R. In accepting this obligation, the parties of Eastern Europe came under the complete control of Moscow. In the 1930's, Stalin appointed and purged the leaders of these parties, dictated their policies, and even dissolved the Polish Communist Party in order to improve Soviet relations with Hitler. Their ties to Moscow reduced the potential followings of most East European parties, because they appeared to be agencies of a foreign power, and because the policies dictated by Stalin were often inappropriate for the political conditions of Eastern Europe.

At the end of World War II, Soviet armies installed Communist parties in power in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. In Yugoslavia and Albania, the Communists came to power on their own, as leaders of wartime resistance movements. Despite their different routes to power, all the leaders of the East European parties had originally been appointed by Stalin. From 1945 to 1948, the parties installed by the Red Army enjoyed considerable leeway in their domestic policies; some of them won a substantial degree of popular support by their policies of land reform and nationalization of industry. But, because of their ideological recognition of Stalin as the leader of the Communist movement and because of the unavoidable fact that they could not stay in power without the support of the Soviet army, these parties were still subordinate to the Soviet Union.

The Yugoslav Communists had never been dependent on the Soviet army. After coming to power, they no longer saw their primary duty

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to be the defense of the U.S.S.R., but the construction of a socialist society in Yugoslavia. As a ruling party, the Yugoslav Communists had to decide whether or not they would let Moscow retain control over matters of policy and personnel. Tito resolved the question in favor of Yugoslav control of the Yugoslav party. Tito's decision led Stalin to the discovery that in a ruling Communist party, the Leninist principle of centralism and the Stalinist model of industrial development both tended to concentrate power over the party in the hands of the local party leader. This discovery prompted him to make strenuous but unsuccessful efforts in 1947 and 1948 to wrest control of the Yugoslav party back from Tito. As a practicing Leninist, Stalin would not voluntarily part with control over a body that had been in his power. He probably also feared that if he permitted Tito to acquire control over the Yugoslav party, the leaders of the other East European parties might try to follow Tito's example.

After failing to overthrow Tito, Stalin launched a campaign to prevent the East European parties still dependent on the Soviet army from consolidating sufficient power to achieve autonomy. He dramatically reasserted the traditional Soviet right to appoint the leaders of the East European parties and to lay down their policies by ordering a massive purge, especially of the "home" Communists who had spent the war years in their own countries. Stalin reserved the leading positions in the East European parties for the "Muscovites"—the Communists who had spent the war in Moscow and were totally dependent on Stalin. He justified these purges by asserting that Titoist agents had infiltrated the East European parties as part of an imperialist plot to begin a new world war.

Stalin demanded that the East European leaders blindly imitate Soviet domestic policies: collectivization, rapid industrialization, and police terror. He also exploited the economies of Eastern Europe for the benefit of the Soviet Union. By insisting that his policies be adopted throughout the Soviet bloc, Stalin established clear criteria by which to evaluate the submissiveness of the East European leaders. Such policies had the effect of so alienating the peoples of Eastern Europe that the party leader in each country and the party itself became even more dependent on Soviet support to stay in power.

Stalin succeeded in pre-empting the autonomy of the East European parties that had been installed by the Soviet army, but he succeeded at the cost of making these parties face the prospect of popular anti-Communist uprisings. Following Stalin's death in 1953, violent demonstrations by workers broke out in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

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Polish workers staged similar demonstrations in 1956. Later that year, a student protest in Hungary erupted into a full-scale anti-Communist uprising. After the violence in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, Malenkov and Khrushchev tried to stabilize the explosive situation in Eastern Europe that Stalin had bequeathed to them. To lessen the likelihood of popular revolts and to invest the East European regimes with a modicum of legitimacy, they ordered the leaders of the fraternal parties to adopt a "New Course." The New Course required the East European Communists to adapt their domestic policies to fit local conditions and to satisfy popular demands for consumer goods.

The purpose of the New Course was not to eliminate Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, but to camouflage it. Stalin's successors were no less willing to part with control over the East European parties than Stalin had been. Soviet party leaders probably feared that they would come under sharp attack from their colleagues if they voluntarily gave up one of the "gains of World War II"—a phrase the Soviets still use to refer to the creation of socialist states in Eastern Europe.

In 1955, Khrushchev resumed relations with Yugoslavia in the hope that rapprochement with Tito would aid the East European parties in their quest for legitimacy. If the independent Yugoslav party voluntarily cooperated with the CPSU, then the other parties in the region might claim that by cooperating with the Soviets, they too were demonstrating their independence. In 1955 and 1956, Khrushchev and Tito signed statements that endorsed the right of every socialist country to determine its own method of socialist construction. At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev made it part of the Soviet canon that each socialist country would follow its own road to socialism.

To the extent that Khrushchev succeeded in removing the danger of popular anti-Communist uprisings in Eastern Europe, he succeeded in bringing back the specter that had haunted Stalin: the possibility that an East European Leninist party would win enough domestic support to make itself master in its own domain, even though it had not come to power on its own. In ordering the fraternal parties of Eastern Europe to adjust their domestic policies to local conditions, Khrushchev was ordering them to tread a fine line between dependence and autonomy. The Soviets defined dependence as loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, to proletarian internationalism, and to the unity of the socialist camp. They defined autonomy as an exaggeration of national peculiarities, nationalism, and ideological deviation either to the right or the left. The excuses the Soviets were later to give for their intervention against attempts by East European Communists to achieve autonomy was that

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the leading role of the party was being threatened, a counterrevolution was in the offing, the unity of the socialist camp was in jeopardy, and the imperialists were scheming to restore capitalism in the country.

After the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, internal power struggles developed in the Polish and Hungarian parties between the Muscovite factions associated with Stalin and loose coalitions of reformers who took Khrushchev at his word and began to seek popular support for extensive domestic reforms. Not surprisingly, the Soviets came out in support of the Muscovites in both countries. In July 1956, a *Pravda* editorial addressed to the intraparty power struggles in Hungary and Poland qualified Khrushchev's proclamation of separate roads to socialism by asserting that though the roads be separate, the goal was the same. In theory, *Pravda*'s goal was one universal form of socialism. In practice, it was preservation of Soviet control over the East European parties. The CPSU daily declared that "the necessary consideration of national peculiarities" would not lead to the "estrangement" of socialist countries, but would contribute to their "solidarity." No one, said *Pravda*, would succeed in destroying the unity of the socialist camp.[2]

The events in Poland and Hungary during October of 1956 revealed to Khrushchev the high price of reconciliation with Tito. In November 1957, the leaders of the East European parties and of the ruling Asian parties met in Moscow to sign a declaration that named the U.S.S.R. as the leader of the socialist camp, and condemned Yugoslavia for its ideological revisionism. It no longer served Soviet purposes to endorse the concept of a truly autonomous East European Communist Party that was capable of winning popular support for its variant of socialism. The Soviets wanted the East European parties to have the appearance of autonomy, but not the reality. The 1957 Moscow declaration duly warned of the dangers inherent in both the Stalin and Khrushchev formulas for maintaining Soviet hegemony over East Europe: "Disregard of national peculiarities by a proletarian party inevitably leads to its divorce from reality, from the masses, and is bound to prejudice the cause of socialism; . . . and, conversely, exaggeration of the role of these peculiarities . . . is just as harmful to the socialist cause."[3]

The only solution that the 1957 declaration could offer for this di-

[2] *Pravda* editorial, July 16, 1956: "The International Forces of Peace, Democracy and Socialism Are Growing and Gaining in Strength," reprinted in Paul E. Zinner, ed., *National Communism and Popular Revolt in East Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press 1956), 63.

[3] "Declaration of the Conference of the Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries," November 14–16, 1957, reprinted in Vaclav Benes, Robert F. Byrnes, and Nicolas Spulber, *The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, no date), 19.

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lemma was to urge the fraternal parties to combat both tendencies "simultaneously."[4] The meetings of world Communist parties which the Soviets organized in 1960 and 1969 endorsed Khrushchev's inherently unstable formula for maintaining control over the East European parties,[5] as did the party congresses of 1959, 1961, 1966, and 1971. In 1971, Brezhnev told the delegates to the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress that success in the construction of socialism in the countries of the socialist commonwealth depended on the "correct combination of the general and the national-particular."[6] He restated this view at the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress in 1976.[7]

To prevent the fraternal parties of Eastern Europe from exaggerating the role of their national peculiarities, Soviet leaders after Stalin appear to have developed more subtle control devices. Like him, they have tried to exercise the right of *nomenklatura*, the prerogative of the Soviets to appoint officials to high-ranking party and state positions in Eastern Europe. But they have exercised the right of *nomenklatura* in a non-Stalinist manner. Instead of ordering periodic purges, Stalin's successors have tried to make loyalty to Moscow a necessary qualification for promotion in the party and state hierarchies. The Soviets have tried to implant this loyalty by encouraging rising bureaucrats to attend Soviet party and technical schools for advanced training. At these schools, they can establish personal contacts with the Eastern Europeans. The Soviets apparently try to maintain these contacts through "pen-pal" relationships between Soviet and East European officials in comparable positions. The existence of party cells in all important areas of East European life makes it possible for the Soviets to penetrate the entire political, economic, social, and cultural fabric of an East European country.[8]

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] "Zaiavlenie soveshchaniia predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii" [Declaration of the Conference of the Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties], *Pravda*, December 6, 1960, p. 2. The same formula appears in the resolution of the 1969 meeting, "Zadachi bor'by protiv imperializma . . ." [Tasks in the Struggle Against Imperialism . . .] in *Mezhdunarodnoe soveshchanie kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii: dokumenty i materialy* [International Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties: Documents and Materials] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury 1969), 327.

[6] "Report of the CPSU Central Committee by L. I. Brezhnev" [hereafter referred to as "Report to the Twenty-Fourth Congress"] in *The Twenty-Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, I (Arlington, Va.: U.S. Government Joint Publications Research Service 1971), 26.

[7] "Report of the CPSU Central Committee . . . delivered by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU, February 24, 1976" [hereafter referred to as "Report to the Twenty-Fifth Congress"] in Supplement to *Moscow News*, No. 9, 1976, p. 2.

[8] Brezhnev, "Report to the Twenty-Fifth Congress" (fn. 7), 2.

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It is likely that the Soviet diplomatic and intelligence services alternately flatter, bribe, and cajole these and other officials in the East European parties into placing themselves under obligations to Moscow. The Soviets repay the loyalty of the Muscovites by protecting them from their rivals in the party. In the post-Stalin period, the Muscovite leaders of the East European fraternal parties have usually enjoyed very long tenure in office. During times of economic crisis, the Soviets have been willing to offer economic assistance to ruling Muscovites rather than let them confront excessive criticism from within the party.

Khrushchev and Brezhnev have also tried to close off avenues of departure from the Soviet bloc by making the leaders of the East European parties commit themselves to long-term economic agreements that preclude political autonomy. Since the late 1950's, the countries of the socialist commonwealth have abandoned Stalinist programs of all-round industrialization and have adopted programs of economic specialization within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Long-range trade and investment projects tie these countries to each other and to the Soviet Union in a net of interdependence. One Western economist has reached the conclusion that since the mid-1960's, the East European countries have economically exploited the U.S.S.R., which has sold them large quantities of raw materials at prices below those of the world market.[9] The political effect of the economic "exploitation" of the U.S.S.R. was to make the East European leaders dependent on the Soviet Union for subsidies.

The Soviets have also tried to deny the East European parties control over their own military organizations by integrating them into the command structure of the Warsaw Pact, which is dominated by Soviet officers. As Brezhnev told the delegates to the last two party congresses, the Warsaw Pact "has served and continues to serve as the main center for coordinating the foreign-policy activity of the fraternal countries."[10]

Like Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev have tried to exercise control over the foreign and domestic policies of the East European parties. Unlike Stalin, his successors have not evaluated East European policies on the basis of how closely they resemble Soviet policies, but on the basis of whether or not they win enough popular support for the local party to free itself of dependence on the Soviet Union. A commentator in *Izvestiia* explained after the 1968 invasion of Czecho-

[9] Paul Marer, "Soviet Economic Relations with Eastern Europe and Their Impact on East-West and US-USSR Trade," paper delivered January 16, 1975, Harvard University Russian Research Center.

[10] Brezhnev, "Report to the Twenty-Fourth Congress" (fn. 6), 27; "Report to the Twenty-Fifth Congress" (fn. 7), 2.

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slovakia that, in making a Leninist analysis of a given policy, "It is not *who* champions the immediate given policy that is important. It is *whom* these proposals, these measures, benefit that is important."[11]

The Leninist approach of Soviet analysts is demonstrated by the vociferous Soviet objections in 1968 to the very suggestion that Czechoslovakia establish diplomatic relations with Bonn, and the warm Soviet endorsement of Prague's recognition of West Germany in December 1973.[12] Husak's recognition of Bonn strengthened a regime entirely dependent on the Soviets, and complemented the U.S.S.R.'s pursuit of détente. Had Dubcek established relations with West Germany in 1968, he clearly would have moved closer toward autonomy. In Hungary, the Soviets have endorsed Janos Kadar's relatively liberal policies probably because they and Kadar recognize that the Hungarian regime has to atone for its bloody origins in 1956. They seem to be confident that Kadar will remain conscious of his dependence on Moscow no matter how content the Hungarians become with "goulash Communism."

The Soviets and their East European allies do not admit to the existence of the Soviet right of *nomenklatura* in East Europe, nor do they acknowledge Soviet interference in the making of domestic and foreign policies in the region. Evidence of Soviet control over the policies and personnel of the East European parties surfaces only when the East European parties challenge the Soviets for control over these areas—as the Yugoslavs did in 1948, the Poles in 1956, the Albanians and Rumanians in the early 1960's, and the Czechs and Slovaks in 1968.

Immediately after being expelled from the Cominform, the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party issued a resolution which claimed that Soviet intelligence services had tried to recruit members of the YCP. The Yugoslav resolution condemned the Soviets for their support "of factionalist activity, of traitors" in the YCP.[13] Tito told his compatriots that for all its ideological protestations, the Cominform declaration of June 28, 1948, was "a notorious appeal to forcibly remove the present leadership of Yugoslavia. . . ."[14] In an essay on relations

[11] V. Sevruk, "Rosovye slova i chernye dela" [Rosy Words and Black Deeds], *Izvestiia*, August 27, 1968, p. 3. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations in this article are by the author.

[12] For Soviet endorsement of Husak's recognition of Bonn as a contribution to détente, see V. Lapskii, "V interesakh sotrudnichestva" [In the Interests of Cooperation], *Izvestiia*, December 14, 1973, p. 4.

[13] "Statement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia . . . ," June 29, 1948, in Royal Institute of International Affairs: *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (London: Oxford University Press 1948), 73, 77.

[14] "Extract from the Political Report made by Marshal Tito to the Third Congress of the People's Front," April 9, 1949, in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs, 1949–50* (New York: Oxford University Press 1953), 449.

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among socialist states, Milovan Djilas, a leading Yugoslav theoretician, asserted that Stalin's policy toward the East European Communist parties was one of "formation of clandestine factions within the various parties for the purpose of exercising control over their line and over individual forums and individual leaders."[15]

Khrushchev later corroborated what Djilas had said. In his secret speech to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev declared that Stalin had demonstrated what Khrushchev described as "suspicion and haughtiness" not only to Soviet party members but to "whole parties and nations."[16] Wladyslaw Gomulka also complained that Stalin had tyrannized over the leaders of the East European Communist parties.[17]

In an essay written in December 1955, shortly after his expulsion from the Hungarian Communist Party, Imre Nagy declared that Stalin and his Hungarian lieutenant, Matyas Rakosi, had "exterminated" party members who had opposed the establishment of a Stalinist dictatorship in Hungary and the subordination of Hungarian interests to Stalin's hegemony.[18] When Nagy became premier of the Hungarian Government as a result of the revolution that broke out on October 23, 1956, the Soviet Government obliquely acknowledged the truth of what he had written. In an effort to quell anti-Soviet sentiment in Hungary, the U.S.S.R. issued a declaration on October 30, 1956, in which the Soviet Government admitted that in the history of relations among socialist states there had been "violations and errors which demeaned the principle of equality in relations among socialist states."[19] The Government of the People's Republic of China immediately expressed full agreement with the Soviet declaration. According to the Chinese, there had indeed been "mistakes . . . misunderstandings and estrangements between certain socialist countries." The Chinese Government specifically mentioned Soviet relations with Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary.[20] After the open break between Peking and Moscow, the Chinese

[15] Milovan Djilas, *Lenin on Relations Between Socialist States* (New York: Yugoslav Information Center 1949), 32.

[16] "Secret Speech of Khrushchev . . ." in Russian Institute of Columbia University, *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* (New York: Columbia University Press 1956), 63.

[17] "Address by Wladyslaw Gomulka Before the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, October 20, 1956," in Zinner (fn. 2), 228–29.

[18] "Ethics and Morals in Hungarian Public Life," in Imre Nagy, *On Communism* (New York: Praeger 1957), 51.

[19] "Declaration by the Government of the USSR . . . ," October 30, 1956, in Zinner (fn. 2), 486.

[20] "Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China . . . ," November 1, 1956, *ibid.*, 493.

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made thinly veiled accusations that the Soviets had attempted to interfere in the internal affairs of the Chinese Communist Party.[21]

The Chinese later added Albania to the list of socialist countries that had endured Soviet attempts to interfere in their internal affairs.[22] The Chinese were referring to Khrushchev's public call, at the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU, for the removal of Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu from the leadership of the Albanian party.[23] In April 1964, after the Rumanian Communists had emerged victorious from their struggle with Khrushchev over whether Rumania would subordinate its economic planning to the dictates of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, they issued a general statement on the world Communist movement. The Rumanian leaders declared that during the existence of the Comintern, "wrong methods" had been practiced in relations between Communist parties.

According to the Rumanians, these methods "went as far as the removal and replacement of leading party cadres and even entire central committees." The 1964 statement said that the Rumanian party had experienced such methods, which were practiced until the dissolution of the Cominform (1955). In looking at the Communist movement in 1964, the Rumanians concluded that the "danger of reoccurrence of the methods and practices generated by the cult of the individual seems possible."[24] They added, "No party is allowed to go over the heads of the party leaders of one country or another, and even less to launch appeals for the removal or the change of the leadership of a party."[25]

Rumanian misgivings about Soviet interference in the internal affairs of the fraternal parties were confirmed by the intensive Soviet efforts during 1968 to deny control of the Czechoslovak Communist Party to the "progressives."[26] Shortly after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leaders made Dubcek sign the "Moscow Protocol," which de-

[21] In a statement issued June 14, 1963, the Central Committee of the CCP implied that the Soviets had tried several tactics to obtain control over the Chinese party. See William E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press 1964), esp. pp. 280–81.

[22] "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves," *Red Flag* and *People's Daily*, September 6, 1963, *ibid.*, 407.

[23] "Khrushchev's Speech on Albania . . . ," October 27, 1961, in William E. Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press 1963), 235.

[24] "Statement of the Stand of the Rumanian Workers' Party . . . ," April 1964, in William E. Griffith, *Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964–65* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967), 292–93.

[25] *Ibid.*, 294.

[26] I have argued that the reason for the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was to prevent a domestic faction from taking over the party. See "Autonomy and Intervention: The CPSU and the Struggle for the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 1968," *Orbis*, XIX (Summer 1975).

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manded that the CSCP "discharge from their posts those individuals whose further activities would not conform to the needs of consolidating the leading role of the working class and the Communist Party."[27]

In examining these conflicts between the Soviets and various East European parties, Western observers have often regarded as genuine the Soviet expressions of dismay over the ideological, economic, or diplomatic politics of a Communist deviant, and have not seen in these protests Soviet attempts to assert control over personnel appointments in the East European parties.[28] They argue that the Soviets are more concerned with keeping the policies of the East European parties within certain limits than with controlling their personnel.

But this is like arguing that the chicken came before the egg. Stalin and his successors have understood that what is at stake in these disputes is not whether the chicken or the egg came first, but who is to control the poultry in whatever form it appears. Even if Soviet leaders have been primarily concerned about the content of a policy pursued by an East European deviant, they have recognized that the best way to secure the adoption of the "correct" policy under constantly changing circumstances is to secure control of cadre appointments in the East European party. Every Soviet leader since Stalin has come to power by acquiring control over both policy and personnel within the CPSU. In dealing with Eastern Europe, the Soviet First Secretary has found that control over the policies and personnel of the fraternal parties is precisely what control over policies and personnel is in Soviet politics: the means and ends of all his endeavors. To cede control of either policy or personnel is to cede control of the other; and to cede control of both to an East European Communist party is to grant autonomy.

The Pursuit of Autonomy by East European Communists

An East European leader may seek autonomy for his party for several reasons. A Leninist party carrying out a program of industrial development has a tendency to concentrate increasingly greater power in the hands of the party leader, to the point at which the leader becomes autonomous of his Soviet patrons. The leader of an East European party may consciously foster this tendency for the sake of sheer personal aggrandizement, a motive not unknown among politicians in any society. An East European First Secretary may also seek autonomy be-

[27] "The Moscow Protocol," in Robin A. Remington, ed., *Winter in Prague* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press 1969), 379.

[28] Brzezinski (fn. 1), passim; see also Levesque (fn. 1).

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cause he feels that it is the best insurance against the possibility that the Soviets may one day decide to replace him. Whatever his reasons for pursuing autonomy, he must seek it by acquiring control over policy and personnel in his party. There are two ways in which East European Communist parties have wrested control of policy and personnel from the Soviets.

One way is for a party leader originally installed by Moscow to travel so far down his own road to socialism that he leaves the Soviet bloc. He can make this journey by gradually extending his control over the lower, then the middle, and finally the upper echelons of the party *apparat*; by gradually winning popular support for his domestic policies; and by gradually acquiring foreign allies. When he is ready to make an open challenge to Moscow's authority, he puts the local Muscovites in the position of being traitors to the East European party, making it very difficult for them to oppose him.

This process is so gradual that it is very difficult for Moscow to halt it before it has passed the point of no return. The party leader appointed by the Soviets who subsequently decides to seek autonomy can make a public show of solidarity with Moscow, and make it awkward for the Soviets to intervene. If they decide to force the issue, they will be reduced to denouncing "hypocritical" protestations of loyalty from a Tito or a Hoxha. The Soviets will find it difficult to reconstitute a Muscovite faction: the rebel leader of the East European party will be able to strike at this faction as soon as it begins to organize.

Tito unintentionally took this road to autonomy during the course of leading the Communist resistance to the German occupation of Yugoslavia. In Rumania, Gheorghiu-Dej quite consciously pursued this route to autonomy, which has also been followed by his hand-picked successor, Nicolae Ceausescu. Hoxha pursued a similar course in Albania. He had obtained a considerable degree of control over his party in organizing Albanian resistance to the Italian occupation, but became quasi-dependent on the Soviet Union after 1948 because he feared that Yugoslavia would annex Albania, and because he needed economic aid for his small and backward country. But when the Soviets insisted on the rights of hegemony in the early 1960's and demanded that he break off relations with Peking, Hoxha resisted and demonstrated just who really controlled Tirana. Despite prodigious efforts, Khrushchev was not able to topple him.

According to a well-placed member of the Czechoslovak party, Novotny may have tried to establish his autonomy of Moscow in the mid-1960's. This official asserts that Novotny feared that Khrushchev's over-

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throw in 1964 would result in Moscow's shift of its support from the Novotny faction of the CSCP to a faction led by Siroky, Kohler, and Bacilek. Novotny took measures to prevent this faction from contacting Moscow. He also began to court the Czechoslovak intelligentsia, to make overtures to the Chinese, Yugoslavs, and Rumanians, to prepare to resist Soviet economic pressure, and to revise Czechoslovak military doctrine.[29] If Novotny did indeed try to embark on the road to autonomy, he quickly found that he had unleashed forces in the Czechoslovak party that he could not control.

Another way in which Moscow can lose control over an East European party is through an intraparty battle between Muscovites and reformers in which the reformers triumph. The battle is joined when the ruling Muscovite faction, confident in its support from Moscow, becomes indifferent to the internal problems of its society. By neglect and incompetence, the Muscovites drive their country into a general economic, social, and political crisis. A reform faction begins to coalesce within the party around a program of correcting abuses, heading off popular discontent, and perhaps even returning to the democratic socialist ideals that attracted many members to the party. The reformers seek support from the general public, from economic technocrats and especially from the members of the humanist professions.

During the early 1950's in Hungary and Poland, and during the early 1960's in Czechoslovakia, the extreme centralization of the economy practiced by the ruling Muscovites led to general economic stagnation. The reformers in these countries called for decentralization of management and replacement of party *apparatchiki* by technical specialists. To carry out economic decentralization in these countries, the reformers advocated a corresponding decentralization of the state bureaucracy. The Communist reformers in Hungary and Czechoslovakia also wanted to give greater freedom to scientists and creative intellectuals in the hope of revitalizing their societies.

The reformers did not intend to have the party surrender power. They sought to make the party more worthy of its power. Many of the reformers came to realize that the Soviets provided a kind of insurance for whatever risks they ran in carrying out a program of decentralization. The threat of Soviet intervention against anti-Communist movements enabled them to appear as the lesser of evils before domestic critics who might have been tempted to raise the demand for an end to the Communist political monopoly.

[29] 'Moravus,' "Shawcross' *Dubcek*" in *Survey* XVII (Autumn 1971).

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The reformers found that the Muscovites and the *apparatchiki* in the party, state, and economic bureaucracies resisted extensive reform because they viewed such measures as a prelude to their dismissal. The Muscovites and the *apparatchiki* would agree with the assessment of reform made by Joe Cannon, the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, who had to surrender much of his power to the Congressional progressives led by Robert La Follette. Cannon said that the real meaning of reform was, "Get out so I can get in!"

To remove the Muscovites, the Communist reformers had to do battle with the Soviets for control of the party. They also had to emphasize those reforms that had the political effect of reducing the power of the Muscovites. The most effective weapon of the reformers was "truth"—public revelations of the incompetence, illegalities, and hypocrisies of the Muscovites, and public revelations of past instances of Soviet interference in the internal affairs of their country. These revelations gave the intraparty feud the quality of a moral struggle between truth and falsehood. In this battle over "truth," control of the information media became crucial.

There have been three different types of outcomes in the battles between reformers and Muscovites for control of the Communist parties in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. In Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Muscovites, supported by half a million Soviet soldiers, managed to defeat the reformers in the eighth month of the Soviet occupation. In Poland in 1956, the reformers defeated the Muscovites, but their leader failed to retain enough popular support to maintain the autonomy he had won, and eventually reverted to dependence on the Soviets. In Hungary, the Communist Party disintegrated during the course of the intraparty battle. As the two factions struggled for power, a popular insurrection broke out and almost swept away both factions of the Communist Party. Khrushchev sent the Soviet army into Hungary to put down the popular insurrection and to reorganize the shattered fragments of the party.

Pursuit of autonomy either by a reformer or by a First Secretary originally installed by Moscow has clearly been a risky venture: the Communist seeking autonomy has to give up one source of support for his party while simultaneously acquiring others. Midway through this process, an East European Communist aspiring to autonomy may find that he does not have sufficient support to retain control of his party, and that his party does not have sufficient support to stay in power. If an East European Communist wants to challenge Soviet control over his

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party, he must carry out three tasks, whether he is a First Secretary originally appointed by Moscow or a reformer who aims to wrest control of the party away from the Muscovites.

1. He must purge the party of Muscovites and potential Muscovites. In order to preclude the appearance of any fifth column within the party, he has to establish personal control over his politburo, central committee, party secretariat, and the lower party organs. Sooner or later he must convene a party congress that will recognize him as the incarnation of the Communist movement in his country—as Tito, Hoxha, and Ceausescu have done. Such public acclaim will make it difficult to remove him.

A Communist leader seeking autonomy from the U.S.S.R. should make the other prominent figures in the party link their fates with his. He has to make it clear that in the event of Soviet intervention, they will all stand or fall together. He has to insist on the "unity" of the party ranks behind him. He would do well to repeat Mehmet Shehu's warning to prospective Muscovites in the Albanian party. Shehu told the delegates to the Albanian party congress in 1961, "For those who stand in the way of party unity, a spit in the face, a sock in the jaw, and if necessary, a bullet in the head. . . ."[30] Once the party is firmly under his control, the East European Communist leader has to establish personal control of his nation's army, security organizations, and state and economic bureaucracies.

2. He has to find diplomatic allies in the Communist camp, in the West, and the Third World. China might offer very real economic and military aid to help him resist Soviet pressure; Yugoslavia and Rumania would enthusiastically join in exercises devoted to the praise of sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and respect for territorial integrity. The West, particularly the United States, could offer economic and military aid. The Third-World countries courted by the U.S.S.R. might be able to exercise some restraint on Soviet actions.

3. He has to win broad popular support for his regime. There are two sources of this support. One is a domestic program for the development of a socialist society. If the party is to preserve its cohesion, its members will have to believe—or pretend to believe—that the party leader has a genuine and realistic commitment to socialist ideals. If the party leader is to win the cooperation of those segments of the population whose talents are necessary for the construction of socialism, he must evoke genuine popular enthusiasm for "the socialist transformation of Yugoslavia," "the Polish road to socialism," or Dubcek's "demo-

[30] Quoted in Griffith (fn. 23), 71.

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cratic socialism." Not only party members but large numbers of ordinary citizens will have to believe that it is worth supporting their domestic order—or at least the future domestic order promised by the party leader.

The second source of potential popular support is nationalism, a sentiment that usually takes an anti-Russian form in Eastern Europe. Handling this issue is an extremely delicate matter. Many party leaders, particularly those who joined the party before 1945, may find nationalism repugnant. They may be reluctant to take up the cause of "national Communism" because they sincerely believe in the ideals of fraternal cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and of unity within the world Communist movement. In 1948, many of the Yugoslav leaders under attack by Stalin found it psychologically very difficult to break with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In 1968, most of the leading reformers in the Czechoslovak party could not accept the idea of opposing Czechoslovak nationalism to Soviet claims of hegemony.

Cultivation of nationalism is a risky enterprise for an East European Communist for another reason. Anti-Russian nationalism may take an anti-Communist form directed not only at the Soviet leaders, but at the local leader as well. Nagy faced this problem during the first stages of the Hungarian revolution of 1956. But seeking support as a nationalist is often a necessary risk, for nationalism will usually provide an East European First Secretary with broader and deeper popular support than will his socialist program. All of the East European Communists who have achieved autonomy from the U.S.S.R. have taken stands both as socialists and nationalists. Dubcek's most critical mistake in 1968 was his failure to take up the cause of Czechoslovak nationalism.

Soviet Military Intervention Against East European Communist Parties

Moscow has never willingly acquiesced in the triumph of a domestic faction over the Muscovites. According to Jiri Pelikan, the director of Czechoslovak television before the 1968 intervention, "Whenever the Soviet leaders lose complete control of the upper echelons of any Communist party they will seek to replace them by a takeover inside the party with the help of elements loyal to them within the central committee—elements often under some obligation to the Soviets and corrupted by them. . . . If they fail, they will not hesitate to embark on a military policing action."[31]

[31] Jiri Pelikan, *The Secret Vysocany Congress* (London: Penguin Press 1971), 282.

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General S. M. Shtemenko, former Chief of Staff on the Warsaw Treaty Organization, made the same point in a recent discussion of the functions of the Pact. According to the late general, one of the missions of the WTO is "suppression of counterrevolutionary and aggressive action against socialist countries." General Shtemenko specifically cited the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia as an example of such a mission.[32]

But military intervention is by no means an automatic Soviet response to the takeover of an East European Communist party by a domestic faction. Although the Czech and Slovak reformers seeking control of their own party failed to deter Soviet military action, the domestic factions of four other East European Communist parties succeeded: the Yugoslavs in 1948, the Poles in 1956, the Albanians in 1961, and the Rumanians in the early and mid-1960's. It may be true, as most Western analysts have concluded, that the Soviets did not consider the ideological deviations committed by the Yugoslavs, Poles, Albanians, and Rumanians sufficiently heretical to require military intervention. Such restraint befits a government that describes itself as peace-loving. But perhaps the reason Brezhnev chose to send half a million soldiers to remove Dubcek and his colleagues from power was that, unlike the other East European heretics, the Czech and Slovak reformers did not summon their armies and peoples to the defense of Czechoslovakia's sovereignty.

If the political objective of Soviet military intervention is to deprive a group of intractable East European Communists of control over their own party, the Soviets must justify their military expedition both to their own citizens and to the citizens of the East European state under attack. The justifications the Soviets offered for overthrowing the leaders of the Czechoslovak party in 1968 by armed force were the same justifications they offered for their attempts to carry out political coups against the leaders of the Yugoslav party in 1948, of the Polish party in 1956, and of the Albanian party in 1961. Should Moscow again use military force against East European Communists seeking autonomy, it would probably use the same justifications.

1. The local East European party has come under the control of an anti-party clique guilty of a right or left ideological deviation, nationalism, and anti-Sovietism. The clique is threatening the foundations of socialism in its country and, according to the Soviet

[32] Gen. Shtemenko's remarks appeared in the early May 1976 edition of *Za Rubezhom*. See David K. Shipler, "Soviet Stresses View Warsaw Pact's Role Is to Quell Revolts," *New York Times*, May 8, 1976.

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press, is "objectively" conspiring with the imperialists to wrest the country from the socialist camp. At the same time, the anti-Soviet clique is hypocritically professing its devotion to socialism, the U.S.S.R., the world Communist movement, the Warsaw Pact, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

2. The "healthy forces" in the local Communist party—that is to say, the "true Marxist-Leninists, loyal to proletarian internationalism"—have rallied the working class to oust the revisionist, chauvinist, anti-Soviet clique. The healthy forces consist of party members who have sided with the Soviets out of opportunism, genuine devotion to the U.S.S.R., or a combination of these motives. In any case, they are dependent on Moscow. But Moscow is also dependent on them. The Soviet leaders require a fifth column in the East European party to legitimize the use of Soviet troops and to form a new government.

In seeking to retain control over an East European party pursuing autonomy, the Soviets would stress the importance of "unity" within the socialist camp. In order to avoid raising the issue of Soviet violation of another country's sovereignty, the Soviets would accuse the rebels of ideological deviations. If the East European Communists complained that Moscow was violating their sovereignty, the Soviets would accuse them of nationalism and chauvinism. Moscow's spokesmen would argue that there are no conflicts between the interests of the socialist commonwealth and the interests of a sovereign East European socialist state, provided these interests are "correctly understood."[33]

If an East European Communist leader wants to parry Moscow's attempts to depose him and to deter Soviet military intervention, he must refuse to argue with the Soviets over ideological issues and personnel matters. He must take his stand on the issue of national sov-

[33] Soviet discussions of relations among socialist states frequently cite Lenin's observation that a "correct understanding" of national interests will lead to the unity of nations. See the argument of F. T. Konstantinov and A. P. Sertsova in Akademia Nauk, SSSR, Institut filosofii and Vysshaia shkola Ts. K., K. P. Ch., *Sovremennyi pravyi revizionizm* [Modern Rightist Revisionism] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo mysl' 1973, and Prague: Izdatel'stvo svoboda 1973), 396–97:

"The rightist revisionists generally attempt to put national interests in opposition to international interests while slipping to a position of bourgeois nationalism. The betrayal of internationalism is also inherent in Maoism. Nationalists consider patriotism and internationalism as mutually exclusive concepts. They try to speculate on the fact that patriotism and internationalism outwardly appear as forces which seem to go in different directions. . . . However, life shows that in a socialist society there is not only no antagonism between patriotism and socialist internationalism but, on the contrary, there is deep dialectical unity. Under the conditions of socialism, fundamental national interests, correctly understood, objectively combine with the international interests of the entire socialist commonwealth."

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ereignty. A dispute over ideology and personnel keeps the struggle a private conflict between two Communist parties. A dispute over the right to national sovereignty makes the conflict a struggle between two nations. The East European leader would be able to find much broader and deeper popular support on the issue of resistance to Russian imperialism than he could on the obtuse ideological issues raised by the Soviets. By raising the issue of sovereignty, a leader would oblige the Soviets to make war on his nation in order to obtain control of his party. In such a conflict, even East European Communists who are deeply devoted to the U.S.S.R. might find themselves echoing the protest of Tito and Kardelj to Stalin in 1948: "No matter how much each of us loves the land of socialism, the U.S.S.R., he can, in no case, love his own country less, which is also developing socialism. . . ."[34] Every Communist party that has achieved autonomy of the Soviet Union has emphatically endorsed the right of each Communist party and each socialist state to sovereignty.

Soviet sources indicate that Moscow has a keen appreciation of the strong desire for national sovereignty among Eastern Europeans and an equally keen appreciation of the fact that East European nationalism is often tied to anti-Russian sentiments. *Nationalism and Internationalism*, a Soviet handbook for political lecturers in the U.S.S.R., notes that "contradictions" sometimes arise in relations between socialist states because of nationalistic and anti-Russian sentiments. The author explains that tsarist interference in the internal affairs of Poland and Hungary implanted anti-Russian feeling in these countries. He cautions that "remnants of reactionary classes" in these countries are still using these emotions to create antagonism toward the U.S.S.R. He also notes that there is a legacy of anti-Soviet sentiment in East Germany as a result of the struggle between German and Soviet armies during World War II.[35]

Other Soviet sources indicate that Moscow has concluded that not only reactionary classes can play on these sentiments, but also leaders of East European Communist parties. In 1969, an article in *Communist of the Armed Forces* declared that nationalism "is ideological preparation for . . . the instigation of one nation against another and for setting one socialist country against another, especially against the Soviet Union."[36] On the fifth anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia,

[34] "Letter from J. B. Tito and E. Kardelj to J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov, April 13, 1948," in Royal Institute (fn. 13), 19.

[35] Mikhail Osipovich Karamanov, *Internatsionalizm i natsionalizm* [Internationalism and Nationalism] (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii 1971), 134–35.

[36] N. Cherniak, "Burzhuaznyi natsionalizm—otravlennoe oruzhie imperializma"

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Communist of the Armed Forces quoted Gustav Husak, the internationalist who replaced Dubcek as head of the Czechoslovak party, as saying, "The slogan of sovereignty, emptied of its class content, is a specific and active weapon of the rightist-opportunist, revisionist and anti-socialist forces."[37]

A Soviet political commentator had earlier reached the same conclusion when he surveyed the situation in Czechoslovakia two months after the invasion. He complained that certain Czechs and Slovaks, "who are Communists in word but liberals in deed, are today repeating only one thing: autonomy, noninterference, independence and sovereignty."[38] In 1973, a joint study by Soviet and Czechoslovak political analysts noted that revisionists often employ the slogan of "defense of national sovereignty."[39]

> Using words about socialism and democracy as a cover, words about defense of national interests and the sovereignty of their countries, for all practical purposes they [the rightist-revisionists] are carrying out wrecking activity specifically aimed against socialism and democracy.
>
> They are betraying the national interests and true aspirations of their peoples and they are faithfully serving the reactionary elements within the country and the forces of external imperialist aggression.
>
> Nationalism and anti-Sovietism are the most poisonous weapons in the hands of the bourgeoisie for the struggle against world socialism.[40]

An East European Communist who has obtained control of his party and his country by taking a stand as both a nationalist and a socialist can deter a Soviet military intervention if he makes three things clear to Moscow: (1) his army and people will go to war in defense of their national sovereignty; (2) the party members who collaborate with the Soviets will be charged with treason; (3) the East European Communists under attack will continue their resistance underground or in exile. Tito wrote these political deterrents to Soviet intervention into the Yugoslav constitution soon after the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Article 252 of the Yugoslav constitution reads, "No one shall have the right to sign or acknowledge capitulation or the occupation of the country on behalf of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

[Bourgeois Nationalism—The Poisonous Weapon of Imperialism], *Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil*, No. 12 (June 1969), 16.

[37] N. Tarasenko, "Leninskii printsip edinstva sotsialisticheskogo internatsionalizma i patriotizma" [The Leninist Principle of the Unity of Socialist Internationalism and Patriotism], *Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil*, No. 16 (August 1973), 11.

[38] K. Ivanov, "Lessons for the Future," *International Affairs* (Moscow) No. 10 (October 1968), 8.

[39] Akademia Nauk, SSSR (fn. 33), 408. [40] *Ibid.*, 414.

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Any such act is unconstitutional and punishable."[41] This article promises that the Yugoslav Government will not surrender even if driven from the country, and that anyone who collaborates with an occupation force will be charged with treason.

Tito first demonstrated his resolve to put up military resistance to a Soviet invasion after 1948, when he faced down a military build-up on his frontiers, as well as thousands of border provocations.[42] In Poland, Gomulka responded in October 1956 in similar fashion to a Soviet threat of military intervention. Khrushchev had ordered Soviet troops to seize strategic locations in Poland and to advance toward Warsaw in order to prevent Gomulka and the reformist faction from taking over the party from the Muscovite "Natolin" faction. Gomulka countered Khrushchev's moves by mobilizing the Polish internal security forces, arming factory workers in Warsaw, and winning the allegiance of many units of the Polish army, which was nominally under the control of Marshal Rokossovsky, a Soviet general with Polish citizenship. According to several Western observers, Gomulka's threat to offer military resistance deterred Khrushchev from carrying out his contemplated intervention. These observers differ, however, on the reasons why Gomulka's action stayed Khrushchev's hand.[43]

A few days after Khrushchev had called for the overthrow of Enver Hoxha in October 1961, the Albanian leader, already in firm control of his party and state, warned the Soviets, "our glorious armed forces are fully in form and prepared militarily to defend the Albanian People's Republic successfully and give a worthy rebuff to any enemy rash enough to violate the sacred frontiers of our beloved socialist fatherland."[44]

In Rumania, the leaders of the Communist Party pre-empted the possibility of Soviet military intervention on behalf of the Muscovite faction by liquidating this faction before the Soviets could develop pretexts for military action. In the process of achieving autonomy, the Ru-

[41] *The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* (Novi Sad: Prosveta 1969), 163.

[42] Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, *White Book* (Belgrade 1951), 472ff.; Vladimir Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia, 1948–1953* (New York: Viking Press 1971), 208, 278.

[43] Konrad Syrop, *Spring in October: The Polish Revolution of 1956* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1957), 97; Flora Lewis, *A Case History of Hope* (New York: Doubleday 1958), 205; Richard Hiscocks, *Poland: Bridge for the Abyss?* (New York: Oxford University Press 1963), 214; Adam Bromke, *Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1967), 91–94; Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence* (New York: Praeger 1968), 591–94.

[44] Hoxha, "Speech Delivered at the Celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the Albanian Party of Labor" in Griffith (fn. 23), 224.

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manian leaders established firm control over their own armed forces.[45] When the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, Ceausescu quickly undertook military preparations to prevent a similar attack against Rumania. The Rumanian Government immediately issued a vehement condemnation of the Soviet action.[46] Ceausescu then convened a mass meeting in Bucharest and told the crowd, "It has been said that in Czechoslovakia there was a danger of a counterrevolution; perhaps tomorrow they will say that our meeting has mirrored counterrevolutionary tendencies. . . . If so, we answer to all that the Rumanian people will not permit anyone to violate the territory of our fatherland . . . be ready comrades, at any moment to defend our socialist fatherland, Rumania."[47] Ceausescu backed upon his promise to fight by mobilizing the Rumanian army and distributing weapons to militia forces.[48]

By drawing these battlelines, East European Communist leaders have made the political risks of military intervention too high for the Soviets. To offset Soviet military superiority, it is not necessary to have geographical terrain suitable for guerilla warfare, but it is necessary to have political terrain suitable for denying the Soviets their political objectives. By threatening to put up military resistance, a rebel Communist leader confronts the Soviets with the necessity of killing East European soldiers, civilians, and party members. Soviet soldiers could very well find themselves facing the same dilemma that baffled American troops in Vietnam: to make a fine political distinction between friend and foe when there are no visible differences between the two. The soldiers would have to search out and destroy the rebel Communists while simultaneously winning the hearts and minds of the onlookers. While this campaign was under way, the independent Communist regimes in Eastern Europe would issue vociferous condemnations of the U.S.S.R. The Communists under attack might appeal for aid from the Communist parties of Western Europe and China. They might even appeal to the West for military supplies and raise the threat of widening the war.

Tito, Hoxha, Mao, and Ho, in their struggles with militarily stronger opponents during and after World War II, judiciously made their battles primarily political rather than military ones. They conceded ter-

[45] Mary Ellen Fisher, "Ceausescu and the Rumanian Political Leadership," Ph.D. diss. (Harvard 1974), 195–196.

[46] "Official Rumanian Communiqué on the Military Occupation of Czechoslovakia," August 21, 1968, in Remington (fn. 27), 358.

[47] "Balcony Speech by Nicolae Ceausescu on Czechoslovakia," August 21, 1968, *ibid.*, 360–61.

[48] Fisher (fn. 45), 315.

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ritorial objectives to their enemies, but preserved their political organizations. As resisters, they constantly widened their political base by appearing as the defenders of national sovereignty against a foreign invader. Robert G. Wesson has argued that the task at which Communist regimes are most successful is waging wars of national liberation. According to his analysis, the psychology and structure of a Leninist party are superbly suited to concentrating the energies of the party and nation on resistance to a foreign invader.[49] Soviet military writers make the same point when they declare that a war in defense of the socialist fatherland inspires a people to give unprecedented support to a Communist regime.[50]

Soviet military theorists are extremely sensitive to the question of whether a war appears to Soviet soldiers as a just one in defense of their socialist homeland or an "unjust" war of imperialist expansion. They warn that the war aim determines the "moral-political factor"—the extent to which soldiers and civilians on both sides support the war efforts of their governments. They emphasize that the strongest military effort comes from an army that believes it is fighting in defense of its country's sovereignty. Soviet military doctrine declares that a multinational army (such as the Soviet army), is potentially unreliable when committed to offensive wars. According to the Soviets, multinational armies are most likely to be reliable in defensive wars. Soviet military theorists also caution that war has a "reverse effect" on politics: if an army fighting an "unjust" war encounters difficulties on the battlefield, army morale may plummet and domestic opposition to the war may develop. In addition, domestic tensions that existed before the war broke out may become severely exacerbated. As a result of the "reverse effect," a government may face threats to the morale of its troops, the stability of its homefront, and possibly even to the legitimacy of the regime itself.[51]

In spite of the risk of provoking a domestic crisis in the U.S.S.R., the Soviet leaders might still be tempted to order their troops into battle

[49] Wesson, "War and Communism," *Survey*, XX (Winter 1974).

[50] Col. Ia. S. Dziuba writes, "The most important feature of wars in defence of the socialist fatherland is that they are genuinely people's wars in all respects. Owing to the just aims and tasks of such a war, which fully correspond to the working people's interests, the masses take an active part in it, support and implement the policy of the Marxist-Leninist party and government and rally even more closely around them." S. A. Tiushkevich, ed., *Marksizm-Leninizm o voine i armii* [Marxism-Leninism on War and The Military] (Moscow: Voenizdat 1968), 139.

[51] For an examination of Soviet military doctrine on these points, see Christopher D. Jones, "Just Wars and Limited Wars: Restraints on the Use of the Soviet Armed Forces," *World Politics*, XXVIII (October 1975).

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against an East European country. If the Soviet Army was victorious, Moscow would have the enormously difficult task of presenting the conquered population with its new First Secretary, an "honest Communist" drenched in the blood of his compatriots. There is no question that the new leader would be entirely dependent on Moscow and quite loyal. But the question remains whether he and his fellow internationalists would be able to establish a Communist regime with the legitimacy necessary to govern. A loyal but illegitimate regime can be a political liability for the Soviets if it is perpetually on the verge of popular insurrections like those in Berlin in 1953, in Poznan in 1956, and in Budapest in 1956. The prospect of the internal collapse of an East European Communist government threatens contagion within the bloc and acute embarrassment before the non-Communist world. A regime despised by its own people can also be a liability in a less visible way—if it is in constant need of economic subsidies, as the Kadar and Husak governments were in the years following Soviet intervention in their countries.

Rather than run the risks of a difficult military campaign, a political crisis in the U.S.S.R., and the destruction of the domestic political base for an East European Communist regime, Moscow will refrain from military intervention against an East European Communist leader who promises to lead his nation to war in defense of its sovereignty. For the Soviet Union to use the indiscriminate destructive power of its army against a rebellious domestic faction of an East European party is to apply a scorched-earth policy to the ground on which East European Muscovites must stand and on which Soviet rule rests. After ruling out military intervention against a dissident East European Communist regime, the Soviets may resume their attempts to overthrow the rebel leaders by means of an internal coup, as they did against Tito after 1948 and against Hoxha after 1961. Moscow may break off diplomatic relations, call upon other socialist countries to impose an economic blocade, and permit Soviet journalists to give full vent to their ideological indignation at the transgressions of the heretics. Such devices, however, amount to little more than demonstrations of pique.

Like Tito, Hoxha, and Ceausescu, an independent Communist leader will turn to the West or to China or both for trade, economic assistance, and military equipment. His foreign policy will move toward a position of nonalignment. In adjusting Communist ideology to local conditions, he will assert that his version of Marxism has as much theoretical value as Moscow's. If the Soviets persist in accusing him of ideological betrayal, he will, like Tito and Hoxha, proclaim the

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bankruptcy of Soviet Marxism and declare his capital the center of genuine Marxism. He will do this to provide greater legitimacy for his own regime and to make it more difficult for Soviet sympathizers in his party to espouse Moscow's cause. Provided that the Soviets refrain from polemics, he can, like Ceausescu, confine himself to stressing how important it is for each socialist country to make its own contribution to socialism.

The Soviets have no wish to drive the independent East European Communists into permanent alliances with the West or with Peking. Sooner or later, they will establish a working relationship with an East European party that has achieved independence. Moscow can wait patiently in the hope that an autonomous East European party may some day fall back into dependence on the Soviets, as the Polish party did. The Soviets can also resume their efforts to infiltrate the ranks of the heretic East European party, as the Yugoslavs and Albanians have charged them with doing during the 1970's.

For their part, the autonomous Communists have been willing to seek rapprochement with Moscow because they never wanted to sever relations with the U.S.S.R., but simply wanted the prerogatives of independence. Like the Yugoslavs and Rumanians, independent East European Communists want mutually beneficial economic ties with the Soviet Union, the economic colossus of the region and the principal broker in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. An independent Communist state in Eastern Europe may have a genuine fear of revanchism on the part of Germany or some other state, and may want to turn to the Soviet Union as *one* of its protectors. The need of autonomous East European Communists for domestic legitimacy as socialists will recommend demonstrations of ideological solidarity with the world Communist movement—including its most powerful member. Maintaining a working relationship with the U.S.S.R. will also help the autonomous Communist regime to persuade domestic dissidents that the home Communists are preferable to the "healthy forces" that Moscow would install in the event of an anti-Communist uprising.

To sum up: Tito, Gomulka, Ceausescu, and Hoxha have shown that the Soviets will not use force to remove the leadership of a rebellious East European Communist party if the leaders of the party are willing to go to war in defense of their national sovereignty. What the leaders of the Czechoslovak party failed to do in 1968 was to mobilize their army and nation against the threat of Soviet military intervention. In 1956, the Soviet intervention in Hungary was not against a ruling Com-

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munist party: Soviet soldiers went into action to save the Hungarian Communists from a popular uprising. To restore the Hungarian party to power, the Soviet army had to crush an impotent coalition government headed by Imre Nagy, a Communist who had taken it upon himself to lead an anti-Communist and anti-Soviet uprising.[52]

[52] After the Hungarian rebellion broke out on October 23, 1956, Khrushchev authorized what had previously been anathema: an autonomous Communist government under Imre Nagy, the leader of the reformist faction of the party. Earlier in the year, the Soviets had refused to let Nagy back into power. Now Khrushchev hoped that the rebels would accept the Nagy government and spare the Soviet leader the necessity of suppressing the Hungarian rebellion with Soviet soldiers. By October 30, 1956, when the Soviets issued a formal declaration of their willingness to accept an autonomous Communist regime under Nagy, Nagy had concluded that his compatriots would not support *any* Communist government, even an autonomous one. He saw two choices before him: to align himself with the Soviets against the rebels, or to join the rebels. He chose the second course and formed a multiparty coalition government dominated by non-Communists. Before Nagy could prepare for armed defense of his new government or find diplomatic support from the West, the Soviet army crushed the rebels and installed a new group of Muscovites in control of the shattered fragments of the Communist party. Khrushchev did not ask his soldiers to fight against a unified Communist party supported by an armed nation; he asked them to fight a bitter but very brief campaign against uncoordinated and isolated groups of anti-Communists. The Soviet army did not attack the Hungarian Communists, it rescued them.

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Research Note

POLITICS IN THE POST-MILITARY STATE: Some Reflections on the Pakistani Experience

By GERALD A. HEEGER*

Introduction

AFTER a prolonged period of preoccupation with identifying the causes of military intervention in the politics of underdeveloped states, scholars have begun to turn their attention to the military governments themselves. This shift of emphasis has had considerable impact on their perception of the military in the underdeveloped state. On the whole, scholars have become increasingly skeptical of the ability of military regimes to obviate the conditions that generated military intervention in the first place—poverty, economic stagnation, and political instability.[1] Military rule appears to have been hardly more successful than civilian rule.

Despite the increasingly apparent inadequacies of the military governments—inadequacies that ought to raise serious questions as to the ultimate viability of such governments—the possibilities of an end to military rule and of the potentialities of a "post-military era" in the underdeveloped states have only recently started to receive some consideration. For all their instabilities and developmental shortcomings, military regimes have apparently been regarded by many as virtually immune to the pressures that brought down their civilian predecessors. The composition of particular military ruling groups may change; whole juntas may be replaced; but the essential military character of a

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[1] See, for example, Eric Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in Non-Western States," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64 (December 1970), 1131–48; Ann Ruth Willner, "Perspectives on Military Elites as Rulers and Wielders of Power," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, 11 (November 1970), 261–76; Claude Welch, Jr., "The African Military and Political Development," in Henry Bienen, ed., *The Military and Modernization* (Chicago: Aldine Press 1971); and Gerald A. Heeger, *The Politics of Underdevelopment* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1974), 107–32.

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government organized after a military coup has generally been viewed as unlikely to change because of the military's monopoly of, or at least supremacy in, the instruments of coercive force. Even where the possibility of civilian successors has been considered, the pre-eminence of the military and its ability to dictate the degree of participation in political life have generally been assumed. Voluntary withdrawal by the military from politics or civilianization of the junta have seemed to be the most likely paths to the post-military era. For the most part, the persisting links between a civilianized junta and the military, and the limited character of withdrawal, raise a question as to whether a distinction between such "civilian" regimes and military regimes is of any validity at all.

The increasingly apparent lack of ruling capability on the part of military elites and the growing likelihood of popular rejection of such regimes—manifested in popular upheavals such as those that occurred in Pakistan between 1968 and 1971, in Thailand in 1973, and most recently in Portugal—suggest that conjectures as to the nature of post-military regimes may not be premature. In this study, which draws upon Pakistan's experiences in reconstituting a civilian-dominated political order, I will describe a particular post-military political system. I will suggest that the institutions and political processes of a military regime, and the means by which such institutions and processes are altered, are likely to shape its civilian successor.

Perceiving the Post-Military State: The Limitations of Current Theory

It has become increasingly apparent that the rigid dichotomy between "civilian" and "military" regimes cannot be maintained. Henry Bienen and David Morell have noted that the many gradations of civilian-military relations and the flux in the determination of power between military, police, civil service, and civilian politicians yield systems that are better thought of as hybrid or mixed rather than as clear manifestations of a military or civilian type. This blurring of regime types has considerable implications for a consideration of an end to military rule in developing states. As Bienen and Morell suggest, it is important to realize that, since many of the military and civilian regimes are in fact mixed, the transition from military rule can be seen in one sense as a transition from one mixed system to another mixed system.[2] Under such

[2] Bienen and Morell, "Transition from Military Rule: Thailand's Experience," in Catherine M. Kelleher, ed., *Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications 1974), 4.

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circumstances, in speaking of the military's withdrawal from politics one risks exaggeration. The transfer of formal political power to civilians may be accompanied by a full-scale return to the barracks on the part of the military. More likely, however, is the emergence of the military in a somewhat less prominent, but no less political, role.

Yet, such precision in definition may be misleading if it leads to ignoring the obvious: i.e., the occurrence of transitions from regimes in which a military elite plays a predominant role in policy making to regimes in which it plays a potentially lesser role. The possibilities and implications of such transitions need to be understood, especially in light of the fact that cross-national research suggests that regime types may be associated with certain patterns of policy outcomes.

It is possible to isolate several broad generalizations by surveying briefly a number of points made in the already voluminous literature on the political role of the military in the underdeveloped states. Such generalizations have implications for our ability to perceive and depict the transition to a post-military period in the developmental sequence of Africa and Asia.

1. *Whatever claims to the contrary a military elite may make, military rule is not likely to be deliberately temporary.* A withdrawal by the military from rulership after a coup d'état is a complex process, dependent not only on a favorable political environment, but on the objectives and the disposition of the military elites themselves. Regardless of their original objectives and intentions, ruling military elites are generally impelled by the post-coup situation to seek to consolidate their rule.[3] At a minimum, they are likely to protect the gains and perquisites for which intervention may have occurred in the first place. Pay raises are easily rescinded and political party militias revived (to cite two of the more common causes of coups), unless the military remains close at hand. Ruling military elites have frequently opted to make a concerted effort to restructure the political system completely. Military coups occur in unstable political systems, and instability is unlikely to produce a situation favorable to a permanent withdrawal. S. E. Finer has noted:

> Those armed forces that have tried to disengage from politics have had to hasten back as soon as their quondam political enemies came within sight of regaining power, while those that have been elected to remain and rule have been rejected only by popular revolt or by further military revolts of their own malcontents. In most cases, the military that have

[3] See Heeger (fn. 1), 115–19.

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> intervened in politics are in a dilemma: whether their rule be direct or whether it be indirect, they cannot withdraw from rulership nor can they fully legitimize it.[4]

In much of the scholarly literature, an aura of permanence surrounds these regimes. For the most part, the central issue seems to be *which* military elites will rule rather than *whether* military elites will rule.

2. *The pattern of civilian-military relationships has been defined largely in terms of a balance—between the organization and cohesion of military elites and institutions on one hand, and the organization and cohesion of civilian elites and institutions on the other.* It is increasingly recognized that the military in the developing states is not the organizational juggernaut that it was once perceived as being. In general, the political behavior of armed forces in Africa and Asia now appears to be influenced as much by their fragmentation and organizational incoherence as by their tight structure and cohesion. Partially as a result of these perceptual changes on the part of analysts, the military has been de-mystified.[5] It has become but one political group involved in complex power relations with other political institutions and groups: labor unions, cooperative movements, political parties, cliques, charismatic personalities, and so forth.

Such de-mystification, however, has not ended the tendency of scholars to stress organizational variables in their explanation of the military's roles in various military regimes. Civilian-military relations are now seen as occurring within a far more complex, more pluralistic environment; nonetheless, their structure is generally viewed as a result of the varying organizational capabilities of military and civilian political institutions. Claude Welch, for example, in a recent assessment of coups and resulting patterns of civilian-military relations in Africa, concludes that organizational variables are far better predictors of a successful coup than are sociopolitical or environmental variables.[6] Despite his own more complex explanatory framework, Welch ultimately returns to Morris Janowitz's hypothesis that high internal cohesion results in greater capacity (1) to intervene in domestic politics; (2) to limit such involvement; and (3) to follow consistent policies. Lack of cohesion "leads to unstable and fragmented involvement and to the likelihood of counter-coups d'état after the seizure of power."[7]

[4] Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (New York: Praeger 1962), 243.
[5] Bienen and Morell (fn. 2), 4.
[6] Welch, "Personalism and Corporatism in African Armies," in Kelleher (fn. 2), 137.
[7] *Ibid.* The quote is from Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1964), 68.

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The emphasis on organizational variables has significant consequences for the analysis of civilian-military relations, for no matter how organizationally weak the military seems to be, its civilian counterparts appear to be worse off:

> Civil institutions do not function effectively and impartially in African states. Corruption saps bureaucracies. Few political parties remain active. Military intervention has resulted in a near-total ban on formal party activity. Trade unions can claim to represent only a small faction of workers. The absence of institutional constraints on the political awareness of the armed forces figures heavily in the ease with which officers have been able to assume control. . . .[8]

Not surprisingly, then:

3. *Given the organizational superiority of the military and its monopoly on coercive force, the only probable means of ending military control of government is voluntary action by the military itself.* A few scholars, most notably Finer, have raised the possibility of a forcible removal of a military government by civilian groups. That alternative is seldom seriously scrutinized, however. The military, having achieved dominance as a result of its coercive capability and its organizational superiority, is generally viewed as enjoying assured tenure.[9]

For the most part, an end to military government is linked to voluntarism on the part of military elites. Claude Welch's writings have been the most detailed with regard to this issue. He describes several circumstances leading to such a voluntary withdrawal. Withdrawal may, for example, be stimulated by growing factionalism within the military—factionalism brought about by the involvement of the military in complex governmental problems. Within the junta, a faction that favors a return to civilian supremacy may ascend to power, or a withdrawal may come about as a result of the growing fear of military elites that their military organization and capabilities are being undermined: "If military regimes set themselves up as doctors of the body politic, they risk being infected by the ills from which the previous civilian government suffered. . . . To avoid such 'infection,' the army may prefer withdrawal."[10]

[8] Claude E. Welch Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Rule* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press 1973), 16.

[9] Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Modernization," in John Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1962); Henry Bienen, "The Background to the Contemporary Study of Militaries and Modernization," in Bienen (fn. 1), 1–34.

[10] Welch, "Cincinnatus in Africa: The Possibility of Military Withdrawal from Politics," in Michael Lofchie, ed., *The State of Nations: Constraints on Development*

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Withdrawal, according to Welch, may also be stimulated by "personal transition" or "conscious civilianization."[11] Military leaders may simply retire from the military and seek to build a civilian base of support. Kemal Ataturk is most frequently referred to in this regard.[12] More recent examples are Joseph Mobutu of Zaire, Sangoule Laminzana of Upper Volta, Park Chung-hee of South Korea, as well as Ayub Khan of Pakistan.

Finally, Welch depicts withdrawal occurring over a prolonged period of time—"protracted civilianization." Shifts in the political environment or the objectives of the military elites, and the existence of an acceptable successor may, Welch argues, promote a gradual but nevertheless steady withdrawal by the military from direct political rule.[13]

Welch is not alone in this emphasis. Morell and Bienen, in their study of the effort at transition from military rule which occurred in Thailand between 1969 and 1971, stress the control that the military had over the process and, more importantly, view the Thai events as prototypical. "If Thailand was and is likely to be an example of a polity dominated by the military, any 'transition' from military rule means taking into account the continued dominance of the military while devising a gradual expansion of the political roles of extrabureaucratic institutions."[14]

The point to be emphasized here is that voluntarism is seen as the principal and most likely means of concluding military rule. As I shall note momentarily, this has significant implications for the kind of "post-military" regime that can be discussed.

4. *Whatever their aspirations to the contrary, military elites are not likely to be successful in "developing" the political systems over which they assume control.* The military decade (1965–1975) that has just ended in Africa and Asia has been highly disillusioning. Contrary to most scholars' earlier depiction of the military as a highly modern force, able to transfer its organizational and technological skills to the art of governing, most military regimes have hindered the development of their countries. Explanations for their incapacity abound. Military

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in Independent Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1971), 219.

[11] Welch, "The Dilemmas of Military Withdrawal from Politics: Some Considerations from Tropical Africa," *African Studies Review*, XVII (April 1974), 217–18.

[12] Welch (fn. 10). See also Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," *World Politics*, XIII (October 1960), 19–44.

[13] Welch (fn. 11), 219.

[14] Bienen and Morell (fn. 2), 21.

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organization is now seen as incapable of dealing with the more elusive problems of development; the military is seen as preoccupied with its own class interests; military rulers are described as so antipolitical as to frustrate their efforts to gain popular support. Regardless of the cause, the important fact is that, in the current literature, the societal and political conditions that originally fostered military intervention are seen as persisting.

The foregoing propositions are emphasized because they combine to impose fairly rigid limitations on the kinds of post-military regimes that can be conceptualized and discussed. The tendency to perceive movement away from military control of politics as largely a matter of choice on the part of military elites makes the problem of transition a question of whether military elites consider it to their advantage to press on with the transition; e.g., "To the degree that generals and ministers who today hold all the power perceive it in their own best interest to compete with one another in extra-bureaucratic politics, expanding their own bases of power with the citizenry and the elected representatives, the political system will develop." Furthermore, it is a matter of gradually expanding participation so as not to outstrip the slow accrual of extrabureaucratic power. Bienen and Morell consider it as "all a question of timing."[15]

It is only vaguely possible to envision, except at the end of the lengthiest of long runs, such a process yielding a regime that differs significantly from its military predecessor. Under most circumstances, a voluntary transition is not likely to reduce a ruling elites's dependency on the military. Personal transition and conscious civilianization may provide the ruling elites with a wider choice of costumes, but are not likely to result in a fundamental shift in the character of the regime. Admittedly, Kemalist Turkey was the result of such a transition; against that single example can be posed the more dubious civilianization of South Korea, and of Pakistan under Ayub Khan. Even where factionalism within the military stimulates withdrawal, the civilian character of the successor regime is likely to be questionable. In such a situation, civilian regimes are likely to persist only with the "advice and consent" of the military factions—as events in Turkey between 1961 and 1963 have attested.[16]

The expansion in participation that occurred in Pakistan between

[15] *Ibid.*, 22.

[16] Nur Yalman, "Intervention and Extrication: The Officer Corps in the Turkish Crisis," in Henry Bienen, ed., *The Military Intervenes* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation 1968), 127–44.

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1968 and 1971 and in Thailand in October 1973 suggests at least the possibility of another pattern of transition. The problem of transition may be less one of engineering it than one of adapting to it; less one of matching gradually enlarging opportunities for participation with gradually enlarging civilian political institutions than one of developing civilian-based, extrabureaucratic institutions within a context of suddenly expanded participation. Military regimes seem unable to resolve development problems, and popular political aspirations seem to escalate with the first indication of movement away from military control.

Together, these two facts suggest that the patterns of Pakistan, and of Thailand in October 1973, may be far more typical of the transition process than that of Kemalist Turkey, or of Thailand between 1968 and 1971.

Current scholarship offers no guide to understanding this more abrupt transition except to suggest that, at best, the new regimes will replicate the civilian governments originally displaced by the military. The inability of military elites to alter the political system significantly is compounded by the intervention itself and the often tenuous legitimacy of military regimes. Such a situation points to a recurrence of naked praetorianism. Even in a protracted period of withdrawal by the military, the societal conflicts may become too much to control. Under circumstances in which the military's departure—voluntary or otherwise—is hasty, widespread conflict and chaos may usually be expected.

In theory then, the post-military state is a kind of nightmarish enigma, a victim of the logical extensions of a host of propositions about military regimes and their impact on society and social change. In the remainder of this essay, I will further elaborate on this type of political system through a brief reflection on Pakistani politics since December 1971, when the broken military of that state relinquished power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. I will then offer some tentative generalizations with regard to the issues that I have raised here.

Pakistan as a Post-Military State

"The hour had struck. The moment so long delayed had finally arrived. The responsibility could not long be put off. . . . I knew that an era was coming to an end. I was going to Karachi where an agonizingly prolonged political farce was drawing to a close."[17] With these thoughts

[17] Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends, Not Masters* (New York: Oxford University Press 1967), 70.

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in mind, Mohammad Ayub Khan began a journey that culminated in the coup d'état of October 7, 1958, and his emergence as the dominating political figure in Pakistan for the next decade.

In a sense, the political system that Ayub Khan created was neither simply dominated by the military nor simply a subcontinental version of oriental despotism. Although the military remained a principal buttress for the regime and contributed personnel to key decision-making roles in the new political system, Ayub refused to involve the military directly in the administration of the country.[18] What emerged in Pakistan between 1958 and 1969 was less a military government than an administrative state strengthened by military support. Political roles in the system were eliminated or at least sharply curtailed and replaced by administrative equivalents.[19] (Political parties were banned after the coup and not allowed back even in a limited way until 1962.) Decision making was restricted to the senior military elites around Ayub and to the bureaucracy. Even when Ayub sought to provide for some degree of popular participation, he did so within the context of a bureaucratic hierarchy (the Basic Democracies), rather than through the traditional participatory apparatus of parties and interest groups.[20] Always, Ayub retained personal control.

The authoritarian character of the system, however, did not mean that it was merely a simple despotism. As Shahid Javed Burki has argued, the new regime was unique in Pakistan's history in terms of its "activist" economic policy.[21] Through a series of reforms, albeit limited, the regime actively sought to build a popular constituency beyond its initial base in the military and the bureaucracy. It initiated a policy of land reform which, despite its limits, ultimately saw the emergence of "middle farmers" as a new force in the countryside. It stimulated rapid industrial growth by fostering the private sector through a complex series of state subsidies and favorable legislation. A whole new class of small- and medium-size industrial entrepreneurs emerged in Pakistan.

The activist character of its economic policies, coupled with its extremely restricted political structure, ultimately undermined the regime. Ayub was unwilling to broaden the political system to provide organized access to decision making to the very interests that had been

[18] On Ayub's political system, see Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958–1969* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press 1971).

[19] For elaboration on this phenomenon in military regimes in general, see Heeger (fn. 1), 118–20.

[20] On the "Basic Democracies," see Ziring (fn. 18), throughout.

[21] Burki, "The Politics of Economic Decision-making During the Bhutto Period," *Asian Survey*, XIV (December 1974), 1131–32.

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fostered by his policies. Thus, in the late 1960's, he found himself increasingly opposed, not only by the urban and rural proletariat that had been neglected by his policies, but also by those sectors he had actively sought to enlist. Ayub countered by re-establishing links to the traditional leadership he had once ignored and by reinforcing the repressive character of the system. Confrontation became inevitable. By 1968, violence had become endemic as dissatisfaction escalated.[22] Increasingly unpopular and faced with eroding support within the civilian bureaucracy and the military, Ayub resigned in March 1969.[23]

Ayub's successor, General Yahya Kahn, the Commander in Chief of the Pakistani Army, came to power promising political reforms. However, the political institutions of the new military regime were even more narrowly drawn, if possible, than during Ayub's regime.[24] Decision making was largely confined to the senior members of the junta. Ultimately, Yahya's government was undone by a set of circumstances similar to those that had undone that of his predecessor. A growing demand for participation—in this case partially fostered by the legalization of political parties (which were again banned after Yahya's declaration of martial law) and the announcement of elections—added to the reluctance of the rulers to provide new structures of participation, proved to be a contradiction fatal to Yahya's government. The regime's inability to contain Bengali nationalism within the framework of a United Pakistan was only one manifestation—the most serious, to be sure—of this contradiction. In December 1971, shattered by its defeat in East Pakistan, and torn by its ineffectual functioning as either a government or an army, the Pakistani military removed itself from politics. Pakistan was a post-military state.

ORGANIZING AUTHORITY IN THE POST-MILITARY STATE: ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO AND THE PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY

The authoritarian character of the Ayub regime fostered the growth of widespread disenchantment with the political system while at the same time hindering the emergence of coherent organization within

[22] The violence of this period is discussed in Shahid Javed Burki, "Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation," *Asian Survey*, XII (March 1972), 201–12.

[23] See Robert LaPorte Jr., "Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and Change in a Garrison State," *Asian Survey*, IX (November 1969), 842–62.

[24] This argument is elaborated upon in Heeger, "The Military and Internal Security Policy in India and Pakistan: Some Reflections on the Relationships Between Political Systems, Policy-Making, and Policy Outcomes," paper presented at the Western Political Science Association Convention, Seattle, Washington, March 1975. For a detailed study of the Yahya period, see Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan: The Yahya Khan Interregnum," *Asian Affairs*, I (July/August 1974), 402–20.

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that opposition. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which succeeded to power in December 1971, and its leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, were no exceptions to this pattern. Bhutto's entire political career had focused around the Ayub regime—first as one of its leading spokesmen and then as one of its principal opponents. Appointed to the first Martial Law Cabinet at the age of thirty and later to the post of Foreign Minister, Bhutto was one of the most visible members of the Ayub government. In 1965, however, he broke with Ayub over what he considered to be the latter's failure to convert Pakistan's battlefield success in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war into a diplomatic success—a belief widely shared by the West Pakistani public. The break catapulted him to high popularity as a spokesman for the opposition.

That opposition, however, did not cohere around Bhutto. Rather, Bhutto gradually emerged as the dominant figure of a movement within a wider opposition movement. Bhutto had, virtually from the beginning of his confrontation with Ayub, assumed a more or less leftist political orientation in his attacks on the government. (As Foreign Minister, Bhutto had taken a strongly anti-imperialist stance and had been the principal architect of Pakistan's cultivation of Communist China.) What eventually emerged around Bhutto as the Pakistan People's Party (formally organized in November 1967) was a synthesis of a small number of Bhutto's personal supporters and a variety of disparate leftist groups.

Although Bhutto's increasingly open confrontation with the Ayub regime and the PPP's growing stridency played important roles in the protest that ultimately forced Ayub's resignation, neither Bhutto nor the PPP led the protests. The PPP, in fact, was more a creature of the protests than their creator. As the protests spread, local party units were set up haphazardly and with little regard for coordination. This pattern accelerated as the elections approached: provincial and national structures remained poorly delineated; local branches were started up whenever and wherever a cotery of supporters existed. The PPP's process of selecting candidates was particularly chaotic. Bhutto had some success in persuading a number of friends and political colleagues to contest on the PPP ticket, but many of the PPP candidates were, in a sense, self-nominated, emerging from the almost independent local party branches.

Despite the party's disorganization and a slate of relatively unknown and unimpressive candidates, the PPP was the major victor in West Pakistan in the 1970 elections—winning control of two (out of four) of the largest provincial legislatures in West Pakistan, and taking 81 of

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the 138 National Assembly seats in West Pakistan.[25] In retrospect, the victory is not surprising. The protests that had dominated Pakistani politics since 1968 had altered the political climate completely, propelling it in a generally leftward direction.[26] In this context, the PPP's emergence as the most leftist, least moderate party gave it a salience that leftist parties had heretofore lacked in Pakistan, a salience augmented by Bhutto's stature as a nationalist.

The period between Bhutto's electoral victory in West Pakistan and his accession to the leadership of that state was marked by civil war, a war between India and Pakistan, and the collapse of United Pakistan. Yet, the elections alone are indicative of the problems that Bhutto faced after assuming power in his tattered country. Even without its eastern province, Pakistan remained beset by regionalism. The PPP, the quintessentially nationalist party, lost decisively in the provinces of Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier. In these two provinces, the dominant National Awami Party was insistent upon a new civilian order that granted maximum autonomy to the provinces. The elections also revealed a highly politicized populace functioning in a state of chaos insofar as formal political organizations were concerned. In the Punjab and Sind, much of the PPP's opposition disintegrated under the pressure of events. Despite its victory, the PPP provided no real means of reorganizing the politicized population. If anything, its problems deepened as its numbers swelled after the electoral victory, and as its organizational incoherence was exacerbated by a surge of factionalism at all levels between old party workers (who had supported the PPP prior to the elections) and new ones (who had joined after the elections).

The rapid transfer of power in the wake of the loss of East Pakistan heightened the national organizational crisis. Pakistan was not only confronted with having to replace a regime, but also with having to reconstitute an entire political system. Although momentary stability was assured by the continuity of bureaucratic and police structures, a whole new system of civilian political institutions and roles remained to be organized and somehow integrated with the surviving governmental institutions. In the process, the boundaries of the various institutions—governmental, party, military, police—would have to be delineated.

Confronted with this massive managerial crisis, Bhutto's response followed along two general patterns: He relied on patrimonialism as a

[25] The elections are surveyed and analyzed in Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Votes, 1970," *Asian Survey*, XI (March 1971), 197–218.

[26] Gerald A. Heeger, "Socialism in Pakistan," in Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque, eds., *Socialism in the Third World* (New York: Praeger 1975), 295–99.

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means of establishing control over the government and other political institutions, and he deliberately discouraged political mobilization within the population as a whole. Because both of these political strategies became fundamental to the regime, they will be discussed in some detail.

Patrimonialism. As Max Weber defines the phenomenon, patrimonialism exists "where authority is primarily oriented to tradition but in its exercise makes a claim to full personal powers." In the patrimonial system,

> The object of obedience is the personal authority of the individual which he enjoys by virtue of his traditional status. The organized group exercising authority is, in the simplest case, primarily based on relations of personal loyalty, cultivated through a common process of education. The person exercising authority is not a "superior," but a personal "chief." His administrative staff does not consist primarily of officials, but of personal retainers. . . . What determines the relations of the administrative staff to the chief is not the impersonal obligations of office, but the personal loyalty to the chief.[27]

More recently, especially among political scientists concerned with a variety of underdeveloped states in Africa and Asia, patrimonialism has come to mean "personal governance," i.e., the attempt by an elite to consolidate its control over a political system through "personalist"—as opposed to organizational—means.[28] One scholar describes patrimonialism in Thailand in the following way:

> Deprived of the traditional deference accorded the morally legitimized monarchy, governments have relied upon the disposition of offices and shared material rewards to obtain the support of key leaders. . . . The personal clique, based on a feudal-like system of personal obligation, provides the principal focus of bureaucratic loyalty and identification. Bonds of reciprocal obligation, reminiscent of earlier patron-client structures in the traditional social system, informally align a number of dependent subordinates with individual political and administrative leaders in more or less cohesive informal structures.[29]

Patrimonialism has long been characteristic of Pakistani politics.[30] Its use became especially pronounced after Bhutto assumed power. With

[27] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social Economic Organization*, translated by Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press 1957), 347, 341.

[28] For a discussion of patrimonial patterns of rule in underdeveloped states, see Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States," *World Politics*, XX (January 1968), 194-206.

[29] Edgar L. Shor, "The Thai Bureaucracy," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, V (June 1960), 70, 77.

[30] For an excellent survey of the "squirarchy" that underlay Punjab's patrimonially based politics, see Craig Baxter, "The People's Party Vs. the Punjab 'Feudalists,'" *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, VIII (July/October 1973), 166–89.

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regard to the civil and military bureaucracies, a number of structural reforms were instituted which have considerably enhanced Bhutto's personal control over those institutions. After taking power, Bhutto purged the officer corps of all three armed services and reorganized the command structure at the senior-most level of the military. The office of Commander in Chief was replaced by the positions of Chiefs of Staff of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Similarly, the civil services were consolidated, ending the formal predominance of the Civil Service of Pakistan in policy making; a considerable number of senior civil servants retired.[31] These changes represented reforms in the sense of re-establishing civilian control over the military and in addressing some of the major causes of bureaucratic inaction and indifference to popular problems. Still, they functioned primarily to render the military and civil service bureaucracies more vulnerable to political influence.[32] Few of the retirements and replacements followed existing personnel procedures. Rather, Bhutto and his ministers repeatedly emphasized the importance of political criteria in staff selection.[33] After the first wave of reforms, Bhutto and the PPP had profited not only from the fact that many posts vacated by politically undesirable members of the high bureaucracy were filled by their own political officials and those who sought their favor, but also by the enhanced sense of political vulnerability felt by the bureaucrats who were left in their posts.[34]

Bhutto also relied on patrimonialism to expand his control in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province, the provinces where two of the PPP's opponents, the National Awami Party (NAP) and the Jamiat Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) had combined to organize governments. Although in March 1972 the PPP, NAP, and JUI were able to agree

[31] The new civil service structure is embodied in the Civil Servants Ordinance, 1973 (XIV of 1973); Service Tribunals Ordinance, 1973 (XV of 1973); Federal Public Service Ordinance, 1973 (XVI of 1973); Orders published by the Cabinet Secretariat (August 22, 1973); Civil Servants Act, 1973; Federal Public Service Commission Act, 1973; and Cabinet Secretariat Memoranda of September 14, 1973, and November 20, 1973. See also, Lawrence Ziring and Robert LaPorte Jr., "The Pakistan Bureaucracy: Two Views," *Asian Survey*, XIV (December 1974), 1086–1103.

[32] Bhutto stressed the need for civilian control over the military repeatedly during this period. See in particular Dilip Mukherjee's interview with Bhutto, March 1972, reprinted in Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses, *News Review on South Asia*, 59, 64–66.

[33] In press interviews, Khurshid Hasan Meer (formerly Minister Without Portfolio, Government of Pakistan, and charged with supervision of bureaucracy reforms between December 1973 and February 1974), and Bhutto repeatedly stressed the need for "reorienting" the bureaucracy to "fit" the government's political objectives. See, for example, Hasan Meer's interview in *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), September 18, 1973.

[34] After the first wave of ousters, a sizable number of those who had been removed were restored to their positions. Although the government needed these men, this sequence very effectively communicated to the bureaucrats the desirability of following the regime's dictates if they wished to remain secure.

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on federating principles so as to resolve a constitutional deadlock and to allow the promulgation of an interim constitution, the central and provincial governments were unable to limit their political differences. Jurisdictional issues were increasingly interpreted by both as insolvable conflicts between a government and its opposition rather than as the natural consequence of a federal system, and bargaining between the two levels of government became more acrimonious and intense. The events that led to the dismissal of the NAP-JUI coalition in Baluchistan and to the resignation of its counterpart in the Northwest frontier province are too lengthy to relate here; in any case, it seems apparent that Bhutto ultimately found the escalating federal conflict too onerous to bear. After a number of such clashes and a general deterioration of law and order in the two provinces (engineered in part by the PPP and its allies), Bhutto dismissed the Baluchistan government, forcing the resignation of the government of the NWFP in consequence. He then replaced the governors of the provinces with nominees of his own choosing. Even in Punjab and Sind, provinces loyal to the PPP, Bhutto has tended to utilize his patrimonial linkages rather than take institutional paths as the principal channel between province and center.

Nowhere has patrimonialism been more pervasive than within the People's Party itself.[35] Because of its "movement" character, the PPP was plagued by severe factionalism at all levels when it and Bhutto assumed power. Even before the transfer of power, personal-cum-ideological factions had emerged in the provincial party organizations. In Punjab, for example, a conflict between Ghulam Mustafa Khar, the provincial General Secretary, and Sheikh Mohammad Rashid, the provincial President, went so far as to produce two separate party headquarters, both attempting to function as the official provincial organization. Self-styled local PPP leaders were frequently challenged by local allies of provincial leaders or by successful National Assembly and Provincial Assembly candidates for control of the local party branches. Indiscipline became the norm throughout the party.

Bhutto countered these problems by seeking to enhance his personal control over the party. Even before the elections, provincial committees were shunted aside by centrally selected provincial parliamentary boards who had the task of supervising the selection of candidates for the PPP ticket. After the PPP came to power, new provincial committees were named, and it was decided that, pending party elections, each

[35] This section is based upon data collected in interviews with PPP figures, conducted by the author at the national, provincial, and local levels between August 1973 and June 1974.

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level of the party organization would be responsible for selecting the officers of the levels below it. A highly erratic pattern of political conflict ensued. Various political figures sought to discredit one another by charges of corruption and attempted to gain nomination to office, either through a personal appeal to Bhutto or through sympathetic supporters in Bhutto's innermost circle. Bhutto's support rather than the occupation of a particular political position was always the determining factor in deciding who wielded power at any level. In Punjab, with Bhutto's support, Mustafa Khar established the office of Governor as the principal political office of the province, thereby undermining the Chief Minister's claim to it. Shortly thereafter, he himself became Chief Minister and, with Bhutto's support, resurrected that office. Disputes between Bhutto and Khar led to the latter's replacement as Chief Minister in March 1974, by Haneef Ramay, another long-time party activist. A year later, Bhutto restored Khar to the governorship, engendering yet another conflict between the Chief Minister and the Governor. Bhutto removed Ramay in mid-July, and Khar at the end of that month, replacing Ramay with the individual who had given up the governorship to Khar five months earlier. In Sind, Bhutto shuttled power between his cousin Mumtaz Bhutto (former Governor of the province, and, in 1975, Federal Communications Minister), and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the Serving Provincial Chief Minister.

The highest levels of the party were not immune to this drive for control. The number of independent founder-members of the PPP in the Cabinet and in Bhutto's personal circle declined rapidly. In October 1974, Bhutto ousted J. A. Rahim, one of his earliest supporters, and Dr. Mubashir Hasan, another founder-member. The Cabinet has become a revolving door, providing momentary but often precarious shelter for members of the party elite ousted elsewhere with Bhutto's support, or returning to favor and offering new alternatives for patrimonial selection, and new potential patrimonial selectees.

The point here is not simply that the PPP is a highly personalized party or even that it is highly factionalized. Both characterizations are true, but by themselves they do not distinguish the Pakistani political system from other systems in less-developed countries. What is unique is the peculiar interplay of factionalism and personalism. Factions have no real stability in the PPP. Power derives, not from the attainment of numerical superiority within a party arena (a situation that tends to generate relatively stable factions within a particular party level), but from patrimonial designation. Members of the elite compete for such designation from Bhutto and *then* garner factional support. Members

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of the PPP elite need not demonstrate majority support for themselves in order to assume leadership positions; they are therefore relieved of the need to build support at lower levels of the party. Political conflict at each level in the political system thus occurs independently of conflict at every other level. At all levels, factions are fluid and amorphous. Some scholars have expressed the hope that factions will stabilize within the PPP (each faction theoretically representing different social and political interests), and that factional leaders will emerge as major actors in the decision-making process, but none of this has occurred.[36] Factions and faction leaders remain extremely erratic.

Demobilization. The growing use of patrimonialism by Bhutto has been accompanied by a general de-emphasis on mobilization. Leadership of the PPP has, under Bhutto's guidance, moved out of the hands of those most active in popular mobilization and political organization. At the party's 1970 convention, Bhutto separated himself completely from the most militant and mass-oriented faction of the party (which rejected any cooperation with the military government then in power) by deciding that the PPP would contest the elections. Since that time, the number of mass organizers in the party has declined rapidly.

As a result of the departure of these men, party organization has languished. Despite an official party rule prohibiting elected officials from serving as party officeholders (a rule designed to encourage mass political organization), Bhutto has appointed patrimonial nominees to government positions and allowed them to retain their party roles. He thereby shaped the PPP into a relatively limited, minister-focused party. At the national and provincial levels, the national and provincial cabinets are, in effect, the relevant PPP organizations.

This de-emphasis on participation and mobilization has also manifested itself in the use of government coercion. The central and provincial governments, like their nonelected predecessors, have continued to rely heavily on a variety of legal statutes that allow suppression of public political behavior. Bhutto kept martial law in effect for more than a year after assuming control, thereby allowing himself extraordinary powers as Chief Martial Law Administrator. To some extent, even the various economic and social reforms initiated by Bhutto were directed at curtailing the continued high level of mobilization sustained by various groups.

In many ways, the erratic use of governmental coercion by Bhutto's followers has proved to be the most formidable discouragement to po-

[36] Burki (fn. 21), 1139–40.

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litical participation. Buttressed by Bhutto's personal support, those in office were seldom reluctant to harass not only members of opposition parties, but their opponents within the PPP as well. Arbitrary jailings, bogus criminal charges, physical intimidation by the police—all became common. Since Bhutto frequently ousted one official in favor of another, the initial instigators of these acts were often the targets of later ones. Although Bhutto expressed a desire to curtail such factional violence, his requirements for frequent personnel changes in order to prevent a challenge to his rule merely perpetuated this type of conflict.

Attacks on opposition politicians have also been severe. In 1972, two opposition leaders were assassinated; in 1973, four unsuccessful assassination attempts were made on Abdul Wali Khan, the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly; in 1974, the Deputy Speaker of the Baluchistan Assembly, also an opposition leader, was assassinated. Numerous attacks on Bhutto's supporters have also taken place. For instance, Hyat Mohammad Khan Sherpao, a founder-member and PPP leader in the Northwest Frontier Province, was killed in a bombing in February 1975. Still, it continues to be the popular belief that most of the violence is officially inspired in order to suppress the opposition. After the Sherpao killing, for example, the principal opposition party, the National Awami Party, was banned and its leaders arrested. Whether or not such impressions are correct, the aura of intimidation that pervades Pakistani politics has been a strong discouragement to participation.

The political system, then, that has emerged in the Bhutto years in Pakistan is a curious mixture. From one perspective, it possesses considerable stability. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto has succeeded in expanding his political control to a degree unsurpassed even in a country where personal rulership has been the norm rather than the exception. From another perspective, however, instability is endemic to the system. The PPP remains in disarray, a collage of fluid, episodic factions. Opposition parties are shattered. Government structures are more amorphously defined than ever. The basis of stability rests on one life. In this world, there is little that is more fragile.

Some Speculative Generalizations

Do Pakistan's experiences provide any insight into the issues raised in the first section of this study? Some would argue that they do not. In an era in which the leaders of the less-developed states seem pale compared to their predecessors, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is an especially

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overpowering figure. Volatile, imaginative, ambitious, Bhutto is the embodiment of energetic activity. For many, Pakistan's political debility can be explained in terms of Bhutto—his background, his views of power, his preferences, his preoccupation with his personal destiny. In the last section of this essay, I will attempt to show that there is more to be learned from a study of Pakistan than simply a vignette of a strong personality.

First, the political elite seeking to reorganize Pakistan's political system was confronted by numerous managerial problems. Such problems are likely to develop when restrictions are imposed on organized political activity during periods of military or quasi-military rule. The restrictions make it unlikely that alternative political structures will develop any significant cohesion. Consequently, they will not possess the capability to function as organizations after a withdrawal or ouster of the military from power.

The various types of restrictions imposed on political behavior as a result of military intervention are too numerous to list. Military regimes are essentially antipolitical in their perception of politics. In the eyes of the military rulers, all participation is inevitably divisive and therefore illegitimate. Political parties are generally banned, politicians barred from public activity, and interest groups, if not banned altogether, sharply curtailed. The fact that some military governments have sought to create their own parties or to provide for new types of participatory structures such as Ayub's "Basic Democracies" does not alter their fundamentally antipolitical character. Regime-organized parties tend to be isolated from the military leadership because of the latter's distrust of such efforts; "Basic Democracies" and other such efforts merely reflect a desire to depoliticize participation.

The emergence of any broad, national, coherent opposition party is therefore unlikely. More likely is the emergence of opposition parties as haphazard amalgams of dissenting groups—some conspiratorial, some not—linked only by a common animosity toward those in power. The Pakistan People's Party developed in very much this way. Essentially a union of a public figure and a disparate group of leftist elites and factions, it expanded in extremely chaotic fashion during the 1968–1969 antigovernment protests. Its organizational problems were aggravated by the events that occurred between the 1970 elections and its accession to power in December 1971.

Second, under the conditions of such institutional chaos, nonorganizational means of political consolidation are likely to dominate. In Pakistan, Bhutto had few resources other than his own personality, his

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immediate set of followers, and limited access to the coercive machinery of government. Bhutto's interest in gaining control over the political system through patrimonialism and demobilization was as much a function of circumstance as of personality. In this sense, periods of military or of quasi-military rule are "de-developmental," functioning to undermine the basis of future political institutionalization. Post-military states that emerge only after the military has been forcibly ousted seem likely to be confronted by a further handicap: The disorganized character of the revolt (which had assisted the revolt by dispersing leadership, thereby limiting the military's capacity to suppress it) exacerbates the organizational problem.

Third, the patrimonially dominated political system which is likely to be the successor to the military state seems equally likely to be the antithesis of a developing state; the requisites for effective patrimonial rule work against the requisites for development. Patrimonialism has its own logic. Patrimonial leaders have historically had to deal with rebellious fiefdoms, as the subordinates with the responsibility for a jurisdiction consolidate their personal control over that area. The present-day equivalent of this problem, especially under conditions of relatively high mobilization, is the effort of patrimonial nominees to develop their own party and bureaucratic factions, popular bases, and geographic areas of influence. Maintenance of control by a patrimonial leader requires the constant movement of lieutenants. In Pakistan, this requirement seems most manifest in Bhutto's rapid changes of support for various supporters and in their limited durability in political and governmental office and his inner circle.

Political development, on the other hand, has become increasingly associated with the emergence of a stable set of expectations concerning the various roles in a political system. In a developed system, each role has a set of consensually based boundaries or parameters. If they are violated, the result will either be an alteration of the political system as a whole or the removal of the violator from his position. The institutionalization of roles in the political system is characterized by a structured and interrelated set of norms for role behavior. Where these norms are weak and ambiguous, institutionalization—not only of political roles but of the political system itself—is at a low level.[37]

All new states are, by definition, at best marginally institutionalized. Political roles are frequently new and ambiguously defined, and conflicts over diverse role expectations and over differing perceptions of

[37] See Raymond F. Hopkins, *Political Roles in a New State: Tanzania's First Decade* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1971), 43.

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role boundaries are endemic to a new state. In this sense, the post-military state is very much a new state, regardless of the number of years that have elapsed since its formal independence. If the case of Pakistan is significant, role ambiguity and conflict may be expected after a period of military rule. In addition to having to deal with the traditional problems of role definition, post-military states must face a general collapse of previously organized roles and institutions. Military roles have been undermined by their expansion and contraction; bureaucratic roles lie in disrepute and are challenged because of their expansion during the military period; and, because of previous repression, few extragovernmental political roles are properly defined.[38]

The dilemma of the post-military state is that such role ambiguity is not likely to pass with time. Because the post-military regime must probably depend on patrimonialism to accomplish political consolidation, role ambiguities are perpetuated. In Pakistan, the patrimonial leader's rapid changes in the occupants of various roles and in his apparent support of the supremacy of different roles over time—strategies essential to patrimonial consolidation—have hindered the development of any sense of role boundaries or expectations. For example, governors, chief ministers, and party presidents have taken turns at asserting their authority over provincial party organizations and legislative party groups; at different times, all have been sustained by Bhutto. In the end, none of these roles surfaced as a dominant focus in this area of political activity. Moreover, civil service reforms have undermined traditional role definitions and expectations without creating new ones in their place.

The attempt to make generalizations from a single case is a hazardous venture, excusable only as part of an effort to organize hypotheses that can be more systematically investigated. On the basis of Pakistan's experience, it would seem that a post-military regime truly reaps the whirlwinds of its predecessors and is far less developed and more likely to be unstable than they were. In view of the sorry history of those earlier regimes, that is not a very comforting conjecture.

[38] On the concept of role expansion, see Moshe Lissak, "Modernization and Role Expansion of the Military in Developing Countries," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, IX (April 1967), 233–55.

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Review Article

OF SYLLABI, TEXTS, STUDENTS, AND SCHOLARSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: Some Data and Interpretations on the State of a Burgeoning Field*

By JAMES N. ROSENAU, GARY GARTIN, EDWIN P. McCLAIN, DONA STINZIANO, RICHARD STODDARD, and DEAN SWANSON**

THERE is no shortage of introductory textbooks in international relations (IR). Here we present the results of a systematic content analysis of 26 volumes published between 1966 and 1973,[1] but many more could have been subjected to scrutiny if we had not confined our conception of a text to *single- or co-authored works that purport to offer a comprehensive overview of the "basics" of the field*. Had we expanded this conception to include works in international organization, international law, and American foreign policy, we could easily have tripled our sample. Indeed, had we developed a conception of a text that allowed for the inclusion of those works that IR teachers treat as worthy of purchase by their students and/or of multiple assignments in their courses—particularly paperbacks that are explicitly and exclusively confined to a thorough and systematic examination of one central aspect of IR (such as diplomacy, game theory, crises, or foreign policy decision making)—our sample would probably have been enlarged more than a hundredfold.[2]

As it is, even the narrow conception of texts which we did employ proved troublesome, partly because we could not include data on 8 such works that have been published since we completed our content analysis in 1974,[3] and partly because definitions differ as to what con-

* A list of the books analyzed appears in Table 1.

** We are grateful to Kay Neves, Steve Ballard, Jon Benson, Gary DeLaRosa, Kathleen Fleming, Mason Frichette, Thomas Johnson, Philip Siegelman, and Mary Stave for their help in preparing this essay.

[1] The 26 texts are hereafter identified by their authors; see Table 1.

[2] In this connection, see Tables 2 and 3 below.

[3] Robert D. Cantor, *Introduction to International Politics* (Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock 1976); Ira S. Cohen, *Realpolitik: Theory and Practice* (Encino, Cal.: Dickenson Pub-

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stitutes the "basics" of IR and how thorough an overview of them must be to achieve comprehensiveness. What is basic to one scholar is peripheral to another; what one considers comprehensive, another views as limited or superficial. In constructing our sample of 26, therefore, we had to proceed in terms of somewhat crude notions of basic and thorough coverage, erring on the side of including those works whose scope was broad enough to be assigned throughout an entire course.

Whatever criteria may be used to identify them, it is instructive to ask *why* there are so many texts. Is it because the IR field is so inchoate that only a multitude of works can serve all the approaches and emphases to which students are exposed in what may be more than 2,000 introductory IR courses given throughout the country in any given year?[4] Because every respectable publisher of political science texts, aware that the market is a big one, feels that his list must include one or more entries covering the IR field, and therefore persuades one or more teachers of IR to write their own texts even though they themselves may be satisfied with the one they have been using? Because the training and capabilities of undergraduates vary so greatly among the nation's colleges and universities that publishers believe there are several IR markets that can only be served by having several texts on their list, some aimed at the Ivy League schools, others at state universities, and still others at junior colleges? Because some teachers need to supplement their income, add to their scholarly credentials, or are otherwise motivated to enhance their work by writing texts? Because others are so thoroughly dissatisfied with the available texts that they seek to elevate the field by preparing their own? Or because teachers have such varied conceptions of what they want to accomplish in their introductory courses?

Probably an affirmative answer to all these questions is warranted. The scope of the field is vast, and diversity does mark its contents. Publishers do seek to uncover and tap all potential markets.[5] Students do

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lishing Co. 1975); David J. Finlay and Thomas Hovet, Jr., *7304: International Relations on the Planet Earth* (New York: Harper & Row 1975); Robert A. Isaak, *Individuals and World Politics* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press 1975); Ralph Pettman, *Human Behavior and World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1975); Steven J. Rosen and Walter S. Jones, *The Logic of International Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers 1974); Richard W. Sterling, *Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1974); and Michael P. Sullivan, *International Relations: Theories and Evidence* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1976).

[4] The estimated figure of 2,000 was given to us by several publishers' representatives.

[5] The role of publishers in the processes whereby knowledge is passed on to new

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vary in their skills and interests from one type of institution to another. Academics do need to supplement their incomes, and they do have images of what students should learn.

Whatever the full explanation of the plethora of texts, collectively they offer valuable insights into the state of the field and the way in which successive generations of students are trained to comprehend it. Our purpose here is to tease such insights out of the welter of available introductory materials. The essentials of a field are perhaps best distilled in the knowledge and methods that are passed on to those who enter it, and it is these essentials we seek to uncover. We assume that the patterns and disparities uncovered in a large sample of texts can serve as measures of the coherence and diversity of IR. We aspire to providing such measures, to portraying the images of IR that are widely shared and the methodologies that are widely practiced. And, in so doing, we hope to provide an assessment that can serve as useful feedback—if not as the basis for revising prevailing assumptions and perceptions, at least as a means for taking stock, for pondering whether the dominant images and practices are taking those in the field in the directions they wish to travel. We also hope that in the process our analysis provides sufficient information about each of the content-analyzed texts to assist those teaching IR courses to make adoptions consistent with their images of the field and the analytic skills they want their students to acquire.

There is another major purpose that motivated us to undertake this inquiry. We want to demonstrate the virtues of systematic assessment. As noted at greater length elsewhere, we believe that the same criteria of evidence and methodological rigor should be applied in evaluating IR materials as are used in IR research itself.[6] Most reviews of texts and most assessments of research consist of analytic essays in which the re-

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generations of students is highlighted by the extent to which several have turned to market research techniques in order to guide the actual writing of introductory texts. Consider, for example, the following account, told with considerable enthusiasm and pride to the senior author by the responsible editor, of how one large publishing firm brought an introductory text in anthropology into being. First the firm circulated a questionnaire to those teaching introductory courses in the field, asking them to indicate the main topics they covered in their courses and offering them three books from the publisher's list in exchange for the information. The returned questionnaires were then content-analyzed, computerized, and an average chapter outline, along with the main themes of each chapter, derived therefrom. At this point the firm scoured the field to find an author to write the book that the market research techniques had, in effect, created. As the editor put it, "We needed to find someone to flesh out the chapter outline!"

[6] James N. Rosenau, "Assessment in International Studies: Ego Trip or Feedback?" *International Studies Quarterly*, XVIII (September 1974), 339–67.

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viewers offer impressionistic interpretations of the central tendencies that underlie the materials under review. Often, to be sure, these analytic essays are insightful and pervaded with useful observations about the state of the field, where it has been, and where it seems to be going.[7] But in the absence of systematic data supporting the interpretations and depicting the extent of their relevance, such assessments fail to provide the bases for corrective measures. One can never be sure whether the trends and practices asserted to be at work are pervasive, whether they are a function of particular outlooks and training, or whether they are overreactions on the part of reviewers with axes to grind. Thus, in the hope of generating materials that are not founded on impressions and that cannot readily be dismissed as axe-grinding, we have dared to undertake an assessment marked by rigor and precision. In so doing we have resisted the temptation to sprinkle our analysis with quotes from the various texts that exemplify the absurdity of the practices we deplore or that uphold the orientations we favor. Given the amount of material we have examined, it would be easy indeed to proceed from quotation to quotation as a means of demonstrating the wisdom of our biases. But our commitment here is to rigorous analysis, and we have therefore confined our interpretations to commentary about the quantitative patterns we have uncovered. We do not claim to have prepared a definitive review, but we do contend that the ensuing analysis rests on solid empirical foundations as well as an aspiration to provoke thought about the problem of introducing students to IR.

I. The Uses of a Textbook

To evaluate the merits of any text is to have notions about the purposes it must serve. Instructors differ in this regard—partly because they have different conceptions of the nature and state of IR knowledge, partly because they have different images of their students' capabilities, and partly because they must cope with different limitations as to the size of their courses, the adequacy of their libraries, the availability of teaching assistants, and the traditions of their institutions. For various

[7] For some stimulating essays in which IR texts are insightfully assessed, see Kenneth E. Boulding, "The Content of International Studies in College: A Review," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VIII (March 1964), 65–71; Charles B. Neff, "The Study of International Relations: New Approaches to a Familiar Subject," *World Politics*, XV (January 1963), 339–53; Richard C. Snyder, "Toward Greater Order in the Study of International Politics," *World Politics*, VII (April 1955), 461–78; Fred A. Sondermann, "The Study of International Relations: 1956 Version," *World Politics*, X (October 1957), 102–11; and Dina A. Zinnes, "An Introduction to the Behavioral Approach: A Review," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XII (June 1968), 258–67.

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reasons, therefore, some instructors organize their courses exclusively around assignments in a text and/or book of readings; others use texts to provide coherence for their courses while at the same time assigning a number of paperbacks and/or selections from a variety of other sources; and still others do not use a text at all, relying instead on their course outlines and/or lectures to infuse a coherence into assignments from a wide range of diverse materials.

Conceptions of the state of knowledge about IR are relevant to these various uses of a textbook: instructors seem more likely to rely exclusively on a text if they believe that the field has achieved a consensus as to what constitutes the basic facts and concepts that ought to serve as an "introduction" to the course of world affairs. Teachers of IR who perceive the field as having yet to evolve an overarching paradigm that identifies the basic facts and concepts, or who adhere to scientific criteria of evidence and consider the accumulated knowledge of the field to be more impressionistic than reliable, seem likely to look beyond the available texts to materials that are consistent with either the particular conceptualization of the field or the criteria of evidence to which they subscribe.

Conceptions of the motivations and talents that students bring to the course are relevant to the way in which texts are used: instructors seem more likely to adopt a text if they are convinced they have found one that is consistent with their image of what their students are willing and able to do. If instructors believe their students lack analytic skills and require simplified syntheses in order to comprehend the basics of the field, they are likely to seek out texts that treat IR knowledge as established, rely on gross definitions, offer unqualified explanations, recite historical facts, ignore nuances, and eschew references to the methodologies whereby the knowledge, explanations, and facts presented were developed. If, on the other hand, they see their students as curious and capable of grasping complexity, they are likely to employ texts that stress alternative conceptualizations and explanations, treat knowledge as tentative and dependent on the methodology employed, and otherwise challenge their readers to form their own conclusions. These two types of instructors are also likely to differ in the degree to which they rely on a text to infuse structure into their courses. Those that tend to view their students as unmotivated and incompetent seem likely to rely more exclusively on a text than those with a more favorable image of students, since the latter will probably look to supplemental materials to insure a wider range of alternative formulations, contradictory findings, and innovative methodologies.

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The varying consequences of the varying conceptions of the field and students will probably be reinforced by the circumstances under which instructors must offer their courses. Those who have huge numbers of students and/or poor libraries seem more likely to view the field as synthesizable into an overall, established paradigm that can be captured in a single text than are those whose classes are small and whose libraries have multiple copies of many books and the funds for placing duplicated materials on reserve shelves. Moreover, the greater the number of students enrolled in their courses, the more instructors are likely to perceive the "average" student as limited in both curiosity and competence.

All the foregoing considerations, of course, may be as operative for those who write texts as for those who adopt them. If IR knowledge is perceived as established and integrated, texts are likely to be compendia of historical facts and conventional concepts; writers who are less sure of the field's base of knowledge are more likely to take note of alternative explanations, conceptual nuances, evidential sources, and methodological underpinnings. Similarly, if textwriters see themselves as synthesizing materials for mediocre and unmotivated students, the knowledge they present is likely to be cast in language that simplifies complexity and that otherwise caters to the perceived need for clear-cut facts and explanations.

The more one ponders the uses of a textbook, in short, the clearer it becomes that texts are more than a reflection of the state of a field, more than a synthesized product of a complex knowledge-building process. They are also contributors to that process, embedded in it as both mirrors and sources of the ways in which researchers, teachers, publishers, and students go about their respective tasks. The dynamics of building and disseminating IR knowledge thus involve a vast feedback system in which texts can play a major role. The interdependence of this system is set forth in Figure 1, an earlier version of which served to clarify and limit our inquiry at the outset. At that time we recognized that we could not explore all the relationships identified in Figure 1, and that we were compelled to confine ourselves mainly to what the 26 texts revealed about the state of the field and the capabilities ascribed to students. At the same time it seemed clear that even such a limited assessment requires recognition of the various ways in which texts shape and reflect the learning of IR perspectives and knowledge.

We were also aware that, although we wanted to undertake as detached and objective an assessment as possible, we were not lacking in

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

FIGURE 1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE IR FIELD AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY TEXTBOOKS

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judgments as to what a "good" text ought to contain. So that the ensuing analysis can be fairly evaluated, it is perhaps useful to explicate our values in this regard. Indeed, since we consciously built our basic values into some of our content-analytic categories, we owe our readers an initial summary of our conception of the prevailing state of the field and the general orientations of the undergraduates who seek (or otherwise submit to) an introduction to it. We see the field as in disarray, as lacking any consensus as to the nature, sources, and consequences of international processes. Thus, whether it is designed for exclusive use in a course or for use with other materials, we believe the "ideal" text should, even as it presents a comprehensive picture of world politics, take note of alternative approaches and explanations, be explicit about the concepts on which the analysis is founded, be precise about the links between causes and effects, be sensitive to the need for evidence in support of assertions made about the motives, dynamics, and ramifications of the actions and interactions examined, and be permeated by phrases that convey the probabilistic, tentative, and qualified nature of the interpretations and conclusions that it offers.

These qualities seem all the more compelling to us because they are also consistent with our conception of students and the pedagogical goals that texts ought to serve. In our experience, students are not so lacking in curiosity and capabilities that they have to be spoon-fed. Rather, we believe that they are more talented than either they or their instructors think; that their curiosities are susceptible to arousal; that they are able to cope with the notion that IR knowledge is elusive, fragmented, and open to multiple interpretations; that they can abandon dependence on sheer description and will thrive on the joys of analysis if given a chance to do so. We *do* recognize the great variability in the orientations and capabilities of students, both within and across institutions, and thus we appreciate that some concessions in style and simplifications of content may be necessary; but we do not accept the premise that the limitations of beginning students necessitate the writing of texts that eschew analysis, avoid complexity, minimize methodology, and rely on historical narration and unverified description.

If the foregoing perspectives seem unduly repeated throughout the ensuing analysis, it is not only because of the importance we attach to them. The repetitiveness can also be viewed as a reflection of the many ways in which the philosophical assumptions that textwriters make about the nature of the field and the ability of students pervade their analyses.

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II. Are Textbooks Used?

As we began to appreciate the various ways in which texts could be used in a course, it became increasingly clear that we ought not content-analyze the 26 texts under review without first ascertaining whether they were being used. Convinced that practitioners in the field were far from agreement on the nature of IR, and aware that introductory courses could be organized around paperbacks and collections of readings, it seemed absurd to probe lengthy, comprehensive, and single- or co-authored texts for insights into the state of the field if in fact teachers were not relying on them and students were not being exposed to them. This realization led us to send a request, in February 1973, to 146 colleges and universities located in various parts of the country and designed to serve a variety of types of students, for copies of syllabi used in "any and all introductory undergraduate courses in 'International Relations' (or 'World Politics,' or whatever title may be used) given by different instructors using differing syllabi in your Department during 1972–1973." Our request yielded an astonishing degree of cooperation: 178 different syllabi for courses defined as introductory were received from 106 different institutions.[8] The senior author of this assess-

[8] In addition to the 178 syllabi that were usable for our purposes, we also received scores of syllabi for more advanced courses, partly because the inclination to cooperate was high and partly because some institutions do not differentiate between introductory and advanced courses. We are grateful to colleagues in the following institutions for their help in creating the sample of 178 syllabi: University of Alabama; Amherst College; Appalachian State University; University of Arizona; Barnard College; Boston University; Brandeis University; Brown University; University of California (Berkeley); University of California (Los Angeles); University of California (Riverside); University of California (Santa Barbara); California State University (Hayward); Carleton College; Case Western Reserve University; Catholic University of America; University of Cincinnati; Claremont Men's College; Colorado College; Columbia University; Cornell University; Dartmouth College; Denison University; DePauw University; Douglass College; Drew University; Eastern Kentucky University; Emory University; Franklin and Marshall College; George Washington University; University of Georgia; Hamilton College; Harvard University; Hobart & William Smith Colleges; University of Illinois; University of Illinois at Chicago Circle; Indiana State University; Indiana University; University of Iowa; Johns Hopkins University; Kansas State University; Kent State University; University of Kentucky; Lake Forrest College; Lehigh University; Livingston College; Louisiana State University; Marshall University; University of Maryland; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; McGill University; Miami University (Ohio); University of Michigan; Michigan State University; Middlebury College; University of Missouri (St. Louis); New Mexico State University; State University of New York (Albany); State University of New York (Binghamton); State University of New York (Buffalo); State University of New York (College of Arts and Letters at Geneseo); State University of New York (Stony Brook); New York University; University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill); Northwestern University; Ohio University; University of Oklahoma; Oklahoma State University; University of Oregon; University of Penn-

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ment personally coded all 178 syllabi in terms of 62 variables that, taken together, provided an overview of the extent to which texts serve as the basis on which world politics is reconstructed for students in introductory IR courses. In addition, so as to depict the breadth of the nontextual materials to which students are exposed, a separate tally was made of every reading assigned or suggested in the 178 syllabi.

The results of this preliminary inquiry provide ample justification for both an intensive and a qualified investigation of the 26 texts under review. An intensive probing is warranted because 136 of the 178 courses (or 76 percent) made assignments from one or more of the 26 texts;[9] the mean number of chapters from the books in our sample that the students taking these 136 courses were required to read was 20. A further indication of the substantial reliance on texts is evident from the fact that 29 of the 178 syllabi listed one or more of the 26 texts under "suggested reading"; 67 assigned chapters from texts not in our sample;[10] and 30 included other texts among the suggested readings. Justification for an intensive analysis of an extensive sample of texts can also be seen in a breakdown of the 26 texts in our sample by the number of courses in which each was assigned. This is presented in Table 1, where it can be seen that none of the texts dominates the field. To be sure, those by Holsti, Morgenthau, Deutsch, and Coplin were adopted substantially more than any of the others,[11] but none of these

sylvania; Pennsylvania State University (Capital Campus); University of Pittsburgh; Pitzer College; Pomona College; Purdue University; Queens College (New York); University of Richmond; University of Rochester; Roosevelt University; Rutgers University (Camden); Rutgers University (Newark); Rutgers University (New Brunswick); Scripps College; University of South Carolina; Stevens Institute of Technology; Syracuse University; University of Texas (Austin); University of Texas (El Paso); Texas Tech University; Union College; Vanderbilt University; University of Virginia; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Wayne State University; West Virginia University; Western Kentucky University; College of William & Mary in Virginia; University of Windsor; University of Wisconsin (Madison); University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee); Wittenberg University; College of Wooster; Xavier University; Yale University; Youngstown State University.

[9] Of the 178 syllabi, 55 percent required reading in only one of the 26 texts, 14 percent required chapters in two of them, and 7 percent assigned three or more.

[10] Of the 42 syllabi that did not assign a text in our sample, 19 were among the 67 requiring reading in other texts, most of them in the fields of American foreign policy, international organization, or international law. All in all, 155, or 87 percent, of the 178 syllabi contained assignments in one or another text—a proportion that is quite consistent with the results of another survey of 553 IR professors, also conducted in 1972–1973, in which some 94 percent were found to rely on texts. Cf. Jerilee Grundy, "CLEP: International Relations Survey," *International Studies Notes*, 1 (Winter 1974), 19.

[11] Comparisons of the figures in Table 1 must be made with caution, since there was substantial variation in the number of months and years for which the texts had been available for adoption. Indeed, several that appeared in none or in only one of the syl-

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was used in more than 13 percent of the courses. This finding surely suggests that a wide range of texts must be examined if the prevailing tendencies and crosscurrents in the field are to be uncovered.

Thus, there are sound reasons to undertake a content analysis of the 26 texts in our sample; there are, however, equally good reasons why the results of the investigation must be carefully qualified. Several aspects of the data make it clear that instructors of introductory IR courses do not rely exclusively on comprehensive texts by single authors. In addition to the fact that in 42 courses none of the texts in our sample were assigned, and that in 23 courses no text whatsoever was used, the analysis of the syllabi yielded a variety of findings that point to a tendency to carry the exposure of students well beyond textbooks:

(a) If teachers placed exclusive reliance on texts, their syllabi would have listed only one source in which assignments were explicitly made. However, that pattern obtained in only 4 percent of the cases. The dominant pattern was one of assignments in a variety of sources (books and articles), with the median figure for all 178 syllabi being 6 different sources, and the mean being 10 sources.

(b) Suggested as well as assigned readings were listed in 33 percent (59) of the syllabi, so that the median for all the sources listed was 8 items and the mean was 19.

(c) Assignments from books of readings were made in 62 percent (110) of the syllabi.

(d) Assignments from nonfiction books other than texts, articles, or compilations of readings were made in 77 percent (137) of the syllabi, with the median number of such books assigned being 3 and the mean 6.[12]

(e) Assignments from the same book more than once during the course were made in 75 percent (133) of the syllabi; 70 percent (125) cited at least one book only once as an assignment (with the mean of books cited only once being 7 and the median 2).

(f) Students were required to purchase at least two books by 82 percent (146) of the syllabi; the average syllabus listed 4 items to be purchased.[13]

In short, any central tendencies uncovered in the 26 texts cannot be automatically treated as indicative of the way researchers and teachers in the field perceive and assess the structure and dynamics of global

labi had been published in the year in which we conducted our survey, and thus could not possibly have been used in a number of courses.

[12] In addition, 50 syllabi listed a mean of 26 nonfiction books as suggested readings.

[13] That this trend toward multiple-book courses is not confined to IR and has become sufficiently widespread and pronounced to trouble textbook publishers can be readily seen in Ray W. Vanderhoef, "College Textbook Crisis of the 1970's," *Publishers' Weekly*, Vol. 200 (October 4, 1971), 24–25.

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politics. The wide use of the texts suggests that they are representative of the perspectives of more than 26 authors, but clearly teachers in the field do not regard them as sufficient syntheses of the fundamental concepts and facts to which introductory students ought to be exposed.

A tally of the number of syllabi that listed duplicated preprints or government reports suggests that this sense of insufficiency with respect

TABLE 1

NUMBER OF SYLLABI FOR 178 INTRODUCTORY IR COURSES IN WHICH ASSIGNMENTS WERE MADE FROM THE 26 TEXTS SUBJECTED TO A SYSTEMIC CONTENT ANALYSIS IN 1973–1974

Text	*Number of Syllabi in Which Assigned*
Axline, W. Andrew and James A. Stegenga, *The Global Community: A Brief Introduction to International Relations* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1972), 196 pp.	5
Bobrow, Davis B., *International Relations: New Approaches* (New York: Free Press, 1972), 95 pp.	1
Coplin, William D., *Introduction to International Politics* (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1971), 391 pp.*	21
Crabb, Cecil V., Jr., *Nations in a Multipolar World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 702 pp.	3
Deutsch, Karl W., *The Analysis of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 214 pp.	27
Dougherty, James E. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1971), 416 pp.	3
Duchacek, Ivo D., *Nations and Men: An Introduction to International Politics* (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), 560 pp.*	4
Edwards, David V., *International Political Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), 366 pp.	0
Frankel, Joseph, *International Politics: Conflict and Harmony* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1973), 265 pp.	1
Hartmann, Frederick H., *The Relations of Nations* (4th ed.; New York: Macmillan, 1973), 715 pp.	2
Holsti, K. J., *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 532 pp.	32
Hopkins, Raymond F. and Richard W. Mansbach, *Structure and Process in International Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 498 pp.	0

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Jordan, David C., *World Politics in Our Time* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1970), 426 pp.	1
Legg, Keith R. and James F. Morrison, *Politics and the International System: An Introduction* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 369 pp.	6
Modelski, George, *Principles of World Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1972), 370 pp.	0
Morgan, Patrick M., *Theories and Approaches to International Politics: What Are We to Think?* (San Ramon, Calif.: Consensus Publishers, 1972), 282 pp.	2
Morgenthau, Hans J., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (5th ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 617 pp.	33
Organski, A. F. K., *World Politics* (2nd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 509 pp.	12
Palmer, Norman D. and Howard C. Perkins, *International Relations: The World Community in Transition* (3rd ed.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 799 pp.	0
Puchala, Donald James, *International Politics Today* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1971), 379 pp.	12
Rosecrance, Richard, *International Relations: Peace or War?* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), 334 pp.	1
Schuman, Frederick L., *International Politics: Anarchy and Order in the World Society* (7th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), 751 pp.	1
Spanier, John, *Games Nations Play: Analyzing International Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1972), 457 pp.*	13
Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971), 499 pp.	6
Stoessinger, John G., *The Might of Nations: World Politics in Our Time* (4th ed.; New York: Random House, 1973), 461 pp.*	3
Van Dyke, Vernon, *International Politics* (3rd ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), 541 pp.	2

* A subsequent edition was published between 1974 and 1976.

to the available texts does not stem from a conviction on the part of instructors that the texts are short on recent research findings. As will be seen, there is little evidence that the work conducted on the frontiers of research gets fed back into textbooks quickly, but this does not seem to be a limitation that instructors attempt to overcome. Only 3 percent of the 178 syllabi assigned preprint materials, and only 1 percent listed them among the suggested reading; for government reports the cor-

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responding percentages were 5 and 2. These figures suggest that the gap between teaching and research may be as wide as the lag between the generation of findings and their formal publication (or, perhaps more accurately, between their generation and their republication in books of readings).[14]

The degree to which texts are relied upon and/or supplemented was not found to be a function of class size. The syllabi for large classes were found not to differ from those of small ones in terms of their length, the number of sources from which assignments were made, the number of items assigned or suggested, the number of assigned books cited more than once, the number of texts assigned, the number of books of readings assigned, the number of nonfiction books assigned other than texts or readers, or the number of books students were required to purchase.[15]

Our data suggest that the inclination to supplement the textbook with a diverse range of materials arises partly out of a pedagogical concern for varying the stimuli to which students are exposed and partly—and probably much more importantly—out of the absence of an underlying consensus about the nature of IR, its major concepts, its methodological premises, and its empirical foundations. If IR was a field in which one or two major paradigms predominated, the number of sources listed as assigned and suggested on syllabi would surely not be as great as indicated above. Indeed, altogether the 178 syllabi listed 2,038 *different* sources as either assigned or suggested. As can be seen in Table 2, only 147 (8 percent) of these appeared on 5 or more syllabi. More than 1,400 books or articles appeared on only one syllabus. Of the 29 works that appeared in 11 or more syllabi, moreover, less than half were systematic inquiries into a selected topic. As can be seen in Table 3, which lists these 29 books, 8 are texts in our sample, one (Wolfers) is an IR text not in our sample, one (Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares*) is a text in international organization, 5 are books of readings, and one (Kennedy) is an autobiographical account of a crisis. This leaves 13 conceptual or empirical inquiries, none of which ap-

[14] To some extent, of course, this gap may be narrowed through the verbal presentations instructors make in class. Yet it seems doubtful to us whether many teachers report extensively to their students on what they read in preprints and journals or hear at professional meetings; else they would be inclined to make more assignments from these sources.

[15] These comparisons were based on a chi square test using a .05 level of significance, with the 32 syllabi for which class size was not known being omitted from the analysis. Of the remaining 146 courses, 19 had 25 or fewer students, 41 had between 26 and 50, 43 had between 51 and 75, 17 had between 76 and 100, and the remaining 26 had over 100, with 10 of these exceeding 200 students.

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TABLE 2

NUMBER OF SYLLABI IN WHICH 2,038 SOURCES ASSIGNED OR SUGGESTED IN 178 SYLLABI APPEARED

Number of Syllabi	*Number of Assigned or Suggested Sources*
1	1,418
2	281
3	119
4	73
5	44
6	25
7	15
8	12
9	11
10	11
11–20	22
21 or more	7
Total	2,038

peared in more than 14 percent of the syllabi, among the 29 used most frequently.

Surely the patterns evident in Tables 2 and 3 would not prevail in a field that was marked by widespread agreement as to what materials constitute the basic—or introductory—notions out of which a more advanced, penetrating understanding must evolve. The resort to such a diversity of materials can only mean that, as a realm of inquiry, IR is at present so lacking in structure as to permit anyone who teaches it to define the field in any way he or she wants. Anything goes, the syllabi seem to say, so long as it takes place on two sides of national boundaries.

From a pedagogical point of view, of course, the diversity that springs from dissensus can be readily applauded. Students have an opportunity to explore various perspectives and, if they are so inclined, can avoid the restlessness that the organization of a single text may engender. There is some evidence in the syllabi that instructors supplemented text assignments partly as a means of catering to this restlessness. Or at least the fact that term papers were assigned in 48 percent of the courses, that 26 percent of these involved literature reviews, and that 19 percent of the syllabi listed participation in a simulation as a course requirement suggests an inclination to vary the learning stimuli.

But it would be erroneous to treat the lack of consensus and the con-

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TABLE 3

THE 29 ASSIGNED OR SUGGESTED SOURCES THAT APPEARED IN 11 OR MORE OF THE 178 SYLLABI

Source	*Number of Syllabi in Which Listed*
H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations**	50
K. J. Holsti, *International Politics**	39
J. N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy***	36
K. W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations**	33
I. L. Claude, *Power and International Relations*	26
W. D. Coplin, *Introduction to International Politics**	26
K. N. Waltz, *Man, The State, and War*	26
E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*	19
T. C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*	18
A. Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*	18
A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics**	17
G. T. Allison, *Essence of Decision*	16
T. C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*	16
J. G. Stoessinger, *Nations in Darkness*	16
I. L. Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares*	15
R. L. Pfaltzgraff (ed.), *Politics and the International System***	15
W. D. Coplin and C. W. Kegley (eds.), *A Multi-Method Introduction to International Politics***	14
R. F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*	14
H. Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism*	14
D. J. Puchala, *International Politics Today**	14
S. Hoffmann (ed.), *Contemporary Theory in International Relations***	13
C. A. McClelland, *Theory and the International System*	13
J. W. Spanier, *Games Nations Play**	13
Q. Wright, *A Study of War*	13
D. H. Meadows and others, *The Limits to Growth*	12
R. N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics*	12
M. A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*	11
S. Spiegel and K. N. Waltz (eds.), *Conflict in World Politics***	11
H. and M. Sprout, *Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth**	11

* Text in our sample

** Book of readings

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cern for student motivation as equally powerful explanations of the number and variety of books and articles to which students are exposed. The syllabi also contained considerable evidence that most instructors were not inclined to appeal to the curiosity of their students, much less to provide opportunities for its expression. Indeed, even the briefest perusal of the paragraphs in the syllabi describing the conduct of the course[16] conveyed the impression that few instructors are ready to concede confusion over, or curiosity about, international phenomena. Even fewer are inclined to treat knowledge of IR as tentative and subject to variation as conceptualizations and methodologies are varied; instead, most know exactly what they want their students to read and are unwilling to initiate a self-sustaining learning process by allowing their students to choose among alternative assignments. These impressions were amply confirmed by the quantitative data: in only 2 syllabi was more than one week explicitly set aside for a discussion of the nature of knowledge and the methodologies available for its generation, and only 27 percent devoted at least a week to the subject; 68 percent of the syllabi included no suggested readings; only 10 percent contained at least one assignment in which students were offered a choice among two or more readings; and only 26 percent offered any kind of choice as to the nature of the term paper that had to be written. Perhaps most important (and, for us, most disquieting), only 12 percent of the syllabi included any wording in their descriptions of the course and its conduct that could be interpreted as suggesting to students that the study of IR is unique, complicated, and/or challenging. Indeed, only 49 percent indicated the goals of the course for which the syllabus was designed.

Pedagogical concerns, therefore, can hardly be seen as the prime source of the diversity of the materials to which students are exposed. The structure of most introductory IR courses appears to be too rigid to attribute the diversity to the performance of the teaching function. Instead, the tendency to supplement text assignments appears best explained by the lack of agreement on the nature of the field. Pedagogical concerns may reinforce this tendency, but most of the evidence from the syllabi makes it seem likely that the absence of a shared paradigm serves to free instructors to pursue whatever intellectual orientations they regard as important.

An insight into the extent of the dissensus over the basic nature of

[16] At least one page of 38 percent of the syllabi was devoted to specifying the purposes and/or procedures of the course; most of the rest devoted only a paragraph or two to such matters.

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IR is provided by the way in which the syllabi subdivided the field. In 89 percent of them, the assignments and lectures were organized in terms of topical categories—31 percent exclusively through major (Roman-numeral type) headings, and 49 percent breaking the headings down further into subheadings; the remaining 9 percent merely attached subheadings to each week of the course. But it is the number of headings and subheadings used that suggests the lack of fundamental agreement. As can be seen in Table 4, IR teachers did not follow a common practice when they broke their courses up into basic components: no more than 14 percent agreed on the number of major headings under which to organize the materials of the field; as many used more than 10 headings as used 4. As might be expected, the figures on the use of subheadings revealed an even wider degree of divergence, but even here the range of subcategorizing tendencies was notably large.

To stress the lack of shared perspectives, however, is to run the risk of overlooking faint signs of convergence. One such sign, turned up by the analysis of the syllabi, bears noting. It concerns the degree to which the teaching of IR is organized around current events. Where earlier generations of students in introductory IR courses were said to have been required to keep abreast of the news,[17] only 13 percent of the syllabi listed such a requirement.[18] A reasonable interpretation of this datum is that, while practitioners in the field have yet to agree about the nature of its discipline and contents, they have at least come to share the view that an appropriate comprehension of international phenomena does not depend centrally on a familiarity with day-to-day developments. If earlier generations of introductory students were as widely exposed to newspaper reading as is alleged, this finding may be of more than passing interest. It may signify movement toward the emergence of an IR discipline; or at least it could be argued that to rely heavily on the presentation of current events is to proceed wholly without discipline, and that any movement away from such a reliance could not occur unless the broad outlines of a discipline were becoming manifest to most of those in the field. Admittedly, a commitment to treat knowledge as more stable than the vagaries of daily events is hardly the same as possessing a disciplined mode of inquiry, but surely it is a necessary first step. One might wish that additional steps had

[17] Grayson Kirk, *The Study of International Relations in American Colleges and Universities* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations 1947).

[18] Interestingly, all but one of 23 of the syllabi listing this requirement indicated that it should be performed through the printed rather than the electronic media.

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TABLE 4

CLASSIFICATION OF 178 SYLLABI BY THE NUMBER OF SUBSTANTIVE HEADINGS AND SUBHEADINGS USED TO ORGANIZE THE COURSE MATERIALS (IN PERCENTAGES)

(1) *Number of Headings or Subheadings Used*	(2) *Proportion of Syllabi Using Specified Number of Headings*	(3) *Proportion of Syllabi Using Specified Numbers of Subheadings*
0	19	40
2	4	1
3	11	1
4	12	1
5	14	1
6	8	2
7	7	2
8	5	4
9	3	5
10	4	4
11	2	4
12	2	6
13	2	4
14	2	4
15	2	2
16	0	2
17	1	2
18	0	1
19	0	2
20	0	1
21	0	2
22	0	1
23	0	1
24	0	2
25	1	1
26 or more	1	4
	100	100

been taken as a consequence of the postwar behavioral revolution in the social sciences; but at least some concrete evidence of disciplinary development can be discerned.[19]

[19] Further evidence that IR teachers have some sense of working in a discipline can be found in the proportion of courses in which movies or items of fiction were listed

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In sum, the 178 syllabi of introductory courses point up the utility of intensively analyzing the texts used in the field, even as they also depict a field marked by considerable diversity, if not disarray. Indeed, all the major tendencies uncovered in the syllabi—the lack of interest in recent research findings, the absence of shared paradigms, the apparent disinterest in methodology and the variable nature of knowledge, the limited concern for student motivation and curiosity—can be discerned even more elaborately in the texts. It is to the content analysis of these that we now turn.

III. Textbooks as Facilitators of Learning

Our content analysis was conducted in two stages. In one, we employed knowledgeable undergraduates to make simple counts of countries mentioned, maps, charts, footnotes, and other structural dimensions of the texts; in the other, we took on the task of tracing 49 more thematic variables through a content analysis of one-tenth of the paragraphs in each chapter of each text. The first procedure involved an examination of 11,020 pages; the second necessitated the analysis of 2,915 paragraphs. We are satisfied that in both instances we adhered to the appropriate methodological canons and that our findings are reasonably reliable.[20] Taken together, the two sets of data allowed us

among the assignments: only 3 percent of the syllabi listed movies, and only 4 percent assigned items of fiction. On the other hand, the limited extent to which the behavioral revolution may have had an impact on the teaching of IR is perhaps indicated by the fact that only 3 percent of the syllabi assigned, or allowed for, the writing of a term paper in which the student was required to develop a research design, and only 8 percent called for a paper that involved the processing and/or analysis of quantitative data.

[20] To some extent, of course, the simple-count data set is more reliable than the thematic data set—partly because it does not involve sampling procedures, and partly because intercoder reliability is bound to be higher when the mere appearance of a word or format entity is counted than when complex themes have to be recognized and aggregated. The simple-count data set is free of sampling problems because it consists of the entire population; i.e., the analytic units were tallied each time they appeared on every page of every text. High intercoder reliability was sought with respect to this set by working closely with the coders to insure common use of the few categories that were subject to multiple meanings (such as whether the mention of a city constituted reference to the country in which it is located), and by then spot-checking their work to prevent systematic error.

In the case of the thematic data set, on the other hand, we did not have the time to content-analyze each paragraph of every text (as it was, roughly ten minutes were required to code the 49 variables for each paragraph), and thus we were compelled to focus on a sample of them. This we did by consulting with statisticians, who assured us that an analysis of 10 percent of the paragraphs was sufficient to achieve a representative sample, and by selecting the paragraphs through a table of random numbers (with transition paragraphs in which the author locates moves from one topic to another being skipped over in order to maximize the analysis of substantive content). The se-

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to organize our inquiry under three broad headings: texts as facilitators of learning, texts as stimuli to learning, and texts as expressive of knowledge.

Texts can facilitate learning in three basic ways: by being written in a clear, concise, and readable style that sustains interest; by being organized in a format that allows the reader to move easily through the written material; and by providing the intellectual tools and skills that are needed to acquire further knowledge and interpret future events. Our data permitted us to evaluate only the last two of these attributes directly. Techniques for assessing style and readability of texts have been developed in the field of psychology,[21] but the constraints of time did not allow us to apply these to the books under review.

Indirectly, however, inferences about style can be drawn from some

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lection process was carried out within each chapter so as to insure coverage of the entire text. Four procedures were used to enhance intercoder reliability in the use of the thematic categories. First, we spent a full twenty weeks (approximately eighty hours) during the winter and spring of 1973 (at Ohio State University) meeting together as a group, identifying, clarifying, pre-testing, and revising the thematic variables. In so doing, we considerably narrowed our differences over the meaning of concepts and the rules for tracing them in the paragraphs. Second, for none of the texts were the paragraphs coded by only one or two of us; rather, the paragraphs for each book were distributed among us for coding, thereby minimizing the degree to which any one of us might introduce systematic error. Third, so as to further prevent systematic bias and achieve uniformity in the coding, the senior author checked the coding of every paragraph and altered those codes for particular variables that appeared to stem from one or two coders holding conceptions of the variables that deviated from that shared by the rest of the group. Fourth, because two aspects of the paragraphs—their "prime units" (i.e., their central foci) and six cause-and-effect variables—proved especially resistant to convergence during the pre-testing, only the senior author identified the prime unit in every paragraph which served as the basis for assessing the other variables, and alone coded the variables that required judgments about cause and effect.

Ideally, of course, we ought to have also used a fifth technique to insure reliability: that of having a substantial sample of the paragraphs coded by all the coders and then calculating the degree of agreement or disagreement among us on each variable. Early in the coding process we did carry out this procedure on twelve paragraphs. By the time we realized that we had not subjected a sufficient number of paragraphs to this test, several of us had left Ohio State; it proved impossible to reconvene the group in order to carry out further intercoder reliability checks. The results on the initial twelve paragraphs were not discouraging, however. Several variables were found to be troublesome, but most yielded high intercoder reliability scores. (A score exceeding .90 was recorded on 38 of 43 variables, and the mean score for these 43 variables was .95.) In checking the coding of each paragraph, the senior author was especially attentive to those variables that had earlier failed to yield high scores.

In sum, we are confident that our procedures minimized the presence of systematic bias in the thematic data set. Any such bias that remains is that of the senior author who explicitly exercised it in the context of the consensual judgment of the other authors.

[21] See, for example, Rudolf Flesch, *How to Test Readability* (New York: Harper and Brothers 1951); and Barry Gillen, "Readability and Human Interest Scores of Thirty-Four Current Introductory Psychology Texts," *American Psychologist*, XXVIII (November 1973), 1010–11.

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of our data on the format, skills, contents, and orientations around which the various texts are organized. Indeed, there is obviously considerable overlap—and there are even some contradictions—among the various attributes and dimensions around which we have cast our analysis. Skills shape format and format shapes skills, and both shape and are shaped by content. In so doing, moreover, certain formats and contents are often precluded by the skills a textwriter seeks to highlight. The style and format of a text that stresses factual material and historical narrative, for example, is likely to be quite different from one that emphasizes conceptual precision and methodological rigor; it may well be that the two types are so contradictory in their goals that the style of one cannot possibly be achieved in the other. Thus, despite the lack of direct measures of style, we hope that the ensuing discussion will provide insights into the readability of the texts.

FORMAT

The basic data on the structure and format of the 26 texts are listed in Table 5. The picture presented is mostly that of substantial variability across a wide range. Some of the texts reconstruct the politics of the world in short compass; others are lengthy tomes. They average 17 chapters and 424 pages, but these figures are misleading, since 11 have more than 450 pages and 8 have fewer than 350. Indeed, the books also differ so much in the size of their pages, the size of their type, and the average number of words on each page that we sought standardization by using a per-25,000-words-of-text unit to present the data in Table 5.

The variability in visual presentations is no less than that which marks the length of the books. Table 5 reveals that some texts rely on tables and diagrams to depict the patterns considered important, while others are conspicuously lacking in such techniques for summarizing data and concepts. Substantially more uniformity is evident, on the other hand, with respect to the visual depiction of geographic patterns. There are no maps whatsoever in 17 of the texts, and only 6 have as many as one map per 25,000 words of text. In general, the texts with maps tend to have few tables or diagrams and, as will be seen, they also tend to be among those most historical in their orientation. It is almost as if a geographic-historical approach precludes the use of tabular and diagrammatic materials and vice versa—a distinction that no doubt reflects different conceptions of the nature of knowledge, and that is also probably another indication of the impact of the behavioral revolution on IR. Much as one might regret and resist the tendency to treat the knowledge contained in maps and narrative histories and that aggre-

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TABLE 5

FORMAT CHARACTERISTICS OF 26 TEXTS

	Absolute Number			*Number per 25,000-Word Units*							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Text	*Paragraphs Analyzed*	*Chapters*	*Text Pages*	*Chapters*	*Pages*	*Maps*	*Tables*	*Diagrams*	*Footnotes*	*Headings*	*Sub-Headings*
Axline-Stegenga	36	5	184	3.2	119.48	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.9	9.7
Bobrow	31	13	94	11.3	81.74	0.0	1.7	9.6	0.0	17.4	15.7
Coplin	93	12	360	2.4	71.29	0.0	2.0	1.8	36.6	12.9	13.3
Crabb	166	20	652	1.4	45.79	0.0	0.3	0.0	75.0	3.9	15.5
Deutsch	62	18	202	4.4	49.39	0.0	2.9	3.7	7.6	10.8	5.1
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	88	13	398	2.1	64.93	0.0	0.0	0.3	157.6	15.5	16.0
Duchacek	128	15	543	1.5	52.87	0.0	0.0	0.0	37.6	7.7	13.1
Edwards	71	15	366	2.7	65.83	1.4	0.0	1.1	22.1	13.7	17.4
Frankel	59	10	265	3.9	103.11	0.0	0.4	0.4	23.3	15.1	1.9
Hartmann	216	31	642	2.2	46.29	1.1	0.5	0.4	29.7	14.6	0.0
Holsti	112	16	515	1.7	55.44	0.0	1.2	0.2	45.4	10.6	8.1
Hopkins-Mansbach	158	23	466	2.1	42.60	0.0	3.7	5.9	28.7	9.8	10.8
Jordan	78	28	287	4.9	50.00	2.8	0.2	0.0	44.8	23.5	1.4
Legg-Morrison	67	8	346	1.6	71.49	0.0	3.7	0.6	5.2	8.7	6.8
Modelski	106	17	362	2.7	58.29	0.2	5.2	1.0	37.2	17.7	1.3
Morgan	65	10	275	2.2	59.78	0.0	2.6	1.7	79.2	12.3	2.6
Morgenthau	147	32	552	3.1	52.87	0.2	0.3	0.9	38.3	9.3	12.2
Organski	174	19	490	1.7	43.56	0.0	1.2	0.3	12.9	8.3	13.7
Palmer-Perkins	272	25	770	1.4	42.73	0.9	0.9	0.3	60.2	8.2	25.2
Puchala	78	15	364	2.7	65.82	0.4	3.6	1.1	35.2	10.8	12.3
Rosecrance	77	21	320	3.4	52.12	0.0	0.8	9.6	19.4	15.6	8.6
Schuman	148	15	687	0.9	42.51	2.6	0.1	0.0	10.6	5.1	7.6
Spanier	80	13	429	1.8	58.29	0.0	0.1	0.7	82.1	7.3	0.5
Sprout-Sprout	163	19	468	2.0	48.45	0.9	3.5	0.9	20.0	12.9	6.0
Stoessinger	98	14	541	1.3	51.67	0.0	0.1	0.0	22.4	12.1	3.1
Van Dyke	142	24	442	2.5	47.02	0.0	0.1	0.0	36.4	13.5	22.3
Mean	112	17	424	2.7	59.36	0.4	1.4	1.2	37.2	11.9	9.6

gated in tables and conceptualized in diagrams as mutually exclusive, it is certainly the case that interpretation of the latter requires, more than does the former, the kind of analytic skills emphasized by the behavioral revolution.

The extent to which the texts acknowledge dependence on a prior body of knowledge is hardly less variable. Table 5 reveals a wide disparity in the practice of footnoting the sources from which the ma-

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terials are drawn: where 4 of the texts were found to have more than 75 footnotes per 25,000-word unit, 4 also have less than 10; the standard deviation from the mean of 37 footnotes is 33. Clearly, the capacity of students to appreciate that the prevailing conception of IR stems from a tradition of previous inquiry is differentially encouraged by the various texts. On the other hand, given the absence of a shared methodological paradigm and a widespread agreement about the nature of IR, it is hardly surprising that textwriters vary widely in their inclination to cite prior findings and theories.[22]

It might be argued that this interpretation is offset by the greater uniformity among the texts in the number of headings and subheadings used to organize the written materials, that a modicum of agreement about the nature of the field is reflected in the fact that the standard deviation from the mean of 12 headings per 25,000-word unit was only 4. Such a conclusion is unwarranted, however, because this uniformity (depicted in column [10] of Table 5) is probably more a consequence of the marketing views shared by the publishers than the views of the field held by the writers. Publishers believe that the interest of readers is best sustained by regularly and frequently breaking up the text into subsections, and using bolder-type leads that anticipate the ensuing paragraphs. Headings and subheadings do facilitate learning from texts but (unlike in syllabi) it is doubtful whether their use also reflects the degree to which observers agree about IR knowledge and its categorization.

PROVISION OF TOOLS AND SKILLS

Presumably, one of the main purposes of any introductory course is to provide students with the capacity to undertake more advanced work in the field or, if they take no further courses, to comprehend the world scene long after they have graduated from college. An introductory course that leaves no residue of competence, no tools and skills with which to interpret and assess the subsequent course of events, is time wasted for all concerned. The facts and issues will change with the passage of time, rendering obsolete and unusable those studied in the introductory course, but the concepts, perspectives, and techniques through which facts and issues are given meaning will continue to be serviceable.

[22] It is noteworthy that a similar pattern, perhaps also stemming from the license which the absence of a dominant paradigm affords, was discovered with respect to the inclination of textwriters to provide their readers with lists of additional sources to consult for more thorough treatments of the major topics covered by each chapter: while 15 of the texts contain such lists, 11 did not facilitate learning through the use of this device.

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It is this basic intellectual equipment that is not dependent on time or place which, hopefully, introductory courses make available to those who take them. Although the provision of the tools and skills necessary to the comprehension of world politics in the future is probably best undertaken primarily in lectures and class discussions, it is a task that textwriters cannot ignore. Even if they choose not to organize their materials in terms of the intellectual equipment they deem necessary to an enduring capacity for sound interpretation, they inevitably contribute to or detract from this capacity by the way in which they present their materials—by the extent to which they define their terms, the clarity and nature of the concepts they employ, the degree of their caution in interpreting motivations and consequences, the degree of explicitness about their own values, the links they draw between their conclusions and the methods used to derive them, their readiness to draw on a variety of disciplines for insights and concepts, and the levels of abstraction at which they cast their analyses. Implicitly as well as explicitly, in short, introductory texts provide tools and skills on which their readers may rely for years as they seek to understand the unfolding international scene.

As will be seen, virtually all the 49 variables probed in our content analysis of the 26 texts under review are relevant to the provision of tools and skills. Hence we will have occasion to take note of the way in which the texts perform this task in all the sections that follow. Here, however, we want to focus on six variables that are more exclusively concerned with the provision of intellectual equipment. Table 6 presents the basic findings relevant to these six variables for each text. Here it can be seen that the texts do not vary much in their provision of five of these tools or skills, largely because they do not provide them. In each case, however, at least one text stands out as an exception.

Perhaps the most interesting pattern in Table 6 concerns the degree to which the textwriters *explicitly* indicated their own values about the materials they present.[23] In only 4 texts did the authors explicate their own judgments in more than 5 percent of their paragraphs; in only 2 of these cases (Axline-Stegenga and Schuman) was this practice followed in more than 10 percent of the paragraphs. On the other hand, only one text (Coplin) totally avoided the practice: 25 of the 26 texts had at least a few paragraphs in which the writers' values are readily

[23] Our coding rule for the identification of explicit values was to ask, "Does the paragraph contain any explicit indication of the textwriter's values?" A simple affirmative or negative response was recorded in each case; any doubt was resolved in favor of a negative answer.

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TABLE 6

PROPORTION OF 2,915 PARAGRAPHS FROM 26 TEXTS IN WHICH 6 TYPES OF ANALYTIC TOOLS AND SKILLS WERE EMPLOYED (IN PERCENTAGES)

Text	(*n*)	(1) *Text-writers' Values Explicit*	(2) *Use of Other Disciplines*	(3) *Data Generation Techniques*	(4) *Data Analysis Techniques*	(5) *Definitions of Prime Unit*	(6) *Location in Time or Space*
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	14	6	0	0	25	17
Bobrow	(31)	3	10	29	26	26	13
Coplin	(93)	0	2	2	1	34	6
Crabb	(166)	2	5	2	0	19	51
Deutsch	(62)	7	5	2	8	29	20
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	2	18	5	6	23	19
Duchacek	(128)	3	4	1	0	17	25
Edwards	(71)	3	6	0	0	27	6
Frankel	(59)	3	2	0	0	20	15
Hartmann	(216)	4	2	0	1	16	58
Holsti	(112)	2	1	0	0	40	24
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	3	3	3	5	16	30
Jordan	(78)	5	0	0	1	22	44
Legg-Morrison	(67)	3	0	0	0	24	13
Modelski	(106)	7	3	0	0	24	9
Morgan	(65)	9	3	12	2	23	5
Morgenthau	(147)	1	2	0	1	16	26
Organski	(174)	2	2	1	2	13	15
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	1	2	0	1	21	58
Puchala	(78)	1	5	0	1	17	9
Rosecrance	(77)	3	0	1	0	12	30
Schuman	(148)	14	3	0	0	18	56
Spanier	(80)	5	4	0	0	20	45
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	3	5	0	1	16	23
Stoessinger	(98)	2	0	0	0	6	56
Van Dyke	(142)	2	2	1	0	17	13
Mean		4	4	2	1	20	31

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discernible—a finding that suggests either that they are not committed to value-free analysis or that they are not entirely successful in maintaining such a commitment.

Our view is that we are practitioners of a value-explicit discipline. We therefore do not fault the textwriters for failing to achieve a 100 percent record of detachment with respect to their own values. Indeed, we tend to be critical of them for not explicating their values in a higher proportion of their paragraphs. Exactly what proportion would be appropriate, however, is difficult to assess, since much of the content of any text is necessarily devoted to sheer description and definitional analysis. Some might argue that the small percentages indicated in column (1) of Table 6 are sufficient to any text that purports to provide a balanced and detached analysis. But we tend to be critical on the grounds that the values of textwriters probably underlie their observations more extensively than these figures indicate; the texts may thus not convey to beginning students an adequate appreciation of the degree to which our understanding of the world is a function of how we perceive and evaluate it. As will be seen, the pervasive disinclination to explicate values is only the first of several indications that IR textwriters tend to treat the world they describe as an objective reality.

A similar pattern was discovered with respect to the extent to which the texts explicitly drew (in either the text or the footnotes) on disciplines other than political science and international relations.[24] Column (2) of Table 6 shows that only 4 texts explicitly cited another discipline as the source of the concepts and/or data presented in more than 5 percent of their paragraphs, and that only one (Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff) did so in more than 10 percent. Data not presented in Table 6 reveal this pattern even more starkly: In 17 of the texts, not one of the sample paragraphs drew upon economics; the equivalent figure for psychology was 19 texts, for sociology and geography 21, for psychiatry 24, and for anthropology 26. Indeed, for disciplines other than the social sciences, the figure was much more impressive—there were only 9 texts with no paragraphs coded in this residual category—as if drawing upon concepts and data from the physical and biological sciences generated a felt obligation—not experienced with respect to the social sciences—

[24] Our coding rule for differentiating between explicit and implicit recourse to the materials of other disciplines read as follows: "The paragraph or footnotes must indicate that it is drawing on other knowledge bases, rather than simply using or citing these bases (e.g., a discussion of international trade would be coded as [no recourse to another discipline] unless it is noted that the discussion depends on or draws from economic theory or data)."

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to be explicit about the borrowing process. To be sure, the coding requirement that the other disciplines had to be explicitly mentioned means that these findings underestimate the degree to which the textwriters are in fact dependent on other disciplines. But we would argue that an appreciation of the unity of knowledge and the resulting inclination to seek insight and evidence across disciplinary boundaries is a skill that needs to be nurtured in students; the most effective way to do so is to acknowledge directly each and every step that is taken back and forth across the boundaries that allegedly separate the various disciplines.

With only one conspicuous exception (Bobrow), a uniform pattern of avoidance also marks the way in which the textwriters *explicitly* drew upon quantitative techniques for generating and analyzing data.[25] As can be seen in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6, only two texts referred explicitly to one or another technique for generating data in more than 5 percent of their sample paragraphs, and only three exceeded this proportion in their explicit references to one or another technique for analyzing quantitative data. Fifteen texts made no references whatsoever in their sample paragraphs to the data generation techniques and thirteen cited no data analysis techniques. Again, it might be contended that our coding requirement—that the recourse to quantitative techniques be explicit—is too stringent, that the provision of these tools and skills can be accomplished simply by using them. We demur. Even if such techniques were frequently used (and below we cite evidence that they have not been), their existence and importance must be highlighted for beginning students, else they will have little basis for coming to appreciate that data do not converge and speak for themselves, that data have to be made and interpreted by observers. However one may feel about the utility and appropriateness of quantitative techniques, surely students in introductory courses are entitled to know of their availability. We can only conclude that textwriters do not share this view. Their reasons, at best, may be that they feel their readers are incapable of coping with a conception of IR as founded on a variable knowledge base; at worst, they may perceive IR as an objective reality which they have undertaken to depict for their readers. In this sense,

[25] Our coding rule for distinguishing an explicit recourse to such techniques read as follows: "The technique must be specifically identified. Code as [reference to technique not made] if the results of the use of a technique are given, but the technique itself not specifically identified. Simply to use a technique is not to refer to it." Separate subcategories for generating (content analysis, simulation, survey research, etc.) and analyzing (correlational methods, factor analysis, etc.) techniques were included in the coding scheme, but so few paragraphs were coded in them that the results did not seem worthy of presentation in Table 6.

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we see their insensitivity to quantitative techniques as stemming from the same sources as their disinclination to explicate their own values and to wander across disciplinary boundaries.

Although hardly less uniform in their practice, the textwriters are not nearly as inclined to avoid specifying definitions as they are to explicate their values and the disciplinary or quantitative sources from which they derived their observations. As can be seen in column (5) of Table 6, all of them explicitly defined the "prime unit" of each paragraph[26] in at least 5 percent of the cases, and 18 of them included such a definition in between 16 and 25 percent of their paragraphs. Plainly, the standard admonition of teachers to students, "define your terms," is widely accepted by those who write texts. The fact that definitions tend to be used in only one out of approximately 5 paragraphs should not be interpreted as an insufficient acceptance of the standard. Rather, it is an indication of the degree to which defined terms are then used in exposition—as if the introduction of a new term requiring definition tended to occur on an average of about every fifth paragraph. Whether the definitions presented are appropriately incisive and elaborate, of course, is another matter, and one that cannot be inferred from our use of the definition variable. Some insight into the question, however, can be derived from the discussion, below, of the level of abstraction at which the prime units were analyzed.

Whereas essential uniformity marks the percentages presented in the first five columns of Table 6, the same can hardly be said of column (6). Here the first sign of extensive variability among the texts is evident in the degree to which the prime units of their sample paragraphs were specifically located in historical time or geographic space.[27]

[26] The prime unit of each randomly selected paragraph served as the basis for coding virtually all the variables discussed hereafter. It might be a person, a role, a process, a concept, a country, an event, an international organization—that is, whatever constituted the main subject or concern of the paragraph (as determined by the senior author on the basis of a close reading of the paragraph and, where necessary for clarification, the preceding three paragraphs).

If a paragraph contained a definition of a phenomenon not identified as the prime unit, it was coded as not having a definition. Similarly (to give one other illustration of the centrality of the prime unit to our analysis), in our effort to trace the degree to which the textwriters were concerned with the outcomes of behaviors or situations, we included a "consequences" variable and a paragraph was coded as citing a consequence only if the prime unit was posited as giving rise to it. Consequences caused by entities other than the prime unit were not coded. Originally we sought to develop a scheme in which our variables were applied to every actor or entity mentioned in a paragraph, but this proved much more unmanageable and unreliable than focusing on what the textwriter seemed to treat as the main subject of the paragraph.

[27] The data on this variable were created by affirmative or negative responses to the question, "Is the prime unit of the paragraph [explicitly or implicitly] identified *in and of itself* in time or space?" Four coding rules were employed to reach a decision in each case: (a) References to times and places that were not part of the prime unit

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Indeed, a bimodal distribution of the texts is plainly manifest in the case of this variable: 7 placed the unit in time or space in 44 or more percent of their paragraphs, while 19 did so in only 30 percent or less. The bimodality of this distribution can be seen even more sharply by noting that the mean percentages for the clusters of 7 and 19 were, respectively, 53 and 17 percent. The distinction between these two clusters is, in effect, the distinction between the tendency to engage in more abstract or more concrete analysis. The 19 that recorded the mean of 17 percent tend toward a more abstract form of presentation in the sense that their mode of analysis does not require them to locate their prime units in time or space; the 7 that recorded the mean of 53 percent cast their analysis in such a way that often the prime unit could not be specified without the inclusion of one or the other of these concrete dimensions.

We regard this distinction as so central to the kinds of tools and skills a text provides that later in the ensuing analysis we note how the texts in the two clusters—which we refer to as the More Abstract and the More Concrete texts—differ in their treatment of certain substantive aspects of IR. It will become clear that the more abstract mode of analysis leads the observer to very different kinds of questions, formulations, and observations than does the more concrete mode. For the present, however, it is sufficient to note that while it may be desirable that students be familiar with certain moments and locales in history, it is quite probable that most "facts" are not retained as working knowledge. Repeated exposure to the practice of abstracting from particular times and places, on the other hand, tends to foster an enduring skill that can be applied under a variety of circumstances. We shall have occasion to return to this point when we look more closely at the specific data on the times and places cited in the sample paragraphs (Tables 13, 15, and 16).

IV. Textbooks as Stimuli to Learning

The acquisition of the tools and skills necessary to an enduring comprehension of world affairs does not ensure the will to use them. The

were ignored, since the coding judgment pertained only to the prime unit "in and of itself." (b) "For the unit to be located in space, mention must be explicitly made of an event, person, or place that a narrative historian or political geographer could specifically identify in an account or on a map." (c) "For the unit to be explicitly located in time, mention must be made of a day, month, year, decade, century, etc." (d) "Implicit time involves specified events without specific time frames (e.g., if the unit is linked to the Korean War without the fact that the conflict occurred in the early 1950s being mentioned)."

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capacity for cogent analysis does not automatically give rise to cogent analysis. Students must be motivated to apply their talents, to probe the dynamics of IR in systematic and creative ways; else they may well fall back on conventional and simplistic modes of thought. Much—indeed, most—of this motivation originates elsewhere than in texts. The way IR is presented and discussed in the classroom, and the attitudes toward learning acquired earlier in life, are obviously more significant sources of motivation than the books that are assigned week after week. Yet, at least texts can be cast in such a way as not to contribute to the attenuation of curiosity, and conceivably they may even serve as stimuli to learning by reinforcing and enlarging the motivations acquired elsewhere. They can make such a contribution, that is, if they approach knowledge about IR cautiously, treating it as tentative and uncertain rather than as given and self-evident; as subject to alternative explanations rather than as susceptible to only one interpretation; and as constantly undergoing revision whenever the dialogue within the community of observers leads to new understandings and changing degrees of consensus. Students are more likely to be stimulated to use their analytic tools and skills, we believe, if international phenomena are not treated as objective realities that teachers and textwriters are revealing for the benefit of those who seek an introduction to the subject. Curiosity is provoked and sustained by what is unknown and yet knowable, by an assurance that the use of analytic tools and skills will yield greater insight and better understanding. To confront students with a body of knowledge that needs to be absorbed rather than pondered is, it seems to us, to dampen the will to learn.

Fortunately, our view of what stimulates learning is entirely consistent with our conception of the field. We believe that knowledge about IR, like that about any other subject, can never be objective, that inevitably it consists of evolving and shifting intersubjective consensuses among those who observe the world, consensuses that evolve and shift as new techniques of observation and new findings lead to new and revised assessments of how and why events unfold as they do.[28] Thus, to expose students to the practice of viewing international phenomena probabilistically and cautiously, of viewing them as subject to variation and alternative explanation, and consequently as the products of varying degrees of intersubjective agreement, is to stimulate learning. The practice also serves to stress crucial methodological and philosophical

[28] For an extensive attempt to elaborate this approach to knowledge, see Rosenau, *The Dramas of Politics: An Introduction to the Joys of Inquiry* (Boston: Little, Brown 1973).

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premises about the nature of the field. The stimuli to learning become, in effect, learning itself.

In addition, the various practices inherent in probabilistic thinking and the various philosophical premises inherent in treating knowledge as varying degrees of consensus constitute tools and skills that enhance incisive analysis. The textwriter who founds his chapters and paragraphs on such practices and premises is providing training as well as substantive knowledge and the motivation to continue learning. The ensuing analysis focuses on six variables included in our content analysis in order to uncover the use of these practices and premises, their relevance to texts as stimuli to learning, and their bearing on the preceding finding that a preponderance of the texts provides little by way of analytic tools and skills.

Although a few exceptions can be noted with respect to some of the variables, the 26 texts are no more praiseworthy as stimuli to learning than as providers of tools and skills. The overall picture derived from the six measures used in this regard is more one in which knowledge of IR is posited as objective and unvarying than as consensual and tentative. Perhaps the most clear-cut indication that the textwriters tend to treat the materials they present as objective reality is provided by the distributions that resulted from coding the sample paragraphs in response to the query "Is the status of the knowledge about all or some of the content specified?" Four possible answers to the question were coded and, as can be seen in Table 7, in virtually every text the preponderance of the paragraphs did not treat the materials they present as the product of greater or lesser degrees of intersubjective consensus. An average of 95 percent of the paragraphs for the 26 texts contained *no* specification of the status of the knowledge proffered.

In other words, except for a few methodological passages in their introductory chapters that note the existence of various approaches to the field, the texts offer virtually no hint that what they present is other than objective reality. To be sure, given the paucity of findings and interpretations that have cumulated in the field, it is understandable that an average of only 1 percent of the paragraphs was coded as specifying the existence of a wide intersubjective consensus in support of the observations they make, or that an identical mean was uncovered with respect to the proportion of paragraphs that posited "a general agreement with some dissent." But it is incomprehensible, at least to us, that the average proportion of paragraphs indicating the existence of controversy over the "meaning, validity, and/or utility" of the knowledge presented was only 3 percent. Only in the two texts explicitly or-

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TABLE 7

DEGREE OF INTERSUBJECTIVE CONSENSUS ABOUT THE KNOWLEDGE PRESENTED IN 2,915 PARAGRAPHS FROM 26 TEXTS (IN PERCENTAGES)

Text	(*n*)	(1) *Wide Intersubjective Consensus*	(2) *General Agreement with Some Dissent*	(3) *Subject of Controversy*	(4) *No Degree of Consensus Specified*
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	3	0	0	97
Bobrow	(31)	3	0	3	94
Coplin	(93)	0	2	5	93
Crabb	(166)	1	1	0	98
Deutsch	(62)	3	0	0	97
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	0	1	16	83
Duchacek	(128)	1	0	3	96
Edwards	(71)	1	1	3	95
Frankel	(59)	2	3	5	90
Hartmann	(216)	1	1	1	98
Holsti	(112)	0	1	4	95
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	0	0	6	94
Jordan	(78)	0	1	3	96
Legg-Morrison	(67)	2	2	2	95
Modelski	(106)	0	0	2	98
Morgan	(65)	0	5	11	84
Morgenthau	(147)	0	0	1	99
Organski	(174)	0	1	1	98
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	1	1	5	93
Puchala	(78)	1	0	5	94
Rosecrance	(77)	0	0	0	100
Schuman	(148)	1	0	1	98
Spanier	(80)	0	1	3	96
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	2	4	5	89
Stoessinger	(98)	1	0	1	98
Van Dyke	(142)	0	1	0	99
Mean		1	1	3	95

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ganized in terms of the contrasts between different approaches and concepts—those by Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff and Morgan—did we record a noticeable proportion of paragraphs in which differences of opinion over the observations offered was acknowledged, and even in these cases the proportions seem considerably smaller than might have been expected.

Surely the field is pervaded by much greater dissensus over the facts, concepts, foci, and perspectives regarded as basic than the data in Table 7 reveal—and yet this equally basic characteristic of the field is kept essentially hidden from students in introductory courses, as if they were incapable of coping with ambiguity and of understanding that knowledge is an ever-evolving process. Probably none of the textwriters is as certain about his understanding of IR as the paragraphs he writes imply, and probably all of them are cautious and probabilistic in their discussions with colleagues on the subject. But somehow, beginning students are considered to be different (as if they were too young to know that knowledge is tentative), so that the rhetoric of certainty and objective reality is reserved for them even as it is eschewed with peers.

Another indicator of such rhetoric is presented in Table 8, which contains the distributions of the data for another variable used to probe the conceptions of knowledge employed by the textwriters. These distributions result from coding each of the sample paragraphs in each text in response to the question, "Is any content of the paragraph explicitly treated as self-evident?"[29] The resulting distribution suggests that while the texts varied somewhat in this regard, a large number of them resorted to assertions of self-evidence in more than an isolated paragraph. Such assertions were found in more than one-tenth of the paragraphs of more than half the texts; in all 26 cases, only a very small proportion of the assertions of self-evidence were accompanied by a citation of the authority for them. Admittedly, a preponderance of the paragraphs in all the texts were free of the rhetoric of self-evidence (the mean for the negative answer to the question was 88 percent), but we would argue that the paragraphs in which such a rhetoric was discerned are higher than is warranted by either the demands of logic (i.e., in paragraphs that elaborate definitions), the facts (i.e., the degree to which anything is self-evident in IR), or the requirements of sound pedagogy (i.e., the need to sustain the curiosity of students).

[29] Our coding rules cited the appearance of the following phrases as examples of contents being treated as self-evident: "obviously," "quite clear," "there can be no doubt that . . ." and "In fact, of course, . . .".

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TABLE 8

PROPORTION OF 2,915 PARAGRAPHS FROM 26 TEXTS IN WHICH THE CONTENTS WERE TREATED AS SELF-EVIDENT, EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT AN AUTHORITY CITED (IN PERCENTAGES)

Text	(*n*)	(1) *Assertions of Self-Evidence With Authority Cited*	(2) *Assertions of Self-Evidence Without Authority Cited*	(3) *Self-Evidence Not Asserted*
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	0	17	83
Bobrow	(31)	3	10	87
Coplin	(93)	0	6	94
Crabb	(166)	3	8	89
Deutsch	(62)	0	3	97
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	1	1	98
Duchacek	(128)	4	9	87
Edwards	(71)	0	7	93
Frankel	(59)	2	13	85
Hartmann	(216)	1	21	78
Holsti	(112)	0	7	93
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	2	4	94
Jordan	(78)	0	9	91
Legg-Morrison	(67)	0	6	94
Modelski	(106)	0	8	92
Morgan	(65)	2	9	89
Morgenthau	(147)	0	18	82
Organski	(174)	0	14	86
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	2	7	91
Puchala	(78)	0	14	86
Rosecrance	(77)	1	22	77
Schuman	(148)	1	17	82
Spanier	(80)	2	10	88
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	2	15	83
Stoessinger	(98)	0	11	89
Van Dyke	(142)	1	7	92
Mean		1	11	88

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If a paragraph does not assert that its observations are self-evident, what kind of support, if any, does it offer for them? We sought an answer to this question in two ways. In one we simply asked, "Does the paragraph identify the source(s) for any observations it offers?"; in the other we sought to classify the nature of the source(s) by asking, "Is the prime unit discussed or analyzed in terms of, or does it consist of, one or more historical examples, mathematical or formal theories, hypothetical or generalized examples (without specific historical references and not mathematically derived), [and/or] quantitative findings created through manipulation?" Tables 9 and 10 present the results of these inquiries. Despite considerable variability among the texts, in both tables it can be seen that the authors were essentially disinclined to draw upon an explicit body of knowledge when they made observations that were not described as self-evident.

The sources and their identification are found in Table 9. Although 3 texts (Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff, Morgan, and Crabb) did offer a source in a preponderance of their sample paragraphs, 19 texts were recorded as not doing so in more than two-thirds of their paragraphs. When they did cite sources, moreover, half the texts generally did so by citing an authority (i.e., another observer or a document) in the body of the paragraph itself rather than by citing the findings of other studies in a footnote—hardly a surprising tendency if IR is conceived to be a field that has yet to cumulate a large body of findings around which wide intersubjective consensuses have formed. Indeed, Table 10 reveals that virtually all the texts worked through their observations by recourse to historical, hypothetical, or general examples to the extent they offered support for them at all. Not only do examples not constitute proof, as has often been noted, but they are also insufficient as a means of encouraging students to approach IR as an emerging, ever-shifting, consensual body of knowledge. On the contrary, historical examples seem likely to serve in great measure as supplements to the rhetoric of certainty and objective reality, since they appear to be unqualified affirmations of whatever points they are intended to exemplify.

The fact that most of the textwriters relied on hypothetical or generalized examples to reason through their observations in one-third or more of their paragraphs might be interpreted as offsetting the tendency to posit an objective reality, as indicating a readiness to concede the tentative, variable, and anything but self-evident nature of IR knowledge. However, such would be the case only if hypothetical or generalized examples were worked through in a probabilistic context, with alternative explanations and differing likelihoods being used to elaborate that

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TABLE 9

PROPORTION OF 2,915 PARAGRAPHS FROM 26 TEXTS IN WHICH THE SOURCE(S) FOR THEIR OBSERVATIONS WERE IDENTIFIED (IN PERCENTAGES)

Text	(*n*)	(1) *Source(s) Identified In Paragraph*	(2) *Source(s) Identified In a Footnote**	(3) *Source(s) Identified In a Display***	(4) *Source(s) Not Identified*
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	11	0	0	89
Bobrow	(31)	19	0	0	81
Coplin	(93)	6	9	0	85
Crabb	(166)	11	51	1	37
Deutsch	(62)	10	4	2	86
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	35	43	1	21
Duchacek	(128)	22	22	3	53
Edwards	(71)	10	13	1	76
Frankel	(59)	10	2	0	88
Hartmann	(216)	8	6	2	84
Holsti	(112)	10	19	3	68
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	9	27	5	59
Jordan	(78)	15	7	1	77
Legg-Morrison	(67)	3	0	2	95
Modelski	(106)	3	13	6	78
Morgan	(65)	40	25	3	32
Morgenthau	(147)	10	6	1	83
Organski	(174)	2	4	2	92
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	16	21	3	60
Puchala	(78)	9	14	3	74
Rosecrance	(77)	6	4	3	87
Schuman	(148)	18	10	1	71
Spanier	(80)	16	38	0	46
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	7	7	1	85
Stoessinger	(98)	12	6	0	82
Van Dyke	(142)	17	14	1	68
Mean		12	16	2	70

* Includes paragraphs in which the source(s) were also identified in the content of the paragraph.

** Includes paragraphs in which the source(s) were also identified in the content of the paragraph and/or a footnote.

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TABLE 10

PROPORTION OF 2,915 PARAGRAPHS FROM 26 TEXTS IN WHICH DIFFERENT TYPES OF EVIDENCE WERE USED TO ANALYZE THEIR PRIME UNITS (IN PERCENTAGES)

Text	(*n*)	(1) *Historical Examples*	(2) *Mathematical or Formal Theories*	(3) *Hypothetical or Generalized Examples*	(4) *Quantitative Findings*	(5) *No Evidence Offered*
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	19	0	38	0	43
Bobrow	(31)	6	6	25	9	54
Coplin	(93)	25	2	48	2	23
Crabb	(166)	55	0	33	0	12
Deutsch	(62)	16	3	48	7	26
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	13	3	41	1	42
Duchacek	(128)	34	0	45	2	19
Edwards	(71)	23	0	31	0	46
Frankel	(59)	29	0	27	0	44
Hartmann	(216)	49	0	25	1	25
Holsti	(112)	39	0	46	3	12
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	32	1	50	2	15
Jordan	(78)	44	0	37	0	19
Legg-Morrison	(67)	3	0	57	0	40
Modelski	(106)	24	0	35	2	39
Morgan	(65)	17	1	33	1	48
Morgenthau	(147)	32	0	34	1	33
Organski	(174)	32	1	24	1	42
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	46	0	32	2	20
Puchala	(78)	18	0	48	2	32
Rosecrance	(77)	34	0	45	3	18
Schuman	(148)	55	0	31	0	14
Spanier	(80)	48	0	38	0	14
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	20	0	44	1	35
Stoessinger	(98)	81	0	5	0	14
Van Dyke	(142)	39	0	11	3	47
Mean		36	1	35	1	27

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which was being exemplified. Unfortunately, as noted below, such a probabilistic context was not a pervasive characteristic of any of the texts, so that it seems reasonable to conclude that the evidence provided by textwriters does not adequately serve as a balance to those of their observations that were offered as self-evident. Whatever the texts may teach about IR, they hardly seem conducive to teaching the basic canons of evidential reasoning and sound analysis.

In order to probe the degree to which the texts were cast in a probabilistic context, we included a variable that required each sample paragraph to be coded in terms of a simple affirmative or negative response to the question, "Are alternative explanations of the prime unit presented?"[30] The results are presented in Table 11, and again they fall short of what we deem proper and desirable. In one text (Morgan), roughly one-third of the paragraphs were coded affirmatively, and in another 7, roughly one-quarter were so coded; but even these proportions are discrepant with our thinking on the extent to which any observation about international phenomena can be alternatively explained or formulated. The finding that no more than 15 percent of the paragraphs in half the texts were coded affirmatively would seem to be particularly out of line with the multiplicity of possible interpretations.

Data on still another variable relevant to the orientations of the textwriters are presented in Table 12. In this instance we asked, "Is the prime unit described or analyzed in cautious or probabilistic terms?" Two forms of an affirmative response, as well as a negative response, were coded. One was used for "specified probabilities" and the other for "unspecified probabilities or cautious terms," by which we meant "phrases such as 'seems,' 'in a sense,' 'possibly,' 'likely,' 'more often than not,' and other terms of cautious observation."[31] Once again we find the results disappointing. Although the texts varied widely in their record in this respect, the degree of caution exercised by their authors hardly seems consistent with either a probabilistic approach to knowledge or a sensitivity to the need to stimulate and sustain the curiosities of stu-

[30] In order to maximize the chances of finding alternative explanations, our coding rules required an affirmative response "if the same prime unit is coded in the three previous paragraphs and alternative formulations of it offered."

[31] Following the practice used in coding all the variables, each sample paragraph was coded only once in response to the question; explicit rules favored the extreme alternatives being employed whenever a paragraph contained wording that was applicable to both the middle (unspecified probabilities) alternative and one of the extremes. If, for example, a cautious term such as "possibly" was used along with an incautious one such as "certainly," the paragraph was coded in terms of the latter.

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TABLE 11

PROPORTION OF 2,915 PARAGRAPHS FROM 26 TEXTS IN WHICH ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THEIR PRIME UNITS WERE OFFERED (IN PERCENTAGES)

Text	(*n*)	(1) *Alternative Explanation Offered*	(2) *Alternative Explanation Not Offered*
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	3	97
Bobrow	(31)	26	74
Coplin	(93)	24	76
Crabb	(166)	14	86
Deutsch	(62)	0	100
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	29	71
Duchacek	(128)	16	84
Edwards	(71)	25	75
Frankel	(59)	24	76
Hartmann	(216)	7	93
Holsti	(112)	14	86
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	23	87
Jordan	(78)	21	79
Legg-Morrison	(67)	18	82
Modelski	(106)	11	89
Morgan	(65)	32	68
Morgenthau	(147)	11	89
Organski	(174)	15	85
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	13	87
Puchala	(78)	13	87
Rosecrance	(77)	13	87
Schuman	(148)	9	91
Spanier	(80)	25	75
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	12	88
Stoessinger	(98)	16	84
Van Dyke	(142)	18	82
Mean		16	84

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dents in introductory courses. To be sure, given the ambiguities and dearth of quantitative studies that presently mark the field, it is understandable that, in virtually all the texts, more paragraphs were coded with unspecified than with specified probabilities. But this finding seems trivial in comparison to the fact that in all but 3 of the texts at least two-thirds of the paragraphs were coded as lacking cautious or probabilistic terms, and that the overall average of such paragraphs was 81 percent.

It is perhaps noteworthy that the inclusion of a probabilistic rhetoric is one of only two pedagogical and methodological variables on which the 19 More Abstract and the 7 More Concrete texts differed noticeably. No more than 3 percentage points separated the overall performance of the two groups with respect to their explication of their own values, their reliance on other disciplines, their use of quantitative techniques, their inclusion of definitions, their tendency to note the degree of intersubjective consensus, their inclination to treat their observations as self-evident and/or to cite sources for them, and their proclivity for alternative explanations; but 13 percentage points differentiated the proportion of their paragraphs that were found to lack cautious or probabilistic terms. In the More Abstract group, 77 percent were so coded, whereas the comparable figure for their More Concrete counterparts was 90 percent—a difference that is readily explicable when it is appreciated that knowledge tends to seem increasingly variable as one moves up the ladder of abstraction.[32]

Even the greater caution exercised by the More Abstract group, however, hardly offsets the central finding that a probabilistic rhetoric does not mark the texts. The More Abstract texts used such a rhetoric to a greater degree than their More Concrete counterparts, but it did not pervade their writing (or even appear in at least one out of every four paragraphs).

Most textwriters, in other words, are inclined to assert that phenomena are either present in an unchanging state, or absent—without allowing for variations under changing circumstances. We suspect that they are much less absolutist in their research and teaching, if only because variability appears to be a prime characteristic of international phe-

[32] The other substantial difference between the two groups on a methodological variable concerns the types of evidence on which they relied to develop their observations: the More Concrete group used historical examples in 53 percent of their paragraphs, and hypothetical or generalized examples in 20 percent; the comparable figures for the More Abstract group are 27 and 31 percent. These differences can also be easily understood in terms of the distinction between concrete and abstract analysis. Interestingly, again the two groups did not differ by more than 3 percentage points in the extent to which they cited quantitative findings in support of their observations.

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TABLE 12

PROPORTION OF 2,915 PARAGRAPHS FROM 26 TEXTS IN WHICH DIFFERENT PROBABILITIES WERE USED TO ANALYZE THEIR PRIME UNITS (IN PERCENTAGES)

Text	(*n*)	(1) *Specified Probabilities*	(2) *Unspecified Probabilities (or Cautious Terms)*	(3) *Probabilistic (or Cautious) Terms Not Used*
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	11	6	83
Bobrow	(31)	10	42	48
Coplin	(93)	4	30	66
Crabb	(166)	1	5	94
Deutsch	(62)	2	13	85
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	3	16	81
Duchacek	(128)	5	20	75
Edwards	(71)	13	32	55
Frankel	(59)	7	15	78
Hartmann	(216)	4	3	93
Holsti	(112)	17	15	68
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	8	31	61
Jordan	(78)	4	23	73
Legg-Morrison	(67)	3	24	73
Modelski	(106)	7	4	89
Morgan	(65)	2	20	78
Morgenthau	(147)	1	3	96
Organski	(174)	3	9	88
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	1	11	88
Puchala	(78)	4	20	76
Rosecrance	(77)	0	12	88
Schuman	(148)	2	5	93
Spanier	(80)	4	10	86
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	5	21	74
Stoessinger	(98)	9	3	88
Van Dyke	(142)	9	14	77
Mean		5	14	81

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nomena. Yet somehow they tend not to allow variables to vary in their texts, treating them more as constants, as unwavering, as givens in what thus emerges as a static world scene. Such a tendency concerns us, to repeat, not only because it violates our notion of the need for probabilistic perspectives on IR, but also—and primarily—because it contradicts what we believe to be the best way to stimulate and train those who enter the field. If students do not acquire the rhetoric of probabilistic analysis at an early stage, if their observations are not pervaded by "it seems as if" or "it is likely that," what will bring them to appreciate the variabilities of world politics or the excitement that can be derived from studying the subject? If they are not exposed to variables that vary, how can they be expected to allow their minds to play with ideas and their curiosities to be provoked by the mysteries of causation?

V. Textbooks as Expressive of Knowledge

Perhaps it seems absurd to assess the substantive materials presented by the 26 texts after having raised so many philosophical and methodological doubts about how the knowledge they offer is developed. Our analysis thus far suggests that none of them can be relied upon as a compendium of accumulated and shared findings. Yet they may be expressive of the trends and crosscurrents at present extant in the field. As indicated in Figure 1, textwriters tend to be consumers rather than producers of research. Although important exceptions could be noted (such as Organski's notions about "the power transition"), the texts probably reflect and reinforce rather than elaborate and contribute to the prevailing trends and crosscurrents, through both their conceptions of the central variables that shape and sustain international phenomena and their organization of these into chapters that derive from their exposure to the literature of the field. If this is so, and if allowance is made for the way in which their assumptions about the capabilities of students lead to the simplification and objectification of the concepts, data, and interpretations they present, then it is reasonable to treat the texts under review as a shortcut to insights about the state of the field, its substantive perspectives and empirical insights. Our analysis thus proceeds by examining data descriptive of their conceptions of time, space, actors, action, issues, and causation as key aspects of world affairs.

Conceptions of Time and History

We noted earlier that a bimodal distribution marked the way in which the texts located the prime units of their paragraphs in time and place,

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with 19 of them tending to be more abstract in this regard, while 7 tended to specify concretely one or another of these dimensions. In order to probe these tendencies more extensively, as well as to investigate whether the historical sensitivities of the textwriters were confined to the immediate past, we coded each sample paragraph (as well as its prime unit) in terms of whether it "explicitly" contained "any mention of points in time located" in any one of seven historical eras. Both the beginning and ending of the time periods mentioned were coded, so as to pick up observations about historical sequences that spanned one or more of our 7 categories. Table 13 presents the distributions of the data for both points in time (with those for the ending dates in parentheses); here again it can be seen that the texts differed considerably in the extent to which they cast their analyses in a historical context. In at least two-fifths of their paragraphs, 10 did so, while another 10 identified a time period in fewer than one-quarter of their paragraphs. Equally clear is the tendency, both for those that stressed historical context and those that did not, to cite developments in the recent past more elaborately than those in the nineteenth and earlier centuries. In 21 of the texts, more references were made to historical periods that ended after 1946 than to periods ending prior to that date. Yet it would be erroneous to interpret this finding as an excessive preoccupation with immediate events. Only 10 texts made more references to historical periods that began after 1946 than to periods beginning at an earlier point in time. Indeed, exactly half of the texts mentioned periods beginning prior to World War I. These apparent discrepancies between the data for the beginning and ending dates can be readily interpreted: since every text mentioned both dates whenever they placed a paragraph in a historical context (i.e., since their proportions in the last column of Table 13 were virtually identical), the greater frequencies in the left-hand columns for the beginning dates and in the right-hand columns for the ending dates reflect a practice of casting analysis in sweeping historical contexts, extending across two or more of the time boundaries through which periodicity is usually introduced into modern history. Stated differently, to the extent historical context was employed, the textwriters tended to look well into the past for explanations of the present rather than focussing exclusively on current events. Just as course syllabi were found not to rely on newspapers for information, so most texts seemed to eschew reliance on the prevailing scene for guidance and insight.

Whatever their use of history as an explanation for the present, however, the texts clearly seemed to be unconcerned with it as a guide to

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TABLE 13

PROPORTION OF 2,915 PARAGRAPHS FROM 26 TEXTS THAT MENTIONED BEGINNING AND (IN PARENTHESES) ENDING DATES IN 7 HISTORICAL ERAS (IN PERCENTAGES)

Text	(*n*)	(1) *Pre-1815*	(2) *1815-1914*	(3) *World War I*	(4) *1919-1939*	(5) *World War II*	(6) *1946-1960*	(7) *1961-1972*	(8) *Dates Not Mentioned*
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	6 (3)	3(0)	3(3)	0(0)	3(3)	11(14)	6 (8)	68(69)
Bobrow	(31)	0 (0)	13(7)	0(3)	0(0)	0(0)	0 (3)	10(10)	77(77)
Coplin	(93)	0 (0)	2(1)	0(0)	2(0)	2(2)	6 (3)	8(14)	80(80)
Crabb	(166)	1 (0)	7(3)	2(1)	9(6)	7(4)	25(18)	15(34)	34(34)
Deutsch	(62)	5 (3)	1(0)	1(2)	3(3)	1(2)	10 (6)	5(11)	74(73)
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	6 (4)	9(5)	1(1)	4(6)	2(2)	0 (1)	0 (3)	78(78)
Duchacek	(128)	5 (1)	4(3)	4(2)	5(1)	11(5)	2 (5)	12(19)	57(64)
Edwards	(71)	0 (0)	0(0)	1(0)	1(0)	1(1)	9 (4)	3(10)	85(85)
Frankel	(59)	7 (3)	7(2)	2(3)	3(0)	0(0)	5 (2)	5(19)	71(71)
Hartmann	(216)	10 (2)	10(6)	3(1)	9(8)	5(6)	20(18)	11(21)	32(38)
Holsti	(112)	14(11)	4(1)	1(0)	7(2)	3(4)	5 (5)	8(17)	58(60)
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	6 (5)	3(2)	1(1)	2(2)	1(1)	9 (3)	9(16)	69(70)
Jordan	(78)	3 (1)	1(3)	0(0)	9(5)	3(1)	10 (7)	10(19)	64(64)
Legg-Morrison	(67)	8 (8)	3(0)	1(1)	5(0)	1(1)	0 (0)	3 (9)	79(81)
Modelski	(106)	17(13)	2(0)	0(1)	5(1)	3(4)	3 (5)	4 (9)	66(67)
Morgan	(65)	3 (0)	2(0)	2(0)	1(0)	3(5)	1 (1)	2 (8)	86(86)
Morgenthau	(147)	15 (6)	6(5)	5(2)	7(8)	2(7)	3 (2)	2 (8)	60(62)
Organski	(174)	3 (1)	3(1)	2(0)	3(2)	3(3)	6 (4)	2(11)	78(78)
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	3 (1)	7(4)	4(1)	7(5)	6(4)	22(20)	8(22)	43(43)
Puchala	(78)	3 (0)	0(0)	1(0)	12(1)	4(3)	5 (2)	1(17)	74(77)
Rosecrance	(77)	17 (9)	16(8)	5(8)	3(4)	1(4)	6 (5)	8(16)	44(46)
Schuman	(148)	16 (9)	6(4)	3(2)	11(6)	7(7)	24(26)	10(20)	23(26)
Spanier	(80)	3 (1)	1(2)	9(0)	3(1)	6(8)	16(11)	10(22)	52(55)
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	5 (1)	6(4)	2(3)	3(1)	4(4)	7 (3)	3(14)	70(70)
Stoessinger	(98)	5 (2)	5(3)	1(0)	6(3)	7(5)	23(17)	14(31)	39(39)
Van Dyke	(142)	3 (0)	2(1)	1(0)	7(5)	2(2)	8 (6)	4(13)	73(73)
Mean		6 (3)	5(3)	2(1)	6(3)	4(4)	11 (9)	7(17)	59(60)

the future. We also coded every paragraph in terms of whether they "explicitly mention structures or trends that may exist or unfold in the future, or cease to exist in the future, or continue to exist in the future." As can be seen in Table 14, virtually every text shied away from a future context. More than half made such references in less than 5 percent of their sample paragraphs and only one (Sprout-Sprout) stands out as having noticeable concern for developments that lie ahead. We confess to being disappointed by this finding, not only because our scien-

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TABLE 14

PROPORTION OF 2,915 PARAGRAPHS FOR 26 TEXTS THAT MENTIONED DEVELOPMENTS THAT MAY OCCUR IN THE FUTURE (IN PERCENTAGES)

Text	(*n*)	(1) *Future Mentioned*	(2) *Future Not Mentioned*
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	11	89
Bobrow	(31)	0	100
Coplin	(93)	4	96
Crabb	(166)	5	95
Deutsch	(62)	8	92
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	5	95
Duchacek	(128)	7	93
Edwards	(71)	1	99
Frankel	(59)	0	100
Hartmann	(216)	3	97
Holsti	(112)	3	97
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	4	96
Jordan	(78)	4	96
Legg-Morrison	(67)	7	93
Modelski	(106)	3	97
Morgan	(65)	2	98
Morgenthau	(147)	3	97
Organski	(174)	8	92
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	9	91
Puchala	(78)	9	91
Rosecrance	(77)	8	92
Schuman	(148)	6	94
Spanier	(80)	10	90
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	15	85
Stoessinger	(98)	3	97
Van Dyke	(142)	4	96
Mean		6	94

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tific orientations lead us to an interest in prediction, but also because our concern for motivating and training students leads us to presume that by more frequent exposure to analyses that project and extrapolate into the future, students will develop a keener sense of the variability and dynamics of IR.

CONCEPTIONS OF SPACE

In this section we present the results of a separate content analysis of every mention of a country, continental region, or international organization on every page of every text.[33] We do so not by way of investigating the way in which the textwriters approach questions of geography. Rather, our purpose is to use the pattern of geographic references as a means of exploring their perceptions of the hierarchical structure of the international system. We presume that the more frequently textwriters refer to a country, region, or organization, the more importance do they attach to it as an international actor. Thus, for example, by comparing the relative frequency of references to the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and the Common Market countries with those to the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, one can develop an insight into the status- and issue-orientations of the textwriters. In addition, the relative frequency with which they refer to the United States (or, in the case of Frankel, to Great Britain), can serve as a good indication of the extent to which ethnocentric bias underlies their analysis. The extent to which the various texts differed in the frequencies of their references to specific actors, moreover, provides a measure of how they vary in terms of the levels of abstraction at which their analyses are cast.

Table 15 presents the mean number of references to political entities at the national level (or, as in the case of Berlin or divided countries, at the subnational level with some claim to statehood or special status) per 25,000-word unit in the 26 texts. The countries are listed in rank order. Here it becomes dramatically evident that the textwriters have a highly stratified conception of the international system. Where 12 countries had a mean in excess of 5.0 units, more than 60 had one of

[33] The unit of measurement used in the analysis and in Table 15 is mentions per 25,000 words. This ratio is based not on a sample of paragraphs, but rather on every mention in every paragraph (except those in book titles, prefaces, appendices, footnotes, or tables). Mentions of capital cities used as a shorthand for countries (such as "Washington" or "Moscow") were coded as a country reference. The geographic categories used to code the data were those developed in Bruce M. Russett, J. David Singer, and Melvin Small, "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (September 1968), 932–51.

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Table 15

Frequency of References to National and Subnational Political Entities (Ranked by Mean Number of References per 25,000-Word Unit for 26 Texts)

Country	*Mean*	*Country*	*Mean*	*Country*	*Mean*
U.S.	74.43	Palestine	.72	Haiti	.09
U.S.S.R.	64.76	Burma	.71	Honduras	.09
Great Britain	27.96	Iraq	.71	El Salvador	.09
China	24.06	Philippines	.70	Zambia	.08
France	23.28	Brazil	.69	Maldive Islands	.08
Pre-WWII Germany	19.96	Laos	.67	Hong Kong	.08
Japan	9.37	Syria	.67	Costa Rica	.08
India	7.18	Malaysia	.66	Trinidad & Tobago	.07
Cuba	6.48	Cyprus	.66	Gabon	.07
Israel	5.76	Ghana	.64	Monaco	.07
United Arab Republic (Egypt)	5.37	Tanzania	.63	Madagascar	.07
Italy	5.12	Cambodia	.61	Mozambique	.07
Vietnam	4.33	Bulgaria	.60	Mauritania	.07
Pakistan	4.25	Morocco	.60	Togo	.06
Korea	3.59	Albania	.56	U.S. Pacific Trust	.06
Czechoslovakia	3.54	Thailand	.54	Senegal	.06
Austria	3.51	Caribbean West Indies	.53	Chad	.06
Berlin	3.24	Dominican Republic	.50	Liechtenstein	.06
Poland	3.03	Luxemburg	.49	Jamaica	.06
Greece	2.64	Argentina	.47	Greenland	.06
Spain	2.44	Lebanon	.46	Oceania	.05
North Vietnam	2.24	Saudi Arabia	.43	Panama Canal Zone	.05
Federal Republic of Germany	2.21	Denmark	.39	Malawi	.05
Switzerland	2.19	Persian Gulf	.36	Bhutan	.05
Yugoslavia	2.17	Ireland	.35	Upper Volta	.05
Indonesia	2.08	Ivory Coast	.34	Sierra Leone	.04
Canada	2.05	Norway	.33	Lesotho	.04
South Vietnam	2.00	New Zealand	.33	Cameroon	.04
Turkey	1.96	Guatemala	.32	Central African Republic	.04
Hungary	1.88	Mongolia	.31	Malta	.04
Congo (Brazzaville)	1.82	Chile	.30	Fiji Islands	.04
Belgium	1.71	Venezuela	.30	Southern Yemen	.04
Union of South Africa	1.66	Yemen	.29	Nauru	.03
Netherlands	1.58	Afghanistan	.27	Western Samoa	.03
Taiwan	1.25	Peru	.26	Quemoy-Matsu	.03
Democratic Republic of Germany	1.24	Sudan	.25	Guam	.03
North Korea	1.21	Kenya	.23	Virgin Islands	.03
Portugal	1.13	Libya	.22	Niger	.03
Rumania	1.12	Sri Lanka	.21	Barbados	.03
South Korea	1.06	Colombia	.21	Burundi	.02
Algeria	1.05	Panama	.19	Bahamas	.02
Iran	.97	Kuwait	.18	Rwanda	.01
Nigeria	.91	Liberia	.17	Guyana	.01
Jordan	.90	Somalia	.16	Bahrain Islands	.01
Bangladesh	.88	Iceland	.14	Macao	.01
Finland	.88	Singapore	.13	Gambia	.01
Ethiopia	.81	Mali	.12	Mauritius	.01
Sweden	.78	Uganda	.12	Bermuda	.01
Tunisia	.77	Uruguay	.12	Martinique	.00
Australia	.76	Angola	.12	St. Lucia	.00
Rhodesia	.75	Paraguay	.11	Zaire	.00
Mexico	.73	Puerto Rico	.11	Grand Cayman	.00
		Nepal	.10	Antigua	.00
		Nicaragua	.10	St. Vincent	.00
		Ecuador	.09	Netherlands Antilles	.00
				British Honduras	.00

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less than 0.5 units. Stated differently (and in terms of data not in Table 15), only 13 countries were mentioned in every text, and only 55 were mentioned in as many as 20 texts. Even among the entities cited most frequently, moreover, the degree of stratification is considerable, with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. being referred to more than twice as often as any other country. These are followed by another cluster of four—Great Britain, China, France, and pre-World War II Germany—that were mentioned more than twice as often as any of the others. At that point in the ranking, neither great- or major-power status, nor even regional leadership, appears to be the prime basis for the frequency of mentions. Rather, a goodly number of the remaining countries near the top of Table 15 consist of those around which major crises of the cold-war period centered. For example, while such regional leaders as Brazil and Ghana appear well down on the list, 7 of the top 20—Cuba, Israel, Vietnam, Korea, Czechoslovakia, Berlin, and Greece—presumably achieved their relatively high status because they have been the foci of major world issues rather than because of the capabilities they bring to the international arena.

For the textwriters, in other words, importance as an international actor is not simply a matter of power and respect. They may conceptualize status in terms of such variables as size and industrial capacity, but aside from the few great powers, the countries to which they refer most frequently are likely to be those that get caught up in major international conflicts. Their time frame for status is thus a narrow one; any comparable ranking derived from texts available twenty years from now is likely to be very different from the one in Table 15. We are distressed by this finding. It can be viewed in several ways, only one of which strikes us as conducive to either the presentation of sound knowledge or the basis for good pedagogy. The narrow, issue-oriented time frame can be interpreted (a) as an indication that the texts continue to be mainly concerned with current events; (b) as an indication that the writers are disinclined to rely on quantified events data to depict the recurrent patterns and hierarchical structure of world politics and therefore fall back on analyzing those major crises for which there is considerable documentation; (c) as a sign that the texts are cast at abstract levels of analysis and use the more dramatic events of recent times to illustrate their analytic distinctions; or (d) as a measure of the large extent to which textwriters are so preoccupied with superpower politics and confrontation that they focus more on the arenas of conflict than on the evidences of hierarchical structure. The third of these interpretations is perhaps the most persuasive and encouraging,

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especially as we shall present some evidence below that more than a few of the texts do cast their analyses at sufficiently high analytic levels to need to cite concrete situations only for illustrative purposes. Even so, we are disturbed by the possibility that major crises have inadvertently come to serve as the bases for moving up the ladder of abstraction rather than as empirical examples of conceptual distinctions derived from an independent understanding of the world's stratification system. Perhaps the catastrophic conflicts that mar history do reveal the hidden structures of international politics; but we suspect that this may not be so and that there are more reliable ways—such as events data—of uncovering underlying patterns.

The data in Table 15 do not allow for the conclusion that the textwriters have an ethnocentric concern with the United States. It is ranked first in terms of the mean number of references, but the Soviet Union is such a close second that the data can more plausibly be interpreted as reflecting a preoccupation with superpower politics than as an expression of ethnocentrism. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 17, 8 texts refer to the Soviet Union more frequently than to the United States.[34]

On the other hand, a pronounced orientation toward industrial and Western societies can be discerned in the rankings of Table 15. Leaving aside the countries that ranked high because they were the foci of cold-war crises, we find that the nations of the Third World were, with few exceptions, conspicuously located toward the lower end of the ranking, while those of the industrial regions could be found mostly in the upper half of the ranking.

An insight into the relative degrees of concern for developed and developing nations is provided by the frequency of references to the various geographic entities to which observers tend to resort when summarily analyzing activities in a whole region or continent. These data are presented in Table 16, and here it is plainly evident that the textwriters are not oblivious to the Third World. Europe was the highest-ranking region, with Africa, Asia, and South America following; in the case of Africa and Asia, the number of references exceeded all but 7 countries, and in the case of South America, all but 11. The countries of the developing world, it would seem, are considered important as aggregates, but not as differentiated entities. Perhaps because they have a more detailed understanding of the inner workings

[34] Furthermore, Frankel, the author of the one text prepared originally for distribution in England, resists ethnocentric temptations and refers to the United States considerably more often than to Great Britain (again see Table 17).

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TABLE 16

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL ENTITIES (RANKED BY MEAN NUMBER OF REFERENCES PER 25,000-WORD UNIT FOR 26 TEXTS)

Region	*Rank*	*Mean Number*	*Region*	*Rank*	*Mean Number*
Europe	1	21.02	Middle East	7	2.96
Africa	2	8.96	Southeast Asia	8	2.18
Asia	3	7.92	North America	9	1.57
South America	4	5.35	Central America	10	1.34
Western Europe	5	3.91	Scandinavia	11	.22
Eastern Europe	6	3.89	Polar Region	12	.14

and problems of Western nations, the textwriters are more inclined to identify them directly, while relying on regional generalizations when their analysis concerns other parts of the world.

Turning to the degree to which the texts vary in the importance they attach to various entities at the national level, in Table 17 we present the rankings, for each text, of the 20 countries with the highest average number of references per 25,000-word unit. Here it can be seen that the rankings of most of the countries were quite stable across the 26 texts, with the level of agreement on the 5 highest being especially conspicuous. Some exceptions can be found in almost every column, but the overall pattern suggests considerable consensus about both the way in which the global system is stratified and the importance that is attached to major international conflicts.

A finding that will become even more evident in the next section is that the frequency of references to international organizations and other supranational political entities (Table 18) does not reflect an intense preoccupation with this level of world politics. To be sure, a comparison of Tables 15 and 18 reveals that the mean number of references to the United Nations exceeded the comparable figure for all but three countries, and that the League of Nations, COMECON, and NATO were referred to more often than several of the top 20 entities at the national and subnational level. Beyond these few exceptions, however, the world portrayed in the texts is not pervaded with supranational institutions. Table 18 lists 29 institutions, of which 23 were referred to less often than once every 25,000 words. Similarly, a comparison of Tables 16 and 18 reveals that 10 of the 12 regional entities were referred to more often than all but 5 of the supranational institu-

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Table 17, Part I

Ranking for Each Text of the 20 Entities at the National or Subnational Levels with the Highest Average Number of References per 25,000-Word Unit (rankings run from 1 for the highest to 20 for the lowest)

Text	*U.S.A.*	*U.S.S.R.*	*Great Britain*	*China*	*Pre-WWII France*	*Germany*	*Japan*	*India*	*Cuba*	*Israel*
Axline-Stegenga	2	1	4	3	4	7	10	6	13	8
Bobrow	2	4	6	8	8	7	8	14	3	13
Coplin	1	2	3	5	4	6	10	9	7	8
Crabb	2	1	4	3	5	8	10	6	11	9
Deutsch	1	2	3	6	4	5	7	10	9	14
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	1	2	3	6	4	4	7	9	11	12
Duchacek	2	1	6	3	5	4	7	8	12	16
Edwards	2	1	6	7	7	9	12	14	5	19
Frankel	1	2	3	4	7	6	14	8	13	5
Hartmann	2	1	5	3	7	4	6	11	16	18
Holsti	2	1	6	4	5	3	9	13	12	18
Hopkins-Mansbach	1	2	3	6	4	5	8	13	7	9
Jordan	2	1	6	4	3	11	9	17	5	7
Legg-Morrison	1	2	4	3	4	6	8	12	10	10
Modelski	1	5	2	4	3	6	7	8	18	15
Morgan	1	2	7	3	6	7	11	14	4	9
Morgenthau	1	2	3	9	4	5	8	11	12	17
Organski	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	13
Palmer-Perkins	1	2	3	5	4	6	8	7	16	13
Puchala	1	2	5	3	4	6	9	7	13	15
Rosecrance	1	2	5	9	3	4	8	17	7	10
Schuman	1	2	3	6	4	5	7	12	18	10
Spanier	1	2	4	3	5	6	10	12	11	18
Sprout-Sprout	1	2	3	4	5	7	6	8	13	12
Stoessinger	2	1	3	4	5	7	11	6	17	8
Van Dyke	1	2	3	5	6	4	7	10	19	16

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TABLE 17, PART II

Text	*Egypt (U.A.R.)*	*Italy*	*Vietnam*	*Pakistan*	*Korea*	*Czechoslovakia*	*Austria*	*Berlin*	*Poland*	*Greece*
Axline-Stegenga	10	16	12	9	18	16	20	15	19	14
Bobrow	5	15	8	1	15	15	15	12	15	15
Coplin	12	18	14	17	11	15	15	13	20	19
Crabb	7	16	12	14	13	17	20	18	15	19
Deutsch	14	8	12	16	11	17	20	19	17	17
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	8	12	17	15	13	18	18	16	20	10
Duchacek	15	13	11	17	14	9	20	19	10	13
Edwards	19	14	11	3	10	14	12	4	18	14
Frankel	20	12	9	14	10	16	17	19	17	11
Hartmann	13	8	19	17	11	14	9	15	10	20
Holsti	11	10	19	14	17	7	15	16	20	8
Hopkins-Mansbach	10	11	12	19	14	16	18	17	15	20
Jordan	14	16	12	14	13	17	20	18	15	9
Legg-Morrison	17	19	7	13	13	13	19	18	13	9
Modelski	11	9	10	17	13	12	16	20	18	14
Morgan	16	13	5	19	10	14	16	11	19	18
Morgenthau	16	7	20	19	13	14	6	17	10	15
Organski	11	9	15	20	12	18	19	15	14	17
Palmer-Perkins	9	10	20	12	11	18	13	19	17	15
Puchala	10	8	12	20	10	18	15	18	11	14
Rosecrance	13	11	12	19	20	14	6	16	17	15
Schuman	9	8	16	19	16	15	13	20	11	14
Spanier	13	17	7	19	9	14	20	8	15	16
Sprout-Sprout	9	10	11	18	13	15	20	19	15	15
Stoessinger	9	18	16	13	15	9	18	12	14	19
Van Dyke	19	8	12	20	15	12	14	17	10	17
All 26 Texts	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20

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TABLE 18

FREQUENCY OF REFERENCES TO INTERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL POLITICAL ENTITIES (RANKED BY MEAN NUMBER OF REFERENCES PER 25,000-WORD UNIT FOR 26 TEXTS)

Entity	*Mean*	*Entity*	*Mean*
United Nations (UN)	26.72	International Labour Organisation (ILO)	.25
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON, CMEA)	6.01	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)	.25
League of Nations	5.53	Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	.24
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	3.53	International Monetary Fund (IMF)	.18
European Economic Community (Common Market, EEC)	2.42	European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)	.17
Organization of American States (OAS)	1.02	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank, IBRD)	.16
International Court of Justice (ICJ)	.91	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	.11
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	.77	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)	.10
Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact)	.72	International Red Cross	.08
"Free World"	.67	Council of Europe	.08
South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)	.63	United Nations Development Program (UNDP)	.07
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)	.47	World Court	.05
Organization of African Unity (OAU)	.33	International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	.04
World Health Organization (WHO)	.31	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	.02

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tions, one of which (the League of Nations) no longer exists. Presumably the League appears high on the list because the textwriters feel compelled to analyze the weaknesses of international organizations as well as to describe the historical antecedents of the United Nations.

In sum, the texts tend to portray the world as centered around nation-states and as sustained by industrialized and Western actors, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. For reasons elaborated below, we are concerned about this underlying structure. Nation-states may be the prime actors, and the industrial superpowers do dominate, but is the imbalance as great as the foregoing data imply? Will such a perspective continue to be appropriate to an increasingly interdependent world?

CONCEPTIONS OF ACTORS

Our preoccupation with the levels of abstraction at which IR texts are cast led us to code each sample paragraph in terms of whether it "explicitly contains any mention" of each of 8 types of actors, 4 of them being concrete actors and 4 being analytic at 4 levels of analysis: (1) "an individual person," (2) "a specific role filled or fillable by a concrete person," (3) "a concrete group less encompassing than a nation-state or national society," (4) "a generalized group less encompassing than a nation-state or national society," (5) "a concrete nation-state or nation-states," (6) "a generalized nation-state or nation-states," (7) "a concrete governmental or nongovernmental international organization," and (8) "a generalized governmental or nongovernmental international organization."[35] Table 19 presents the percentage of each type of actor found in the sample paragraphs of each text. Here several patterns could be discerned. One of them affirmed the earlier finding that texts can differ considerably in their emphasis on concrete and analytic phenomena. Whereas 6 of the texts, for example, cited an equal or higher proportion of generalized actors at all 4 levels of analysis, 4 mentioned concrete actors more frequently at each level. Similarly, another 5 included generalized actors in as many or more paragraphs at 3 of the 4 levels, while 5 mentioned concrete actors in more paragraphs at 3 levels. The percentage differences in both directions, moreover, were often sizable, running as high as 69 points in one case (Stoes-

[35] Perhaps the best way to summarize our coding rules for these categories is to give an example or two of actors coded in each: (1) "Winston Churchill"; (2) "the American presidency" or "the voter"; (3) "the Nixon Administration" or "the Labor Party"; (4) "bureaucracies" or "dissident factions"; (5) "Albania"; (6) "superpowers"; (7) "the United Nations" or "IBM"; and (8) "transnational professional societies" or "multinational corporations."

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TABLE 19

PROPORTION OF 2,915 PARAGRAPHS FROM 26 TEXTS IN WHICH MENTION WAS MADE OF 8 TYPES OF ACTORS AT 4 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
(IN PERCENTAGES)

		Individuals		*National Subgroups*		*Nation-States*		*International Organizations*	
Text	(*n*)	*Concrete* (1)	*Analytic* (2)	*Concrete* (3)	*Analytic* (4)	*Concrete* (5)	*Analytic* (6)	*Concrete* (7)	*Analytic* (8)
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	8	39	6	25	31	69	8	14
Bobrow	(31)	3	10	7	6	26	13	0	0
Coplin	(93)	8	45	5	30	41	68	11	14
Crabb	(166)	47	26	25	20	80	35	31	5
Deutsch	(62)	13	24	10	40	40	56	11	11
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	21	22	6	25	23	42	3	9
Duchacek	(128)	36	36	20	27	50	56	14	7
Edwards	(71)	8	6	1	6	24	32	9	1
Frankel	(59)	8	5	5	14	41	58	14	5
Hartmann	(216)	32	8	3	10	68	46	23	5
Holsti	(112)	14	25	16	33	56	62	17	10
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	34	36	19	24	50	36	15	7
Jordan	(78)	22	18	10	15	58	45	8	6
Legg-Morrison	(67)	6	16	7	36	22	61	10	10
Modelski	(106)	4	17	3	23	27	55	5	9
Morgan	(65)	9	25	9	28	15	38	9	8
Morgenthau	(147)	18	16	3	15	49	51	19	4
Organski	(174)	5	11	5	16	45	65	9	5
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	27	23	3	16	61	45	42	7
Puchala	(78)	14	32	6	26	31	62	13	5
Rosecrance	(77)	14	17	9	23	53	73	9	7
Schuman	(148)	50	29	33	30	68	36	17	4
Spanier	(80)	40	22	31	39	74	60	13	5
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	10	28	7	31	33	59	6	4
Stoessinger	(98)	32	5	12	9	84	15	49	3
Van Dyke	(142)	11	11	4	16	43	61	24	8
Mean		22	21	12	22	50	50	18	6

singer at the national level) and exceeding 20 points in more than a few cases. Stated differently, the bimodal distribution resulting from the opposite tendencies toward concrete and analytic formulations left only 6 texts with more paragraphs containing generalized actors at 2 levels and more concrete actors at the other 2 levels. It might be said that these 6 texts are the only ones that achieve a balance in identifying the generalized and concrete actors, but we would be more inclined to

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conclude that they are the only ones that lack a perspective on this important issue.

A second pattern that becomes evident in Table 19 is that, within the texts, striking differences prevail between the way in which subnational groups and international organizations are presented. The former tend to be treated as generalized actors, while the latter are identified in concrete terms. Of the 26 texts, 22 recorded a higher proportion of paragraphs with generalized subnational groups; the same number mentioned concrete international organizations in as many or more of their paragraphs. It is as if the role of subnational actors has yet to be adequately researched, and thus their activities and importance are understood only at the conceptual level, whereas the role of international organizations is historically clear but conceptually obscure. One "knows" that subnational actors exert influence on foreign policy, but it is an influence that is difficult to trace empirically, and few case studies that do so are available. On the other hand, one "sees" international organizations at work almost daily, but whether and how they perform a central role in the dynamics of world politics is hard to derive from the welter of observations. In addition, the relative neglect of international organizations at more abstract levels may stem from the tendency (elaborated below) of the textwriters to organize their materials around a nation-state–centered world. In such a world, empirical note must be taken of how international organizations facilitate, hinder, or otherwise serve as a backdrop for the activities of nation-states, but the need to locate them conceptually is not considered important inasmuch as their role is considered to be slight. Whatever the reasons for the sharp discrepancy in the treatment of subnational and international actors, they do not obtain with respect to national and individual actors. In both these instances, more texts cite the generalized actor as or more often than its concrete counterpart, but the discrepancy is not so pronounced (17 to 9 in the case of national actors, and 14 to 12 in the case of individual actors).

The most clear-cut pattern in Table 19 involves the nation-state orientations of the textwriters. All 26 pay as much or more attention to this type of actor than any other, *both* conceptually and empirically. Indeed, the mean figure for the proportion of paragraphs mentioning a national actor was exactly 50 percent for both the generalized and concrete categories, and this figure is more than twice the size of the average for any of the other actors in either category. If the deeper structures of the international system are undergoing profound change, as some assert, the recognition of such processes does not appear to have sur-

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faced at the textbook level. Notwithstanding occasional paragraphs that acknowledge the process whereby technological change has fostered the emergence of new actors, issues, and transnational relationships, the student is introduced to a world pervaded by the nation-state.

In like manner, perhaps for reasons already suggested, all 26 texts paid the least attention to international organizations as generalized actors. On the other hand, 13 mentioned them as much or more as concrete actors than they did subgroups or individuals; only 7 refer to them less often than to any of the other concrete actors.

Aside from their shared preoccupation with nation-states and their minimal interest in generalized international organizations, the texts do not exhibit any uniformity with respect to their relative treatment of the other actors. Generalized subgroups were mentioned second-most frequently by 16 of the texts; at the concrete level only 3 did so, and 14 referred to them least often. Generalized individual actors were cited second-most frequently in 11 texts and third-most frequently in the remainder. The comparable figures for concrete individual actors were 12 and 12, with the remaining 2 citing them least often.

CHARACTERISTICS AND VARIABILITY OF ACTORS AND ACTION

Whatever the actor and whatever the level of abstraction at which it is depicted, how do the texts tend to conceive of it? As goal-oriented? As motivated? As subject to variation? As being shaped or influenced by causes? As giving rise to consequences? As engaging in behavior, either interactively with other actors or independently without reference to them? Our content analysis included variables designed to shed light on these questions. More accurately, we coded each sample paragraph in terms of whether the prime unit was associated with any or all of these characteristics.[36] In the case of most of these variables, moreover, we recorded whether or not the paragraph described them as varying.

The first four columns of Table 20 present data on the goals and motives ascribed to the prime units, with goals being defined as "in order to" statements about the unit, and motives being viewed as "because of" characterizations. That is, paragraphs were coded as referring to goals

[36] Although often the prime units were individual, subgroup, national, or international actors, a number of them were not: thus there is need for caution against treating the data in Tables 20–24 as exclusively descriptive of actors. They also depict the characteristics of situations, wars, crises, schools of thought, and the other topics that constitute the main focus of a paragraph. An insight into the way in which the texts conceptualize actors is best achieved by comparing the columns in Tables 20–24 rather than by interpreting the absolute figures.

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TABLE 20

PROPORTION OF 2,915 PARAGRAPHS FROM 26 TEXTS IN WHICH GOALS, MOTIVES, AND INDEPENDENT BEHAVIOR WERE ASCRIBED TO THEIR PRIME UNITS AND VARIATIONS IN THEM WERE DEPICTED
(IN PERCENTAGES)

Text	(*n*)	(1) *Goals*	(2) *Goal Variation*	(3) *Motives*	(4) *Motive Variation*	(5) *Independent Behavior*	(6) *Behavior Variation*
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	14	3	11	3	22	8
Bobrow	(31)	10	3	0	0	3	3
Coplin	(93)	27	7	6	3	27	16
Crabb	(166)	35	10	12	3	20	13
Deutsch	(62)	31	13	6	2	23	14
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	20	7	8	4	23	12
Duchacek	(128)	16	2	5	1	19	8
Edwards	(71)	25	11	10	6	20	16
Frankel	(59)	25	12	2	2	10	7
Hartmann	(216)	25	6	10	5	37	19
Holsti	(112)	53	18	26	16	51	38
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	33	13	6	1	33	18
Jordan	(78)	30	11	10	2	24	15
Legg-Morrison	(67)	37	14	2	0	24	13
Modelski	(106)	17	1	4	3	22	15
Morgan	(65)	14	1	5	2	15	5
Morgenthau	(147)	20	4	12	4	20	15
Organski	(174)	27	4	10	2	20	6
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	31	7	9	3	31	15
Puchala	(78)	28	9	13	8	19	4
Rosecrance	(77)	35	14	6	0	23	13
Schuman	(148)	30	15	11	7	35	20
Spanier	(80)	42	9	10	1	44	16
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	10	1	2	1	9	4
Stoessinger	(98)	24	5	14	3	13	4
Van Dyke	(142)	30	6	9	4	18	7
Mean		27	8	9	3	25	13

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when their units were described as being oriented toward—either through planning or through action—some future state of affairs, thus necessitating the use of "in order to" language (or its equivalent) to depict the plans or action. Paragraphs were coded as referring to motives when the present plans, actions, or circumstances associated with their prime units were assessed in terms of past or present states of affairs, thereby compelling the textwriters to use some equivalent of "because of" language.[37] Table 20 reveals that the textwriters are much more interested in the goals than in the motives of actors. Indeed, all 26 texts were found to have a higher proportion of paragraphs with goals than with motives; in 23 instances the former were more than twice the number of the latter. We interpret this finding as indicating the degree to which the field of IR has both moved away from the orientations of historians and eschewed those of social psychologists. If historical narration were still an overriding concern, the ratio of motive-to-goal characteristics would presumably be larger for most of the texts. And it seems likely that this would also be the case if the field had replaced a tendency toward narrative history with one in which the psychological sources of behavior were considered central. Instead, the ratios evident in Table 20 suggest that the field proceeds mainly from a political and/or policy perspective in which actors and their activities are conceived to be goal-oriented. Such a perspective, moreover, appears to be operative irrespective of whether textwriters cast their analyses at concrete or abstract levels. A comparison of the 7 More Concrete texts with the 19 classified as More Abstract, in terms of the degree to which they attributed motives and goals to the units, yielded virtually no differences: only 3 and 5 percentage points, respectively, separated the two groups along the motivation and goal dimensions.

Although the texts are uniformly inclined to focus more on goals than on motives, they differ considerably in the extent to which they portray units as goal-oriented. In at least one-third of their paragraphs, 5 made goal attributions, whereas 8 did so in no more than one-fifth of their paragraphs. The political model may be more prevalent than the historical and psychological ones, but it is hardly accorded equal attention by the various texts.

On the other hand, uniformity does mark their inclination to allow for variation on the part of the goals they ascribe to the units. As can be

[37] For an elaboration of this distinction between "in order to" and "because of" statements, see Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics* (New York: Free Press 1962), 144.

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seen in Table 20, only one text (Schuman) depicted goals as varying in half of the paragraphs where goals are identified, while 12 texts allowed for such variability in less than one-quarter of their goal-oriented paragraphs. Stated differently, on the average the texts had goal attributions in 27 percent of their paragraphs, but the mean for the proportion of varying goals was only 8 percent. And the same disinclination to portray variability was equally manifest in the attribution of motives, with the comparable means being 9 and 3 percent. Such tendencies are, of course, not surprising in view of the earlier findings that most textwriters tend not to cast their analysis in cautious or probabilistic terms or to offer alternative explanations of the phenomena they investigate. Indeed, the data on variability in Table 20 are a particular expression of the earlier findings. Nevertheless, we cannot help but record again our dismay over the apparent insensitivity to both the intellectual and pedagogical need to treat the key variables in world affairs for what they are: variables and not constants.

To be sure, the lack of sensitivity along this line is probably exaggerated in Table 20, since conceivably the textwriters occasionally assess the variability of the identified goals and motives in the paragraphs that follow those that were selected as part of our sample. It seems doubtful, however, whether the practice of extending the analysis of goals and motives beyond a single paragraph fully accounts for the discrepancies in Table 20. If the impulse to depict variability dominated textwriters to the extent we think it should, the identification of a goal or motive would be followed sufficiently closely by an indication of alternative goals or motives to appear in the same paragraph more often than is the case according to our data. In our judgment, a goal or motive is not properly identified until its variability is simultaneously indicated—a rule of procedure that would surely result in a much narrower gap between the percentages in columns (2) and (4) of Table 20 on the one hand, and their counterparts in columns (1) and (3) on the other.

That a greater disposition toward discerning and depicting variability is possible can be seen in the way in which the textwriters portray and assess behavior apart from its sources, attributes, and consequences. Each sample paragraph was coded in terms of a positive or negative answer to two questions on the presence of behavior in other than interactive situations: "Is the prime unit explicitly posited as engaging in behavior without reference to the reactions of another actor?" "If behavior is identified on the part of the prime unit, is it posited as varying in some way?" The resulting data are presented in the last two columns

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of Table 20. Here it is evident that although most of the texts devote roughly the same amount of attention to behavior as to the goals it is designed to serve, they are much more prone to treat the former as variable than the latter. In contrast to the one text noted above that depicted goals as varying in half of the paragraphs in which goals are identified, 16 texts described variations in independent behavior in more than half of the paragraphs where such behavior was ascribed to the prime unit. Indeed, in one text (Bobrow) such variation was portrayed each time independent behavior was identified. All told, an average of 25 percent of the sample paragraphs in all the texts were coded as containing prime units that engaged in independent behavior; the mean for those containing variations in this behavior was 13 percent.

It is not difficult to develop an explanation for the greater tendency to associate variability with behavior than with its goals or motives. One can observe behavior directly, whereas goals and motives must be inferred from behavior. Hence it is much easier to perceive variations in behavior and record them with confidence. Even the inferential derivation of one goal or motive involves a tentative and uncertain analytic exercise, so that to derive ways in which the goal or motive might vary or be part of a multiplicity of goals or motives is to undertake an especially tenuous task. But this, of course, is precisely our point. Analysis ought not to be confined to that which is readily observed. If the dynamics of world politics are to be uncovered and explained, imagination and venturesomeness must be invoked. The variability that constitutes the dynamics of the field is at least partially rooted in inferential phenomena, in the sources and consequences of behavior; any analysis that avoids probing variability at these levels seems destined to fall short of a substantial addition to understanding.

This is not to say, however, that the textwriters are unconcerned with the sources and consequences of behavior. As can be seen in columns (1) and (3) of Table 21, all but one text "discussed or analyzed" the prime unit "in terms of sources or causes that affect it" in at least one-quarter of their paragraphs; all 26 "discussed or analyzed" the prime unit "in terms of consequences or outcomes it causes" in at least one-third of their paragraphs.[38] Indeed, a comparison of these columns with column (5) in Table 20 reveals that the proportion of paragraphs that ascribed sources and consequences to the prime unit is higher for, respectively, 21 and 25 of the texts than is the equivalent figure for independent behavior.

[38] The quoted words are taken from our rules for coding each variable.

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TABLE 21

PROPORTION OF 2,915 PARAGRAPHS FROM 26 TEXTS IN WHICH SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES WERE ASCRIBED TO THEIR PRIME UNITS AND VARIATIONS IN THEM WERE DEPICTED (IN PERCENTAGES)

Text	(*n*)	(1) *Sources*	(2) *Source Variation*	(3) *Consequences*	(4) *Consequence Variation*	(5) *Links Between Varying Sources & Consequences*
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	39	11	47	19	6
Bobrow	(31)	23	7	26	3	0
Coplin	(93)	55	23	46	20	14
Crabb	(166)	30	7	43	5	1
Deutsch	(62)	47	23	48	16	11
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	30	9	38	14	6
Duchacek	(128)	34	4	34	5	3
Edwards	(71)	44	18	44	6	4
Frankel	(59)	42	10	44	3	2
Hartmann	(216)	27	7	37	7	2
Holsti	(112)	48	28	62	30	21
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	45	16	34	16	9
Jordan	(78)	36	5	47	9	3
Legg-Morrison	(67)	52	16	42	18	9
Modelski	(106)	35	8	35	9	4
Morgan	(65)	37	12	34	9	5
Morgenthau	(147)	37	11	48	9	6
Organski	(174)	40	8	44	6	3
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	29	4	37	5	1
Puchala	(78)	46	23	38	13	8
Rosecrance	(77)	69	36	57	34	27
Schuman	(148)	31	2	37	1	1
Spanier	(80)	60	11	54	11	6
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	36	14	49	14	4
Stoessinger	(98)	36	0	52	5	0
Van Dyke	(142)	31	9	37	5	1
Mean		38	11	42	10	5

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Yet, to discern sources and consequences is not equivalent to fully carrying out the task of inferring from observed behavior. One can hardly avoid taking note of causes and effects if one is operating with a model of political behavior rather than a commitment to historical narration. Such inferences, we believe, must be supplemented with an analysis of (i.e., further inferences about) the ways in which the sources and consequences perceived to be operative can or do vary. And in this respect the texts are no more exemplary than in their handling of variation in goals and motives. Columns (2) and (4) of Table 21 depict the extent to which they allowed the identified sources and consequences to vary, and here it is evident that again variables tended to be treated as constants. Only one text (Rosecrance) depicted both the sources and consequences as varying in more than half the paragraphs in which these characteristics were identified. On the other hand, 10 texts identified variable sources less than one-quarter of the time, and 8 others did so less than one-third of the time. Similarly, 14 and 4 texts portrayed varying consequences in, respectively, one-quarter and one-third of their paragraphs where that characteristic was identified. On the average, the texts ascribed sources in 38 percent of their paragraphs and variable sources in 11 percent, while the comparable means for consequences were 42 and 10 percent.

Given this degree of insensitivity to the variability of international phenomena, it is hardly surprising that only a very small proportion of the paragraphs in most of the texts linked variations in sources to variations in consequences. The last column in Table 21 lists the proportion of paragraphs in which such a linkage was found. Here we uncovered what we regard as perhaps the most important finding of our inquiry: 15 texts linked varying causes and effects in fewer than 5 percent of their paragraphs, and 7 others did so in fewer than 10 percent. This strikes us as a crucial finding because such links are, in effect, at the center of any intellectual effort in which independent and dependent variables are analyzed. They are the very nature of hypotheses, not to mention the materials out of which theories are developed. And the data in the last column of Table 21 plainly indicate that IR texts are conspicuously lacking in this central dimension of the knowledge-building enterprise. It would seem that either the field is barren of hypotheses that textwriters feel comfortable in passing on to those taking introductory courses, or that they are afraid to appear wrong by casting the knowledge that has cumulated in hypothetical form. Both interpretations are probably accurate, but in either event we find it difficult to imagine how the field can move from its present impres-

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sionistic knowledge base to a reliable, ever-expanding one if its practitioners and textwriters avoid seeking and proposing links between the independent and dependent variables that are deemed important.

CONTEXTS OF INTERACTION

Although students of IR have yet to develop a widely accepted explanatory paradigm, they have long shared the basic premise that comprehension of the field requires an understanding of the dynamics of interaction among actors, as well as the sources and nature of their behavior. To be able to explore why actors do what they do is not to grasp what happens subsequently, as their actions precipitate and sustain the sequences of interaction through which the situations, crises, and relationships of world politics are established, maintained, and transformed. These interaction sequences, most analysts seem to agree, are more than the sum of the actions of the parties to them; accordingly, they need to be conceptualized and probed separately even as the actors and actions that sustain them are subjected to scrutiny. Thus, bifurcation has tended to mark the field, with some investigators exploring phenomena at the action level and others casting their analyses at the interaction level—emphases that have come to be seen as the distinction between foreign policy and international politics.

Our content analysis took account of these two levels through the inclusion of several key interaction variables. With respect to each of the paragraphs we asked, first, whether "the prime unit is explicitly discussed or posited as an interaction sequence."[39] We then proceeded to record whether it is "discussed or analyzed in a context where the presence of force,"[40] of "conflict,"[41] of "cooperation,"[42] of "bargaining," and of the "distribution of power" are "explicitly noted." The resulting data on these 6 variables are presented in Table 22. Here it can readily be seen that the texts faithfully reflect the tendency to emphasize both the action and interaction levels. Column (1) depicts 17 texts as positing interaction sequences in more than one-quarter of their paragraphs; half of them had at least one-third of their paragraphs so coded. Indeed, a comparison of the data in this column with

[39] Our coding rules required that at least "two parties" had to be explicitly identified for a prime unit to be treated as an interaction sequence. If the existence of a second actor had to be inferred from the description of the sequence, it was not coded as interaction.

[40] The coding rule here specified, "by force is meant the use of arms."

[41] "Conflict refers to differences of opinions, goals, etc., among parties to a situation (including interpersonal and intergroup conflict as well as nonviolent and violent conflict)."

[42] "Cooperation refers to compromise, accommodation, concerted effort, etc."

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TABLE 22

PROPORTION OF 2,915 PARAGRAPHS FROM 26 TEXTS IN WHICH THE PRIME UNIT WAS ANALYZED IN THE CONTEXT OF 6 INTERACTION VARIABLES (IN PERCENTAGES)

Text	(*n*)	(1) *Interaction Sequences*	(2) *Conflict*	(3) *Cooperation*	(4) *Force*	(5) *Bargaining*	(6) *Power Distribution*
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	25	62	22	50	6	36
Bobrow	(31)	10	19	3	16	7	3
Coplin	(93)	52	52	33	24	24	25
Crabb	(166)	45	65	32	33	3	29
Deutsch	(62)	37	42	21	31	13	18
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	35	56	14	36	5	12
Duchacek	(128)	38	66	21	39	10	27
Edwards	(71)	34	42	18	30	4	13
Frankel	(59)	17	42	20	20	2	17
Hartmann	(216)	24	63	23	49	7	20
Holsti	(112)	32	72	37	42	5	33
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	45	59	24	38	10	22
Jordan	(78)	35	62	15	37	5	31
Legg-Morrison	(67)	25	51	21	18	3	22
Modelski	(106)	18	40	9	26	0	29
Morgan	(65)	21	32	12	22	0	6
Morgenthau	(147)	24	60	9	44	8	35
Organski	(174)	25	42	10	28	6	41
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	34	56	28	34	5	21
Puchala	(78)	24	47	22	27	10	23
Rosecrance	(77)	43	83	26	56	9	22
Schuman	(148)	34	70	22	46	9	28
Spanier	(80)	41	76	15	56	1	39
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	21	36	10	28	2	24
Stoessinger	(98)	45	50	30	33	8	27
Van Dyke	(142)	22	42	15	33	5	18
Mean		32	55	20	36	6	25

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those in column (5) of Table 20 yields the finding that interaction phenomena tended to be emphasized somewhat more than those pertaining to action: 21 texts had a higher proportion of their paragraphs coded in the former category than the latter. Taken together, the 26 texts associated the prime unit with an interaction sequence in 32 percent of their paragraphs, while the average at the action level was 25 percent.

The other columns of Table 22 also reveal some clear-cut tendencies. Perhaps most noticeable are the sizable differences in the extent to which the textwriters focused on conflict on the one hand and cooperation on the other. Although empirical data are available that indicate the processes of conflict and cooperation may be equally prevalent in world politics,[43] such a balance was not evident in any of the texts. All 26 were found to have a higher proportion of paragraphs depicting conflict than cooperation; 23 of them had more than twice as many paragraphs coded in the conflict than in the cooperation category; and 7 had more than 4 times as many conflict as cooperation paragraphs.[44]

The fact that force was found to be present in a higher proportion of paragraphs than bargaining in all 26 texts is, of course, quite consistent with the tendency to place greater emphasis on conflict than on cooperation. The exercise of force is one form of conflict, while bargaining may be an expression of a readiness to cooperate. Indeed, the inclination to stress conflict was even more pronounced in a comparison of the data on force and bargaining in Table 22: all texts but one (Coplin) were found to place at least twice as many paragraphs in a force context than in a bargaining context, and 13 texts had at least 6 times as many paragraphs coded in the force than in the bargaining category.

Much the same can be said about the data on the variable we have labeled "power distribution" in column (6) of Table 22. Coded here were sample paragraphs in which the prime unit is "discussed or analyzed in a context where the distribution of power and authority is explicitly noted."[45] We included this variable in order to identify the

[43] Charles A. McClelland and Gary D. Hoggard, "Conflict Patterns in the Interactions Among Nations," in Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (rev. ed.; New York: Free Press 1969), 711–24.

[44] These findings are consistent with the impressions of Boulding (fn. 7) and Snyder (fn. 7) recorded more than a decade ago. Both authors decried the imbalance between conflict and cooperation and urged textwriters to pay more attention to integrative processes. Apparently their advice has yet to be taken seriously by the authors of textbooks.

[45] Our coding rules allowed for distributions of power and authority that "may involve superiors, subordinates, or equal parties," as well as those within "domestic"

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degree to which the textwriters are sensitive to hierarchical distinctions, which we conceive to be another possible indicator of a preoccupation with the conflict dimension of interactive phenomena. Thus, it is not surprising that a comparison of the data on power distribution more closely resembled those on force than those on bargaining. To be sure, all but 3 texts had a higher proportion of their paragraphs coded in a force than in a hierarchical context, but at the same time all but 2 placed at least twice as much emphasis on power distribution than on bargaining; in 11 cases the stress on hierarchical distinctions was at least 6 times greater. Indeed, as indicated by the mean figures for columns (3) and (6) in Table 22, the texts even tended to pay slightly greater attention to the distribution of power and authority than to processes of cooperation.

This imbalance in the direction of conflict, force, and hierarchy is easier to explain than to justify. The advent of World War II led to a great stress on "realism" in the study and teaching of IR, on recognizing that international actors are often aggressive and self-serving in their behavior, and the cold-war period of the 1950's and 1960's perpetuated and legitimized the presumption that the central tendencies in world politics move toward conflict. Indeed, one of the texts in our sample (Morgenthau) was a major stimulus to the ascendency and continued dominance of the realist school. Published first in 1948 and periodically republished in revised editions (the one in our sample is the fifth), *Politics Among Nations* so explicitly and cogently espoused "the theory of realism" and so effectively managed to place all the seemingly relevant phenomena of world politics in a realist framework that it came to dominate introductory teaching in the field, reportedly being used far more widely than any other text throughout the 1950's and most of the 1960's. Our survey of syllabi reveals that this primary reliance on Morgenthau's text has come to an end, but the data in Table 22 make it no less clear that the influence of realist thinking continues to prevail.

Though the imbalance in the direction of conflict and force is thus understandable, it cannot be readily justified. Whatever the accuracy of the realist model in the past, it seems increasingly discrepant with the course of events. The cold war has abated and the interdependence of nations had increased considerably, thereby emphasizing the cooperative and bargaining processes through which international actors

settings (such as, for example, "the President is more powerful in foreign affairs than Congress").

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relate to each other. To be sure, nations still conflict and they still resort to force, but the dynamics of technology have shrunk the social, economic, and political distances that separate them, and have given rise to a vast array of new issues requiring cooperation over the conservation and distribution of resources. In recent years, the scope of world politics has been extended upward to the biosphere and downward to the ocean bottom, and in the process the realist model appears increasingly obsolete. Or at least it seems clear that students of IR will need as incisive a comprehension of the processes of cooperation as of the processes of conflict if they are to grasp either the immediate issues or the long-term trends of world affairs.

ARENAS OF ACTION AND INTERACTION

Additional evidence of the predominance of the realist model is provided by comparisons of the extent to which the texts "explicitly discussed or analyzed" the prime unit "in the realm of diplomacy," in "the military realm," in "the economic realm," and in "the realm of nongovernmental international relations." The data for these variables are presented in Table 23. Here it can be seen that much more attention is devoted to diplomatic and military issues or processes than to economic and nongovernmental questions. In roughly half the texts, more of the sample paragraphs were coded in the military than in the diplomatic realm, but in 22 a higher proportion was recorded in both of these realms than in the economic category. In all 26, more paragraphs were coded in these two realms than in the nongovernmental realm. More often than not, in fact, the proportions in the military and diplomatic categories were two and three times larger than those in, respectively, the economic and nongovernmental arenas. The key to these comparisons, it seems to us, is the relatively high degree of attention paid to the military aspects of IR. The attention devoted to diplomatic aspects could have been anticipated, given the viability of nation-states and their need to interact with each other through governmental channels,[46] but the equally extensive concentration on military matters seems inappropriate to a world in which economic and social interdependencies are mounting and attempts to achieve military resolutions of conflict are lessening. Such an imbalance, however, is quite consistent with the realist model, and thus leads us again to wonder whether the

[46] Indeed, one survey reports a slow but continuous growth between 1921 and 1970 of the space that IR textbooks devote to diplomacy. Cf. Elmer Plischke, "Treatment of 'Diplomacy' in International Relations Textbooks," *World Affairs*, xxxv (Spring 1973), 328–44.

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TABLE 23

PROPORTION OF 2,915 PARAGRAPHS FROM 26 TEXTS IN WHICH THE PRIME UNIT WAS ANALYZED IN 4 REALMS OF ACTION AND INTERACTION (IN PERCENTAGES)

Text	(*n*)	(1) *Diplomatic*	(2) *Military*	(3) *Economic*	(4) *Nongovernmental*
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	39	39	8	11
Bobrow	(31)	3	6	0	3
Coplin	(93)	59	32	26	11
Crabb	(166)	47	31	19	9
Deutsch	(62)	14	31	11	3
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	24	23	5	8
Duchacek	(128)	45	34	9	10
Edwards	(71)	23	21	6	14
Frankel	(59)	19	22	17	12
Hartmann	(216)	44	41	15	2
Holsti	(112)	42	39	21	6
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	52	35	22	13
Jordan	(78)	36	39	14	10
Legg-Morrison	(67)	36	30	22	27
Modelski	(106)	24	24	7	22
Morgan	(65)	15	15	0	5
Morgenthau	(147)	38	39	9	9
Organski	(174)	19	29	24	4
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	43	30	28	12
Puchala	(78)	33	27	30	13
Rosecrance	(77)	43	49	16	6
Schuman	(148)	46	41	24	9
Spanier	(80)	29	59	31	10
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	25	26	28	17
Stoessinger	(98)	29	32	20	1
Van Dyke	(142)	22	25	15	4
Mean		35	33	18	9

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available texts in the field are not somewhat out of phase with the emerging parameters of world politics.

Our content analysis also includes two domestic realms of action and interaction. One is a general arena in which paragraphs were coded in terms of whether the prime unit is "explicitly discussed or analyzed in the context of sociopolitical processes internal to nation-states." Internal governmental processes were excluded from this category but were included in a second domestic variable that differentiated paragraphs in terms of whether they "explicitly contain any mention of a policy-making process or a decision-making process."[47] At least two clear-cut tendencies became apparent in the data on these two variables. As can be seen in Table 24, most textwriters devoted more attention to internal nongovernmental processes than to governmental policy making. Not only did more paragraphs of 23 texts qualify for coding in the former than in the latter category, but 16 recorded at least twice as high a proportion in the nongovernmental arena as in the policy-making realm. This is perhaps a surprising finding, given the long-standing interest in foreign policy decision making and the recent prominence of bureaucratic models of policy making. On the other hand, it is quite consistent with the aforenoted tendency of the textwriters to place somewhat greater stress on interaction at the international level than on action at the national level. Indeed, a comparison of the data in Table 24 with those in columns (1) and (2) of Table 23 reveals that in 20 texts more paragraphs were coded in the diplomatic realm than in either the internal nongovernmental or policy-making arenas, and that the comparable figure for the military realm was 24 texts. In many instances, moreover, the proportions for the diplomatic and military realms were more than twice those recorded for either or both domestic arenas.[48]

VI. Some Summarizing Data

It seems clear that our data lend themselves to several interpretations; different readers planning to adopt IR texts will doubtlessly reach different conclusions as to which ones are most appropriate for their

[47] Our coding rules defined "policy making" as involving "interaction among role occupants of a specified unit designed to chart a course of action."

[48] These findings are also consistent with the impressions of Boulding and of Snyder, recorded a number of years ago. The former (fn. 7, p. 68) admonished textwriters for not concentrating more attention on internal sociological processes; the latter (fn. 7, pp. 473–75) stressed the need for more extensive consideration of foreign policy decision-making processes. Again their advice appears to have gone largely unheeded.

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TABLE 24

PROPORTION OF 2,915 PARAGRAPHS FROM 26 TEXTS IN WHICH THE ANALYSIS WAS CAST IN TERMS OF 2 DOMESTIC ARENAS (IN PERCENTAGES)

Text	(*n*)	(1) *Internal Nongovernmental Processes*	(2) *Internal Policy-Making Processes*
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	28	11
Bobrow	(31)	19	13
Coplin	(93)	9	15
Crabb	(166)	25	9
Deutsch	(62)	24	10
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	15	15
Duchacek	(128)	22	15
Edwards	(71)	13	13
Frankel	(59)	17	3
Hartmann	(216)	13	5
Holsti	(112)	20	6
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	13	20
Jordan	(78)	18	4
Legg-Morrison	(67)	22	10
Modelski	(106)	11	0
Morgan	(65)	12	15
Morgenthau	(147)	17	7
Organski	(174)	22	2
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	18	4
Puchala	(78)	26	3
Rosecrance	(77)	25	13
Schuman	(148)	32	13
Spanier	(80)	27	16
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	26	13
Stoessinger	(98)	7	4
Van Dyke	(142)	18	1
Mean		19	9

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courses. So as to facilitate such choices, we have developed a simple additive index that summarizes our data and provides a basis for comparing and evaluating the 26 texts. Our index is founded on 24 data points (listed in the Appendix, along with the weights used for each item). These are subdivided in terms of the three main dimensions around which the preceding analysis has been organized, i.e., the provision of tools, the stimuli to knowledge, and the expression of knowledge. The 24 data points comprise roughly half of our indicators, and we believe that they offer a good composite picture of each dimension as well as of the three taken together.

The data generated by the index are summarized in Table 25.[49] In it, the weighted scores (expressed in percentages) for each dimension are presented along with the overall score for each text. The texts are rank-ordered in terms of their overall scores.

It is important to stress at the outset that interpretation of the index scores must be in comparative rather than in value terms. The range of 0 to 100 offers a standardized yardstick for comparing the quality of the 26 texts in our sample, but it does not allow for judgments based on absolute criteria. Theoretically the "ideal" text would record a score approaching 100 percent. Plainly, it is unrealistic to expect scores at such a high level (since it would be unwieldy to an extreme to write paragraphs that contain all 24 components of the index); at the same time it is not feasible to specify exactly what scores would constitute a desirable level (since styles can vary as to the length and scope of paragraphs).

[49] The index was constructed according to the following formula:

$$\frac{\sum_{p=1}^{N}\left[\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{4} T_i}{4} + \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{5} S_j}{5} + \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{15} E_k}{15}\right]}{3N} \times 100$$

where T is the sum of all the "tools" variables across all paragraphs, S is the sum of all the "stimuli" variables across all paragraphs, E is the sum of all "expression of knowledge" variables across all paragraphs, and N is the number of paragraphs sampled from the text. We chose to construct the index in this fashion for three reasons. First, we wanted the index scores for each of the three dimensions to range from 0 to 100. The index scores are therefore an average of percentages for each dimension relative to the number of paragraphs. Second, the index treats each of the three major components of an IR text as equal by dividing by the number of items that make up each category. Some may view this as a questionable assumption, but it is quite difficult if not impossible to make a case for differential weighting of the three categories. Third, we controlled for book length by dividing the index score by $3N$, thereby avoiding unintentional weighting of variables according to the number of items included in the index.

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On the other hand, comparisons among the texts and the three dimensions can be readily undertaken on the basis of the index scores. To be sure, the overall scores have a narrow range, from a high of 35 percent to a low of 15 percent (giving rise to a standard deviation of 4.2). In some respects, of course, this narrow range constitutes a major finding on which we shall shortly comment. At the same time, despite the narrowness of the differences, we are persuaded that our index has yielded enough variability to allow for several useful summarizing observations. It is interesting, for example, to compare the index scores and the syllabi data on usage presented in Table 1. Of the 4 texts most frequently assigned, 2 (Holsti and Coplin) rank among the top 3 on the index and one (Coplin) ranks highest. Of the 3 next most frequently used texts, 2 (Spanier and Puchala) are also among those near the top of the rankings. In other words, although text usage in the field is far from dominated by one or two texts, those that rank high on our index tend to be among those most widely used by IR instructors. This finding is further supported by a comparison of the index scores and the data in Table 3, where a similar pattern can be discerned. Of the top 9 texts, 4 are among the 29 assigned or suggested sources that appear in 11 or more of the 178 syllabi.

Turning now to the three components of the index, the scores on individual tools, stimuli to learning, and expression of knowledge are quite instructive. Consider, first, the tools section. We believe that the ideal introductory text in IR should provide the student with a capacity to do more advanced work in the field and to understand world affairs long after graduating from college. To our minds, it is more important to present concepts and perspectives through which "facts" are given meaning rather than to present the "facts" alone. Thus the provision of analytic tools is quite central to our evaluation. Practically all 26 texts received relatively high scores on this indicator. The mean (27 percent) for the provision of analytic tools was higher than that of the other two components of our index. Indeed, 15 texts registered a score above the mean. And the standard deviation (5 percent) was the lowest recorded. Two reasons come to mind as helping to explain these comparatively high scores. We noted earlier that textwriters tend to take seriously the admonition often directed toward students—"Define your terms." This tendency toward explicit definitions increased the score for tools. Also, two important tools—"Are there data generation and analysis techniques cited?"—were omitted from the composite index because we presumed that these techniques may be learned in other disciplines and in more advanced IR courses. Had these variables been included,

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TABLE 25

COMPOSITE INDEX SCORES FOR 26 IR TEXTS ALONG 3 DIMENSIONS AND OVERALL (IN PERCENTAGES)

Text	*Number of Paragraphs Sampled*	*Rank*	(1) *Overall Scores*	(2) *Individual Tools*	(3) *Stimuli to Learning*	(4) *Expression of Knowledge*
Coplin	(93)	(1)	35	34	37	32
Dougherty-Pfaltzgraff	(88)	(2)	29	31	28	21
Holsti	(112)	(3)	28	31	17	35
Spanier	(80)	(3)	28	23	21	34
Morgan	(65)	(5)	26	33	27	18
Axline-Stegenga	(36)	(6)	25	33	14	27
Edwards	(71)	(6)	25	33	21	20
Hopkins-Mansbach	(158)	(6)	25	24	22	30
Puchala	(78)	(6)	25	32	16	27
Duchacek	(128)	(10)	24	27	18	23
Deutsch	(62)	(11)	23	29	13	28
Legg-Morrison	(67)	(11)	23	29	11	29
Bobrow	(31)	(13)	22	34	21	10
Crabb	(166)	(13)	22	21	19	26
Frankel	(59)	(13)	22	31	14	21
Rosecrance	(77)	(13)	22	26	8	32
Sprout-Sprout	(163)	(13)	22	29	16	23
Modelski	(106)	(18)	21	31	11	21
Van Dyke	(142)	(18)	21	28	15	20
Jordan	(78)	(20)	20	22	16	26
Schuman	(148)	(20)	20	21	12	28
Morgenthau	(147)	(22)	19	28	9	20
Organski	(174)	(22)	19	28	8	22
Palmer-Perkins	(272)	(22)	19	18	13	26
Hartmann	(216)	(25)	16	20	7	21
Stoessinger	(98)	(26)	15	15	10	19
		$\bar{x}$ =	23	27	16	25
		SD =	4	5	7	6

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undoubtedly they would have reduced the tools scores, since we found them to be conspicuous by their absence from the texts (with the striking exception of Bobrow). Even without the benefit of these indicators, it is noteworthy that Bobrow's text shared, with Coplin, the highest score on tools.

Whereas the tools section received relatively high scores, the opposite is true for the indicators on stimuli to learning. With Coplin as a major exception, the texts scored uniformly low on the elusive but important learning-stimuli indicators. Of course, the argument can readily be made that the acquisition, reinforcement, and enlargement of motivations for learning is not easily accomplished through the medium of an IR text. Many might even say that it is futile to rely on texts as a means of raising aspirations. We dissent. As stated earlier, we believe that to ponder knowledge and its inexactness, rather than to memorize it, will result in more curiosity about how and why events unfold as they do. Apparently, however, ours is a minority position. Our index indicates that the majority of writers of IR texts assume that their introductory students are sufficiently motivated and curious about IR phenomena. How else can one explain the strikingly low stimuli scores? Here the mean score (16 percent) was considerably below the other mean scores. Only 10 texts received a score above the mean.

It is interesting to speculate why the score of Coplin's text is considerably higher than the others on the learning-stimuli indicators. One possible explanation of Coplin's concern with the motivation and curiosity of students may lie in the fact that his text, in manuscript form, was subjected to fairly extensive pre-testing in a number of introductory IR classes before publication. Indeed, one of this article's junior authors participated in an introductory IR class in which the Coplin manuscript was used. Students were encouraged to provide feedback as to their impressions of the text's adequacy, and many did so. The argument can be made, then, that Coplin's text, as a result of the pre-testing, is more in touch with the realities of the classroom environment and the lack of interest in IR on the part of many students. This speculation, of course, does not account for the relatively low scores registered by the other texts since, among other things, we do not know the extent to which they were extensively pre-tested. Our only recourse, at this time, is to re-emphasize the alarming neglect of motivational considerations.

As for the third component of our index, scores for expression of knowledge were noticeably higher than those for stimuli to learning, but slightly lower than those for tools. That is not surprising. After all,

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we might expect that the provision of substantive materials would be a primary objective of many IR textwriters. The scores of 13 texts were above the mean, and the standard deviation (6 percent) indicated a relatively close grouping. While no single text dominated this category, there is one (Bobrow) that scored exceedingly low. This is surprising, given Bobrow's scores on tools and stimuli; but perhaps it is understandable in view of the "new approaches" orientation of his text. In general, however, the restricted range and relatively low index scores, in conjunction with our earlier findings, support the arguments (1) that IR texts vary slightly in terms of emphasis on substantive materials, and (2) that a cumulated body of established findings and shared understandings remains beyond our current grasp.

The above observations concerning the lack of variability, the relatively low component scores, and the small mean values for individual index elements apply to the composite index as well. The overall mean score (23 percent) reemphasizes, once again, our central contention that the 26 IR texts, when reviewed systematically along a variety of dimensions, fall far short of the ideal. The lowest-scoring text (Stoessinger) was separated by 20 percentage points from the highest-ranked text (Coplin). The top ten texts were separated by only 11 percentage points. The scores, in short, suggest that the 26 texts, with some notable exceptions, just do not differ from one another in any appreciable degree with respect to our terms of reference. Our analysis clearly indicates that the IR instructor in search of a good text has a small field from which to choose. No one text suffices. Rather, our analysis would recommend the use of various combinations of texts that maximize certain desirable qualities. Some instructors, for example, may choose to assign a text such as Spanier's, which scored comparatively high (34 percent) on the expression of knowledge variables, in conjunction with Bobrow's brief but succinct "new approaches" text, while others may simply choose one of the highest-ranked texts and augment it with relevant outside reading.

These examples are offered as suggestive of how our analysis and index can be utilized, and should not be interpreted as saying that a combination of Spanier and Bobrow is best for use in the IR classroom. On the contrary, notwithstanding the many value judgments offered throughout the analysis, we recognize that there is no single best way to teach IR or to write a text about it. Our inquiry discloses that all is not well in the teaching of IR, but improvement can be achieved in a variety of ways, and thus we are not so presumptuous as to conclude

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with pronouncements as to which texts ought to be favored. Rather, we derive satisfaction from having raised more questions than we have answered and, in so doing, having called attention to some of the premises and promises that teachers and textwriters alike may want to follow or avoid as they go about their respective tasks.

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Appendix

24 Variables (and the Weights Attached to the Responses) Included in the Composite Index for 26 IR Texts

I. Acquisition of Tools and Skills

A. value explicitness
- 1 yes
- 0 no

B. other disciplines
- 1 yes
- 0 no

C. prime unit defined
- 1 yes
- 0 no

D. time or space
- 0 yes
- 1 no

II. Stimuli to Learning

A. status of knowledge
- 1 yes
- 0 no

B. content self-evident
- 0 yes
- 1 no

C. sources presented
- 1 yes
- 0 no

D. alternative explanations
- 1 yes
- 0 no

E. probabilistic terms
- 1 yes
- 0 no

III. Expression of Knowledge

A. prime unit has consequences
- 1 yes
- 0 no

B. prime unit behavior
- 1 yes
- 0 no

C. prime unit behavior varies
- 1 yes
- 0 no

D. interaction sequence
- 1 yes
- 0 no

E. presence of goals
- 1 yes
- 0 no

F. goals vary
- 1 yes
- 0 no

G. prime unit has causes
- 1 yes
- 0 no

H. cooperation present
- 1 yes
- 0 no

I. economic realm
- 1 yes
- 0 no

J. nongovernmental realm
- 1 yes
- 0 no

K. internal processes
- 1 yes
- 0 no

L. policy-making process
- 1 yes
- 0 no

M. future cited
- 1 yes
- 0 no

N. history present
- 0 yes
- 1 no

O. individuals, subnational groups, nation-states, international organizations—generalized
- 1 yes
- 0 no

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

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